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This dissertation evaluates the applicability of Elinor Ostrom’s theory of the commons to 
other forms of collective action by mapping it on a case study of the Oromia Coffee 
Farmers Cooperative Union in Ethiopia and its efforts to overcome the vast disparities 
that have long structured the global coffee commodity chain (the “Coffee Paradox”).  The 
conclusions I draw are the following.  While Ostrom’s theory has serious omissions, it 
also sheds much needed light on the struggles of Ethiopia’s coffee farmers to overcome 
their poverty.  Both the design principles that Ostrom identifies for governance rules and 
her list of predictors for successful common property resource management institutions 
suggest that Ethiopia’s coffee cooperatives could be in peril.  However, by expanding 
Ostrom’s governance framework to incorporate a broader enabling role for governments 
as well as supportive roles for civic organizations, NGOs, and social movements, we see 
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It took a global crisis for anyone to point to the dismal state of the dismal science. The 
heroes of the mainstream economics profession and supporters of free markets and 
financial regulation were forced to admit mistakes. The bail-outs and recovery 
programmes have been multibillion-dollar lessons that mainstream economics is 
unrealistic. Economists such as Keynes and Minsky came to the fore again to explain the 
crisis. It is time that the economics perspectives of nonmainstream economists are given 
an ear (Mohamed 2010).  
 
 
In 2009, Elinor Ostrom won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, becoming the first 
woman to do so in the forty-year history of the award.  When the Nobel committee 
announced their landmark decision, they stated that Ostrom, who is actually a political 
scientist by trade, won the prize “for her analysis of economic governance, especially the 
commons” (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 2009).  Beginning with her 1990 
magnum opus, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action, Ostrom’s research career has focused on challenging the argument that groups 
cannot use and manage natural resources collectively and sustainably.  In other words, 
Ostrom’s research shows that the “tragedy of the commons” is actually not such a                                                            
tragedy, but a problem—one that many communities all over the world have been solving 
for centuries. 
Ostrom won the Nobel Prize during a time when the broader public, overwhelmed by 
the encroaching front of existing environmental problems, has been ripe for hearing her 
message.  Instead of the widespread but stale belief that solving our environmental 
 2 
problems is limited to two very disparate paths—the market or the state
1
—Ostrom’s 
research has the potential to empower people and communities to collectively devise 
solutions to these pressing issues.   
What is less known about Ostrom’s work, even in academic circles, is that her 
underlying purpose has long been to develop a broad theory of collective action, one that 
moves beyond the cases of communities managing watersheds and forests, to other 
examples of group self-organization.  “My choice of the CPR [common-pool resource] 
environment for intensive study was based on a presumption that I could learn about the 
processes of self-organization and self-governance of relevance to a somewhat broader 
set of environments” (Ostrom 1990, 27).  Furthermore,   
What is missing from the policy analyst’s tool kit—and from the set of 
accepted, well-developed theories of human organization—is an 
adequately specified theory of collective action whereby a group of 
principals can organize themselves voluntarily to retain the residuals of 
their own efforts…I hope this inquiry will contribute to the development 
of an empirically supported theory of self-organizing and self-governing 
forms of collective action  (Ostrom 1990, 25). 
 
If Ostrom’s claim is true, that the framework she developed for her research on the 
environmental commons can be applied to other examples of collective action, then her 
work has the potential to shape debates about the disheartening state of our economy and 
the burgeoning efforts to build economic alternatives that enhance the well-being of 
people and the environment.   
The fallout from the global financial crisis, dovetailing with the longer-term 
overgrowth of a neoliberal varietal of globalization, has created a public cry for 
fundamental changes in our economic system.   
                                                 
1 Either the market will achieve the best possible outcome via private property rights or the market is so 
addled with inefficiencies that environmental quality can only be achieved by state regulation. 
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This wake-up call is inspiring unprecedented numbers of people to take 
action to bring forth the culture and institutions of a new economy that can 
serve us and sustain our living planet for generations into the future                
(David Korten 2010). 
 
Ostrom’s set of ideas could very well contribute to the development of a “new economy.”  
In the spring 2010 issue of Yes! Magazine, which was essentially an homage to Elinor 
Ostrom, Jay Walljasper, former editor of the Utne Reader and a contributor to 
onthecommons.org, described her Nobel win as a milestone for the “emergence of a 
commons-based society” (Walljasper 2010).
2
   
As exciting as Ostrom’s work is, and as hopeful as the prospect of applying her 
theory to the development of a different kind of economy is, we should be mindful of its 
limitations when using it.  There is a genuine risk that communities will become the new 
panacea,
3
 which puts the onus for devising economic solutions
4
 on people rather than 
their governments (or the market) and ignores the fact that communities can be parochial 
and harbor bigotry (Bowles and Gintis 2002).  Thus, before we indiscriminately apply 
Ostrom’s theory of the commons to other forms of collective action, we need to think 
carefully about the feasibility and implications for doing so.   
Beyond the commons, Ostrom identifies cooperatives as one of the main forms of 
collective action that can and should be included in her comprehensive framework 
(Ostrom 1990, 25).  That claim is what this dissertation will explore.   
 
                                                 
2 The magazine also published Ostrom’s “8 Keys to a Successful Commons,” and Fran Korten, the 
magazine’s editor, conducted a feature interview with Ostrom. 
 
3 For the record, Ostrom is very clear that that there are no panaceas, but that does not negate the possibility 
of other people treating community-level solutions as such. 
 
4 This is true of environmental solutions as well. 
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To what extent does Ostrom’s theory of CPR governance elucidate our understanding 
cooperatives?  
 
I answer this question by demonstrating what Ostrom’s theory looks like in a 
particular cooperative setting—a union of coffee farmers cooperatives in the Oromia 
region of Ethiopia—and evaluate the ways in which the features that are important and 
necessary for CPR institutions explain the achievements and struggles of Oromia 
cooperatives.     
The International Cooperative Alliance (ICA)—the main organizing body of the 
global cooperative movement—defines cooperatives as “autonomous associations of 
persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and 
aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise” 
(International Cooperative Alliance 2009).  In other words, cooperatives are formed, 
owned, and controlled by groups of people for the purpose of producing, selling, and/or 
buying.
5
   
By grouping cooperatives with CPR institutions, Ostrom is arguing that, like CPR 
institutions, cooperatives are forms of collective action.  Ostrom defines collective action 
as occurring when two or more people act collectively to achieve a common goal, which 
is to say, to solve an initial free-rider problem, like the “Tragedy of the Commons.”  But, 
the institutions that arise from the collective action are themselves public goods, which 
thereby create new free-riding opportunities.  Thus, any viable group effort, in solving 
their initial collective action problem, must simultaneously solve the secondary free-
riding problems.  
                                                 




By linking them theoretically, Ostrom is saying that both CPR institutions and 
cooperatives conform to this definition of collective action.  Thus, both are using 
institutional governance to solve free-rider problems, and both must overcome the free-
riding problems that arise from the group effort itself.  Other similarities to note: first, the 
institutions themselves are nested within broader institutional governance (locally and at 
the state level) and market contexts that both support and pose challenges beyond their 
group interactions; and second, both have broader, longer-term goals of securing 
sustainable livelihood security.  
At this point, the comparison between CPR institutions and cooperatives becomes 
more complicated.  While both institutions are solving collective action (free-riding 
problems), they diverge in terms of the nature of those problems and the specific 
mechanisms with which they solve them.   
To be specific, CPR institutions essentially transform open-access resources into 
common property through the elaborate design and enforcement of informal rules.  
“Hardin’s parable hence is better termed the ‘tragedy of open access,’ referring to free-
for-all situations where rules for the joint use of common property do not exist” (Boyce 
2002, 8).  The collective action of CPR institutions, then, is the appropriation, creation, 
management and protection of a certain bundle of property rights for the sustainable, 
group management of a particular natural resource.  
In terms of Oromia’s coffee cooperatives, collective action does not necessarily 
center on managing a natural resource via property rights.
6
  I argue that instead, they are 
                                                 
6 Although, managing natural resources might be a secondary function.   
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using their collective agency and power to overcome what Daviron and Ponte (2005) call 
the “Coffee Paradox.”   
Not only were Northern coffee drinkers blissfully unaware of a devastating “coffee 
crisis” that smallholder coffee farmers in the global South experienced from 1999 to 
2005, in the global North, there was actually a “coffee boom” occurring.   
The coffee market has gone through a ‘latte revolution,’ where consumers 
can choose from (and pay dearly for) hundreds of combinations of coffee 
variety, origin, brewing, and grinding methods, flavoring, packaging, 
‘social content’, and ambience.  Retail coffee prices continue to rise in the 
specialty market […] At the same time, coffee farmers receive prices 
below the cost of production (Daviron and Ponte 2005, xvi).   
  
Daviron and Ponte argue that instead of interpreting this juxtaposition as simply a 
disparity in who controls market share, it is better understood in terms of the ability to 
“define the ‘identity’ of a coffee—in other words to set the language and the reference 
values that determine production norms and quality standards” (Daviron and Ponte: xvii).  
I will demonstrate that the “Coffee Paradox” is an extremely befitting way to frame 
the collective action of Oromia’s coffee cooperatives.  Nowhere did the coffee crisis hit 
harder than in Ethiopia, the very birthplace of coffee.  Here the farmers were already a 
few price points away from starvation; they rely on coffee not just for income, but also 
for deep cultural sustenance and connection; and they grow some of the most reputed 
coffees in the world.  These poor coffee farmers have had no control over the valuable 
attributes of their supreme coffees, and, thus, the price they are receiving is well-below 
the “true” value of their coffees. 
Thus, rather than solving the “Tragedy of the Commons,” the free-rider problem that 
Oromia’s coffee farmers are working to solve is the “Coffee Paradox.”  Rather than 
instituting property rights, the collective action of coffee cooperatives entails the creation, 
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appropriation, management and/or protection of a certain bundle of their coffees 
attributes.  Defining the collective action of Oromia coffee cooperatives in terms of the 
“Coffee Paradox,” we can then ascertain whether Ostrom’s theory offers a 
comprehensive enough explanation of the successes and/or failures of their efforts. 
The conclusions I draw are the following.   In profound ways, Ostrom’s theory sheds 
much needed light on the struggles of Ethiopia’s coffee farmers to overcome their 
poverty and nourish their families and communities.  The design principles that she 
identifies for CPR governance rules suggest that Ethiopia’s coffee cooperatives could 
strengthen their sense of proprietorship over their organizations if they first played a 
larger role in writing their own governance rules.  Her list of predictors for successful 
CPR institutions validate what Ethiopian activists have long been saying, that civic 
organizations cannot play an authentic role in the governance of their society underfoot a 
government that does not recognize the basic democratic rights of its citizens.  
Ostrom’s theory is a major methodological contribution to the social sciences.  Her 
understanding of the role and limitations of economic theory is profound.  The style of 
her theory, a “list of ingredients” if you will, is accessible and even democratic—
something any idealistic and capable cooperative organizer could pick up and understand 
(as opposed to the formal models of economists written for each other or, at best, for 
policymakers).   
Ostrom’s theory, however, also has some egregious omissions, which makes it a less 
than comprehensive framework of Oromia’s coffee cooperatives.  For example, she does 
not address issues of power disparities or the ways that inequality in general manifests in 
collective action.  Inequality between those who control valuable coffee attributes and 
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those who do not is what perpetuates the “Coffee Paradox,” but in coffee cooperatives’ 
attempts to close this “social distance” (Boyce 2002), other forms of social inequality are 
reproduced.  (So too with CPR institutions.)   
In addition, Ostrom’s viewpoint on the state’s role in collective action governance is 
overly narrow.  For cooperatives to succeed, governments must nurture an enabling 
environment through carefully established laws and direct support to farmers in 
overcoming market failures (e.g. imperfect credit markets) that are beyond their capacity 
to solve independently.  Furthermore, Ostrom pays inadequate attention to other levels of 
governance. She makes no mention of the roles that civic organizations, NGOs, and 
social movements might play.  These other types of governance are all important in 
empowering Ethiopia’s coffee farmers, especially within the context of such an 
authoritarian government.   
Finally, although Ostrom’s view of economic rationality is much broader than what 
has been canonized in mainstream economics, she fails to articulate or theorize any 
degree of altruistic intentions—for example, Amartya Sen’s (1977) concepts of sympathy 
and commitment—that have the potential to help groups overcome free-rider problems 
and are, at least to some extent, present in the coffee cooperative setting.  Social justice 
activists, whose actions have undoubtedly altruistic underpinnings, have long been 
working to support cooperative struggles.  Oromia’s cooperatives in particular can only 
be fully understood in light of broad efforts—especially since the coffee crisis—of the 
global justice movement’s efforts to build alternative trade paradigms 
 Incorporating Elinor Ostrom’s theory of collective action into cooperative analyses is 
an important step in improving cooperative research.  Instead of assuming cooperatives 
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are inefficient because of free-rider problems, we can think about how some cooperatives 
overcome these.  Furthermore, Ostrom’s work forces us to ask ourselves about what 
theory is, what its role should be, and for whom we are constructing it.  And the 
shortcomings of her theory are by no means fatal; they simply need to be accounted for to 
better tell the cooperative story.   
 
Overview of the Following Chapters 
Chapter 2 “Detaining Potential: Economic Theories of Collective Action” provides the 
impetus for this dissertation, which is that the existing economic models of cooperatives 
are insufficient and misguided.   
I do this by, first, describing what Ostrom cites as the main collective action theories 
that are paradigmatic in economics and her critiques of them.  I also discuss Ostrom’s 
objection that the aforementioned collective action theories are misused because of the 
confusion within economics on the distinction between a theory and a model.  In the 
second section, I present a literature review of the economic models of cooperatives.  
Finally, I provide my own argument that the problems of the models discussed in this 
chapter stem from their use of rational choice theory to describe human behavior, which 
is ultimately a distorted assumption for understanding the motivations, values, and 
capacities of cooperative members.  
The purpose of Chapter 3, “Internalizing ‘Social Distance’: Cooperatives and the 
Global Justice Movement,” is to contrast the mainstream economic approach to 
cooperatives with a social movement perspective by locating them both in the current 
movement to combat corporate-centric globalization and the older cooperative movement 
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to battle industrial capitalism.  Instead of simply another institutional means with which 
to achieve Pareto efficiency, these movements portray cooperatives as a symbol of, and a 
mechanism for building, democracy and equality.  Because cooperatives come in a wide 
variety of forms, a second purpose of this chapter is to elucidate their complexity by 
providing a brief historical account that identifies the various types of cooperatives.  
Chapter 4, “Ostrom’s Theory of Collective Action” gives a detailed presentation of 
Ostrom’s work, drawn mainly from Governing the Commons, but supplemented with 
several of her other publications.  First, I argue that Ostrom’s greatest contribution to the 
social sciences (and heterodox economics) is her interdisciplinary methodology that fuses 
theoretical and empirical practices. Second, I define CPRs and discuss one CPR scenario 
in great detail.  Third, I present the details of Ostrom’s theory of collective action.  The 
final section provides my critique of her theory, alluded to earlier in this chapter.  
Chapters 5 and 6 provide my case study.  In chapter 5, I present “Part 1: The Political 
Economy of the Coffee.”  Although coffee is similar to other food commodities in many 
ways, there arguably is no global commodity industry that contains such vast power 
disparities as the coffee trade.  Because of these inequities, the global justice movement 
and cooperatives play a central role in the battle to weaken corporate hegemony in the 
global coffee trade.  For example, trade alternatives, especially Fair Trade, are arising as 
a different route than the conventional global coffee commodity market that leaves so 
many small coffee farmers vulnerable to poverty.  There is no better example of 
cooperatives battling global market forces than the vast uprising of coffee farmer 
cooperatives across the global South.  
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Chapter 5 provides a detailed picture of the global coffee industry, including its early 
history, its policy narrative, and the uneven impacts of the coffee crisis on coffee farmers 
and coffee producing countries.  It then describes in detail Daviron and Ponte’s (2005) 
concept of the “Coffee Paradox,” and their framework of material, symbolic, and in-
person service attributes that we can use to define the collective action of Oromia’s 
coffee cooperatives.  I then describe the prominent alternative trade paradigm being 
developed in response to the coffee crisis, as well as the mainstreaming debate brewing 
within Fair Trade about its trajectory and how it can be most beneficial to coffee farmers.  
Finally, I use this discussion to further specify the nature of collective action for coffee 
farmer cooperatives, which weighs on the mainstreaming debate. 
There are several reasons why I have chosen Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative 
Union (OCFCU) as the focus of my case study (Chapter 6, “Case Study Part 2: The 
Political Economy of the Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union,”).  First, its 
leadership has played a pivotal role in Ethiopia’s impressive cooperative renaissance of 
the past decade (a revival made even more remarkable in light of the country’s sordid 
cooperative history).  Second, as the “stars” of the documentary film Black Gold, 
OCFCU has become a symbol of coffee farmers’ worldwide efforts to overcome the 
devastating impact of the coffee crisis by forming cooperatives.  
The chapter tells the story of OCFCU, which begins with the history of the country’s 
cooperatives, continues to the challenges and opportunities of Ethiopia’ coffee sector, and 
ends with the birth and growth of the most successful cooperative union in Ethiopia. 
In Chapter 7, “Understanding Cooperative Governance: Lessons from Oromia,” the 
final chapter of this dissertation, I assess the extent to which Ostrom’s theory of CPR 
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institutions can explain the collective action of Oromia coffee cooperatives.  The first 
section compares CPR institutions and Oromia coffee cooperatives, while also defining 
the collective action of Oromia’s coffee cooperatives in terms of Daviron and Ponte’s 
(2005) the “Coffee Paradox.”  The second section provides examples of Oromia’s 
collective action, defined in terms of the attribute framework that Daviron and Ponte 
(2005) present for overcoming the “Coffee Paradox.” The third section describes the 
secondary free-rider problems that could arise from these examples of collective action.  
The fourth section evaluates the Oromia and Ethiopian evidence and draws some 
preliminary conclusions, arguing that many of OCFCU’s cooperatives (and Ethiopia’s 
cooperatives in general) could be in peril.  The fifth section reintroduces a discussion of 
Ostrom’s theory, and my critiques.  The final section provides some recommendations 
based on the results derived from this analysis, regarding both the use of Ostrom’s theory 
to interpret the collective action of Oromia cooperatives and my broadening of it to 
reflect inequality considerations and the role that broader forms of governance play in 
Oromia’s collective action struggles.    
 
Conclusion 
In a recent New York Times blog entry, Nancy Folbre suggests “another economics is 
now under way” (Folbre 2010).  One of the main cornerstones of the burgeoning effort to 
build this new economy is, indeed, cooperatives.   
The task of developing a new economy, one that fully reflects humanity’s concerns 
and capabilities, is not simple, especially with current economic tools that are 
“fragmentary and incomplete and not yet adequate to the task of institutional design 
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(Folbre 2010).  By focusing on Elinor Ostrom’s work and by carefully studying 
cooperatives, it is my hope and intention that this dissertation contributes to this growing 













The purpose of this chapter is to explain and critique mainstream economic approaches to 
collective action in general, and to cooperatives in particular, in order to make the 
argument that developing an improved economic framework of cooperatives is 
imperative.   
I do this by, first, describing what Ostrom cites as the main collective action theories 
that are paradigmatic in economics and her critiques of them.  I also discuss Ostrom’s 
objection that the aforementioned collective action theories are misused because of the 
confusion within economics on the distinction between a theory and a model.  In the 
second section, I present a literature review of the economic models of cooperatives.  
Finally, I provide my own argument that the problems of the models discussed in this 
chapter stem from their use of ration choice theory to describe human behavior, which is 
ultimately a distorted assumption for understanding the motivations, values, and 
capacities of cooperative members.  
 
Economic Models of Collective Action 
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Ostrom argues that there are three models that are the basis of current economic thinking 
on collective action: Mancur Olson’s Theory of Collective Action, Hardin’s “Tragedy of 
the Commons,” and the prisoner’s dilemma. 
 Before Olson’s 1965 thesis, it was widely assumed across the social sciences that 
individuals can and will achieve the best possible outcome for the group (Azfar 2001).  
Olson’s central argument was a counter to that supposition.  “Even if all of the 
individuals in a large group are rational and self-interested, and would gain if, as a group, 
they acted to achieve their common interest or objective, they will still not voluntarily act 
to achieve that common or group interest” (Olson 1965, 2).  Individuals might benefit 
from clean air, for example, but their desire to maximize their individual well-being 
limits their willingness to contribute to the collective good,
7
 “unless there is coercion to 
force them to do so” (Olson 1965, 2). 
 Hardin’s 1968 article “The Tragedy of the Commons” has, of course, become the 
most commonly referenced in an extensive history of arguments concluding that humans, 
left to their own devices, will inevitably destroy natural resources.  Hardin’s most famous 
passage is the following: 
Picture a pasture open to all.  It is to be expected that each herdsman will 
try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons.  Such an 
arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because 
tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast 
well below the carrying capacity of the land.  Finally, however, comes the 
day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social 
stability becomes a reality.  At this point, the inherent logic of the 
commons remorselessly generates tragedy (Hardin 1968, 1244). 
 
Not only has Hardin’s article been used to advocate population control, which was, in 
fact, the original purpose of the article, but it also has been frequently wielded on both 
                                                 
7 This is the definition of “free-riding” behavior. 
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sides of the private property/free market versus state ownership/regulation debate (see 
Smith 1981 and Percival 1992, respectively).   
Finally, according to Ostrom, the third most commonly used collective action model 
is the prisoner’s dilemma, which articulates that two hypothetical prisoners will 
simultaneously choose a “non-cooperative solution.”  Both prisoners are better off if 
neither betrays the other, but the incentive immediate to each (a shorter jail sentence) is 
to, in fact, betray their partner.  (The prisoner’s dilemma is often used to formally 
illustrate Hardin’s tragedy of the commons—see Hanley et al. 1997 as an example.)   
What Ostrom finds problematic about collective action theory is not these models per 
se, but the way they are brandished. 
When models are used as metaphors, an author usually points to the 
similarity between one or two variables in a natural setting and one or two 
variables in a model.  If calling attention to similarities is all that is 
intended by the metaphor, it serves the usual purpose of rapidly conveying 
information in graphic form (Ostrom 1990, 7-8).   
 
Yet, these models are used for policy-setting.  In other words, it is assumed that only the 
state can change fixed or exogenous variables, which crowds out collective action efforts 
and essentially imprisons citizen power and agency.   
The prisoners in the famous dilemma cannot change the constraints 
imposed on them by the district attorney; they are in jail.  Not all users of 
natural resources are similarly incapable of changing their constraints.  As 
long as individuals are viewed as prisoners, policy prescriptions will 
address this metaphor (Ostrom 1990, 7).   
 
A poignant example is the following:  
Nationalizing the ownership of forests in Third World countries, for 
example, has been advocated on the grounds that local villagers cannot 
manage forests so as to sustain their productivity and their value in 
reducing soil erosion.  In countries where small villages had owned and 
regulated their local communal forests for generations, nationalization 
meant expropriation.  In such localities, villagers had earlier exercised 
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considerable restraint over the rate and manner of harvesting forest 
products.  In some of these countries, national agencies issued elaborate 
regulations concerning the use of forests, but were unable to employ 
sufficient numbers of foresters to enforce those regulations.  The foresters 
who were employed were paid such low salaries that accepting bribes 
became a common means of supplementing their income (Ostrom 1990, 
23).   
 
In this example, it is the assumption that local villagers are powerless and incapable of 
working together to decide governance rules for usage—and the subsequent state 
intervention and control —that opened the borders to a tragedy of overuse.  
Ostrom’s critique stems from what she argues should be a clear distinction between a 
model and a theory.  Theories or frameworks (will refer to them interchangeably 
throughout this dissertation) are meant to be general or universally applicable.  Models, 
on the other hand, are for application in very specific contexts.  The problem with 
mainstream economic methodology in general, and the collective action models 
discussed above, is they are taken as theories even though they carry with them the 
assumption that certain variables are fixed.  As we saw above, this can undermine the 
goals of the policymakers, not to mention the “recipients” of the policies.   
Theories, on the other hand, are loose associations of variables that “relate whole 
families of models together” (Ostrom 1990, 192).  
They point to the set of variables and the types of relationship among 
variables that need to be examined in conducting any theoretical or 
empirical study of a particular type of phenomenon.  From a framework, 
one does not derive precise prediction.  From a framework, one derives the 
questions that need to be asked to clarify the structure of a situation and 
the incentives facing individuals (Ostrom 1990, 192). 
 
“Once the incentives are clarified”—in other words, once the framework is applied to 
a specific context—“the theorist can analyze a situation and predict likely behavior in 
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terms of choice of strategy and the consequences that are likely to result” (Ostrom 1990, 
192).  
How does Ostrom’s critique of mainstream collective action theories apply to 
economic models of cooperatives?  After presenting a literature review of these models, 
this chapter will answer this question.    
 
Economic Models of Cooperatives 
The Mystery of the Disappearing Cooperatives 
Providing a review of economic literature on cooperatives is a somewhat paradoxical 
exercise, as it first requires a discussion about cooperatives’ pervasive absence in the 
literature.  For example, despite cooperatives’ growing presence in today’s economy 
(described in the following chapter), both Hill (2000) and Kalmi (2007) argue that the 
majority of today’s economists perceive cooperatives as entirely nonexistent institutions 
or, at best, only worth mentioning in a footnote.  Their evidence comes from conducting 
surveys of economics textbooks, which they contend are good indicators of the fields’ 
priorities overall.  
 Hill evaluated seventeen contemporary economics textbooks, finding that the “basic 
institutions around which production is organized […] are commonly thought of as either 
proprietorships, partnerships, or corporations” (Hill 2000, 281).  Eight of these textbooks 
gave absolutely no discussion of cooperatives.  Of the textbooks that did, “coverage 
ranges from a passing mention up to one page” (Hill 2000, 283).  Hill finds that there is 
no in-depth discussion of, for example, why cooperatives exist in a capitalist economy, 
their strengths and weaknesses, and the ways they differ from investor-owned firms. 
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Kalmi reviewed a sample of 24 textbooks from between 1905 to 2000.  He found that 
despite the fact that cooperative membership has increased globally over time, “textbook 
coverage” vastly differs between the pre-1945 period and the current period.  “The main 
finding from the statistical analysis is that […] the textbooks of the early twentieth 
century contained much more analysis of cooperatives than those originating from the 
post-World War II period” (Kalmi 2007, 632).  Furthermore, the textbook coverage in the 
pre-1945 period was much broader in scope.  “Early authors typically examined 
cooperatives widely, devoting an almost equal number of pages to the main forms of 
cooperation” (Kalmi 2007, 631).  Discussions in the later texts mainly dealt with 
cooperative financial institutions, while no post-World War II textbook author discussed 
worker cooperatives whatsoever. 
 Both authors claim that the absence of cooperatives from mainstream economics 
education prevents them from breaching the main enclosures of the discipline.  “The 
majority of students who study some economics are exposed only to these books.  These 
textbooks set the framework within which students are taught to think about the 
economy” (Hill 2000, 282) and, therefore, future economists will ultimately fail to 
recognize the importance of cooperatives. 
• • • 
 
Despite the absence of cooperatives from mainstream economics textbooks, there does 
exist a sizable amount of economic literature on cooperatives, mainly in the subfields of 
organizational economics and agricultural economics.  Although neither of these areas of 
study arguably hold much sway within the mainstream, the models are useful for 
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illustrating how economists apply their theoretical tools to cooperatives or, in other 
words, how economists think about and portray cooperatives when they do study them.   
The following discussion frames the cooperative literature into two schools of 
economic thought: the first is the neoclassical literature on cooperatives; the second is the 
new institutional economics literature (NIE),
8
 which is organized further into two strands 




Benjamin Ward (1958) is generally credited with introducing the neoclassical treatment 
of cooperatives (Sisk 1982 and Kamshad 1997).
9  
He was writing in the midst of a debate 
on the feasibility of socialism, in the context of “some Eastern European countries 
groping toward a less centralized form of economic organization” (Ward 1958, 566).  
Ward devised a model of the labor managed firm (LMF)
10
 that he argues closely 
resembles a Yugoslav industrial firm.  What he designates the “Illyrian firm” operates in 
a perfectly competitive market, but instead of maximizing profits as the objective 
function (as the neoclassical firm does), the worker-managers of the LMF are 
maximizing their individual incomes over a specific time period.   
The key result from Ward’s model is called the “Ward effect” or “perverse supply 
reaction”—when output prices rise, employment and output do the opposite of what we 
                                                 
8 Although technically the NIE school is definitively separate from the neoclassical school, their 
simultaneous uses of rational choice theory lumps them together in this discussion. 
 
9 John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, and Alfred Marshall were actually the first economists to expound the 
benefits of cooperatives and, according to Staatz (1989), Stephen Enke (1945) was the first to use 
neoclassical theory to analyze (consumer) cooperatives as a separate kind of business firm.. 
 
10According to Jossa (2001), the difference between an LMF and a worker-managed firm (WMF) is that a 
LMF borrows capital whereas in an WMF, members inject their residual profits. 
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typically expect: they decrease (in the short-run).  In other words, in order to maximize 
per-worker income, LMFs lay workers off.   
 Evsey Domar (1966)—arguably the second most recognized author in the 
neoclassical literature on cooperatives—applied Ward’s model of the LMF, which he 
calls the “Pure Model,” to the Soviet Kolkhozes (or collective farms).  Domar refined 
Ward’s model by reworking it into a more generalized production function (Sisk 1982).   
And lastly, Jaroslav Vanek (1969) improved Ward’s model (within the LMF 
example) by assuming that employees received residual income rather than wages.  One 
of Vanek’s main results was that the Ward effect was only a special case.   
In contrast to the Ward-Domar-Vanek models, Amartya Sen (1966), who was also 
speaking to a broader debate on socialism—examining the respective welfare advantages 
of the principle “to each according to his needs” versus “to each according to his 
work”—took a very different approach to modeling cooperatives.  Unlike Ward, Sen 
fixed the number of workers and made the amount of labor hours per person a variable 
and also unlike this set of models, which demonstrated an underutilization of labor, Sen’s 
key result was to demonstrate that cooperatives can in theory result in an overutilization 
of labor, too.  (I will return to Sen’s model later in the chapter.)   
Pryor (1983) observes that Sen’s model (along with Israelsen 1980 and Ireland and 
Law 1981) had a decentralized perspective.  In other words, he focused on the ways in 
which incentives (created once a production decision is made) induce the labor responses 
of the individual cooperative members, whereas the centralized tradition of Ward, 
Domar, and Vanek focused on aggregate employment and output and assumed that “a 
manager or the cooperative itself has sufficient knowledge of the production function and 
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the utility functions of its members so that in some unspecified fashion, a once-and-for-
all production decision (quantity, labor force, production methods, etc.) is made which  
maximizes group utility and thereafter, each member does exactly what is decided at this 
time” (Pryor 1983, 140).
11
 
By the late 1980s, what was a fairly strong interest in the neoclassical, Illyrian-style 
models had dissipated.
12
  Kalmi (2007) conjectures that this demise was caused by both 
the unavailability of data (it is impossible to test a theory about an economy that does not 
exist) and the political climate of the time, i.e. it is probable that the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in the early 1990s made theories of “socialist organizations” seem fairly 
irrelevant.   
It is probable that the empirical invalidity of the Illyrian-style model also played a 
role, particularly with regard to the perverse supply reaction result of the Ward-Domar-
Vanek approach.  According to Bonin et al. (1993), “Plywood PCs [producer 
cooperatives] behave as if both earnings and employment matter and do not exhibit the 
perverse or inefficient behavior predicted by the simple model” (Bonin et al. 1993, 1300).  
Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to find a cooperative that fires members in response to 
growth!  
It was widely agreed that the neoclassical, Illyrian-style models were simply not the 
right fit and eventually they lost the attention of economists; in its place emerged the new 
institutionalist school. 
 
                                                 
11 Pryor says that the two different traditions give opposing results.  “The centralized production 
cooperatives leads to an underutilization of labor (vis-à-vis a twin capitalist firm), while a decentralized 
production cooperative yields an overutilization of labor (vis-à-vis) its capitalist twin” (141).   
 
12 The decentralized approach seems to have been less popular. 
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New Institutional Economics 
As background, new institutional economics (NIE) is an interdisciplinary school of 
thought
13
 that, like the neoclassical school, uses methodological individualism to explain 
social and political institutions—cultural norms, property rights, contracts, and laws—
within the efficiency paradigm.
14,15  The concept of institutions encompasses such broad 
social phenomena that it is easy to understand why there is disagreement about what NIE 
is exactly (Brousseau and Glachant 2008).  Bardhan (1989), however, provides a useful 
framing device for the NIE literature by distinguishing between two strands of the NIE 
school: the first strand he calls the CDAWN school (for Coase-Demsetz-Alchian-
Williamson-North) and the second is built upon the theory of imperfect information 







According to Bardhan, CDAWN originated from two papers by Ronald Coase, “which 
led to the flowering of a whole school of neo-classical writers on property rights and 
                                                 
13 Involving disciplines such as law, sociology, political science, and anthropology. 
 
14 Oliver E. Williamson (1975) coined the term new institutional economics, which appears to be the point 
at which scholars began to self-identify as members of the NIE school and movement. 
 
15 Methodological individualism is what differentiates NIE from “institutional economics” or “old 
institutional economics”, which had a much more holistic approach.  One way to understand the difference 
between the two schools of thought is institutional economics borrows from the other social sciences to 
study economic institutions, whereas NIE uses neoclassical economics to apply to other social institutions.  
An example of the criticisms of the old institutionalist school was that it was too descriptive and 
theoretically lazy (Bardhan 1989). 
 
16 Of course, these strands overlap, especially as the field has developed over time.  However, there tends to 
be a pattern as to the “point of entry” that NIE theorists choose, which is a useful way of understanding 
both NIE in general and NIE as it is applied to cooperative studies.   
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transaction costs” (Bardhan 1989, 4).  In The Nature of the Firm (1937), Coase presented 
the idea of transaction costs to explain why firms exist (because, theoretically, in a 
perfectly competitive market, they do not).  According to Coase, “the main reason why it 
is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price 
mechanism” (Coase 1937, 390).  Thus, individuals are motivated to collaborate in 
business activity (as opposed to producing and selling independently) to reduce the 
prohibitive costs that individuals face when engaging in market transactions.  In other 
words, the cost of a good or service involves not only producing the good or service but 
also the costs associated with buying or selling the good or service: gathering 
information, bargaining, coordination, monitoring, enforcement of contracts, etc.  
According to Coase, the reason firms arise and evolve is to minimize these transaction 
costs.  
 Coase’s discussion of property rights comes in his article The Problem of Social Cost 
(1960), in which he presents his famous theorem:
17
 individuals can solve problems of 
externalities (without government intervention) through the process of negotiation and 
bargaining; the initial allocation of property rights does not matter for an efficient 
outcome, because rights can be transacted during this negotiation process.  The exception 
to this rule occurs when transaction costs of negotiation are prohibitively high (arguably 
more often than not); moreover, when transaction costs are high, the allocation of 
property rights is important. 
True to Bardhan’s claim, transaction costs and property rights theory are major 
themes in the NIE cooperative literature.  Transaction cost theory postulates that 
                                                 
17 Bardhan (1989) calls it a “so-called theorem” because Coase never stated it as such. 
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cooperatives, as a particular governance structure, arise to minimize transaction costs.  
For example, Bonus (1986) says that cooperatives internalize important transactions, 
thereby avoiding rent-capturing threats to their investment.  Similarly, John M. Staatz 
(1987) uses transaction cost theory to emphasize the ways in which cooperatives, in 
minimizing transaction costs, create “countervailing power,” which he says stem from 
asset fixity.
18
    
Porter and Scully (1987) offer a paradigmatic property-rights approach to 
cooperatives.  Arguing that transaction costs are present, they look at the impacts of a 
cooperative’s property rights structure on efficiency (and find that this very structure 
renders cooperatives inefficient).  Other examples include Sykuta and Cook (2001), Cook 
(1995), and Fulton (1995), all of whom argue that cooperatives’ organizational structures 






The other NIE strand is the theory of imperfect information.  When asymmetric 
information exists, according to Stiglitz (1994), there is an power imbalance that renders 
the market inefficient.  Furthermore, Bardhan (1989) argues that, in the theory of 
                                                 
18 Asset fixity or specificity is a term in transaction cost theory that refers to assets intended for a use in a 
given transaction, which are generally limited in some way to that use.   
 
19 The main critiques (in the literature) of the CDAWN strand fully apply to these cooperative models.  
North (1998) argued that many NIE theorists “simply are ignorant” about the ways institutions emerge 
(North 1998, 21). Instead of explaining the ways in which property right structures, for example, emerge 
and develop, they simply appear because there is a net benefit for them to exist.  Additionally, according to 
Bromley (2000)  “since transaction costs – indeed all costs – depend upon (are functions of) the 
institutional setup, it is circular to advance a theory suggesting that institutions depend on transaction costs” 
(Bromley 2000, 10).  Finally, Valentinov (2007) argues that a transaction cost viewpoint automatically 
frames institutions like cooperatives to be advantageous (the most efficient), because, otherwise, they 
would not exist—another tautological argument. 
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imperfect information, institutions develop as substitutes for missing markets “in an 
environment of pervasive risks, incomplete markets, information asymmetry, and moral 
hazard” (Bardhan 1989, 4). 
The theory of imperfect information is related to transaction cost theory, as 
information costs are a form of transaction costs.  Bardhan (1989) claims, however, that 
the theory of imperfect information is 
usually cast in a more rigorous framework, clearly spelling out assumptions 
and equilibrium solution concepts, drawing out more fully the implications of 
strategic behavior under asymmetric information, sharply differentiating the 
impact of different types of information problems, and yielding somewhat 
more concrete and specific predictions than the usual presentations of 
transaction cost theory about the design of contracts, with more attention to 
the details of the terms and conditions of varying contractual arrangements 
under varying circumstances (Bardhan 1989, 6). 
  
One example of the imperfect information analysis in the cooperative literature is 
Braverman and Guasch (1989).  The authors evaluate the motivation of credit 
cooperatives in developing countries—incomplete credit markets— as well as their 
formation and design.  They find that credit cooperatives can be extremely successful and 
provide important advantages to their members as long as the “intrinsical and moral 
hazard problems are properly accounted for” (Braverman and Guasch 1989, 353).
20
   
 
The Tragedy of Rational Choice 
                                                 
20 Agency theory, and the principal-agent problem around which it centers, is an offshoot of the imperfect 
information approach.  The principal-agent problem describes a situation in which a principal (e.g. a 
shareholder) hires an agent (e.g. a manager) who does not hold the same selfish interest as the principal.  
The “problem” is one of moral hazard, which could potentially arise because managers shirk their 
responsibilities for which they were hired.  Monitoring, then, becomes a fundamental issue in agency 
theory, as a way to mitigate the principal-agent problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  Agency theory is 
applied to cooperatives in the following way: members are defined as the principals and cooperative 
managers are the agents (Van Bekkum 2001).  The same incentive problems are theorized to exist, for 
which monitoring is necessary.  According to Egerstrom (2004), a major accomplishment of the agency 
theory of cooperatives is the comprehensive list of problems it addresses (including free-rider, horizon, 
portfolio, control, and decision-making problems). 
 27 
How does Ostrom’s discussion of economic methodology apply to the economic models 
of cooperatives?  Ostrom would argue that these models are applied out of context 
(inappropriately elevated to the status of theory), and thus the conclusion is made that 
only the state can change exogeneous variables.  
Here I want to both extend Ostrom’s argument and also offer a critique of it, by 
claiming that the way these models—the collective action models and the cooperatives 
models— are used “out of context” stems from the fact that the majority of them (though 
not all, as I discuss below) base their theories on the rational-choice/efficiency paradigm, 
which is especially inappropriate for cooperatives. 
Notwithstanding the vast range of differences within heterodox economics, one of its 
defining characteristics is a rejection, or at least a modification, of neoclassical rational 
choice theory.  Rational choice theory—the behavioral assumption that buttresses the 
whole of mainstream economics—is a framework that depicts individuals as solely out to 
maximize their benefits and minimize their costs while facing a limited amount of 
resources (and employing a given set of preferences).  The argument then follows that the 
entire economy is an aggregate of individual cost-benefit analyses, which ultimately 
results in Pareto optimality—the most efficient outcome for society. 
The foundational assumption that threads together all three of the economic collective 
action models discussed in this chapter is that individuals are “rational” in the 
neoclassical sense.  For example,  
It is not in fact true that the idea that groups will act in their self-interest 
follows logically from the premise of rational and self-interested 
behavior” […] “rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve 
their common or group interests (Olson 1965, 1-2).   
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As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain.  Explicitly 
or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, ‘What is the utility to me 
of adding one more animal to my herd?’ (Hardin 1968, 1244). 
 
This assumption about human behavior is directly linked to the conclusions of these 
models.  If Hardin’s herdsman were altruistic towards each, then the “tragedy of the 
commons” will not occur.   
Ostrom herself defines her conception of rationality to be much more flexible than 
what is assumed in these economic models. 
 I presume that individuals try to solve problems as effectively as they can.  
That assumption imposes a discipline on me.  Instead of presuming that 
some individuals are incompetent, evil, or irrational, and others are 
omniscient, I presume that individuals have very similar limited 
capabilities to reason and figure out the structure of complex 
environments.  It is my responsibility as a scientist to ascertain what 
problems individuals are trying to solve and what factors help or hinder 
them in these efforts.  When the problems that I observe involve lack of 
predictability, information, and trust, as well as high levels of complexity 
and transactional difficulties, then my efforts to explain must take these 
problems overtly into account rather than assuming them away (Ostrom 
1990, 26). 
 
Nevertheless, what is striking in Governing the Commons is that despite her 
broadened notion of rationality, Ostrom never explicitly criticizes these collective action 
models for using rational choice theory.  In fact she states that “these models are thus 
extremely useful for explaining how perfectly rational individuals can produce, under 
some circumstances, outcomes that are not ‘rational’ when viewed from the perspective 
of all those involved” (Ostrom 1990, 6).  In other words, there are collective action 
circumstances whereby Olson and Hardin predict correctly.  In 2000, however, she states 
that, although they might be useful in extremely competitive scenarios, 
Thin [neoclassical] models of rational choice have been unsuccessful in 
explaining or predicting behavior in one-shot or finitely repeated social 
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dilemmas in which the theoretical prediction is that no one will cooperate 
(Ostrom 2000, 474). 
 
Although Ostrom’s prisoner metaphor in Governing the Commons is extremely 
poignant, she seems somewhat stuck in the cement of (false) positivism; she fails to 
follow through with her analogy by extending the problem directly to rational choice 
theory.  I suggest that it is the very assumption that people base their collective action 
decisions solely on a self-interested cost and benefit calculus, instead of their motivations 
and actions reflecting a wide set of values, concerns, structures, goals, and behaviors—
including free-riding behavior—that ultimately incarcerates their capabilities and 
potential, and leads to the assumption that the state needs to alter the cost-benefit 
structures by instituting policy in order to effect change.  
Rational choice theory is even more inappropriate for understanding cooperatives, 
institutional forms that embody principles of democracy and equality, that foster a range 
of development outcomes (not just economic), and, since their inception, have been 
embedded in social movements that confront the abuses of capitalism, whether that be of 
the industrial revolution or 21st century globalization.     
Just as rational choice theory informs the conclusions of collective action models, so 
too for cooperatives.  Recall that Sen’s 1966 model of producer cooperatives
21
 
demonstrated a possible overutilization of labor, a result that hinged on a key behavioral 
assumption: what Sen calls “sympathy,” which could also be termed “empathy.”  
Specifically, Sen defined the utility functions of cooperative workers to include valuing 
the well-being of fellow workers, which results in the opposite of “Ward effect.”  Maybe 
                                                 
21 Stiglitz (1989) describes a “peasant rationality,” one in which peasants are rational, but not fully 
informed.  This is certainly an improvement on the neoclassical definition.  However, the imperfect 
information is still not broad enough to capture the social and political features of cooperatives. 
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it is, in fact, the assumption that cooperative workers are rational in the neoclassical sense 
that is “perverse,” for this assumption is the ultimate cause of Ward’s “perverse effect.” 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that we need better a better economic 
framework for understanding cooperatives.  Transaction costs, property rights, and 
imperfect information are all useful and relevant concepts to build on, but they are 
constrained by rational choice theory, which precludes any meaningful understanding of 
this organizational form that also embodies the values of democracy and social justice. 
Applying strict rational choice assumptions to frame the motivations of cooperative 
members implies they are not capable of solving their collective challenges, which 
incarcerates their potential and, as Sen illustrated with his model of producer 
cooperatives, drastically changes the range of possible results.   
In proceeding to develop a more useful framework with which to identify the 
objectives, struggles, and achievements of cooperatives, it is incumbent upon 
economists— heterodox economists especially—to do better than this.  The next chapter, 
by contrasting the economic framing of cooperatives with one that locates them in social 
justice movements, is an attempt to provide a more nuanced and realistic picture of 








CHAPTER 3  
 
 
INTERNALIZING “SOCIAL DISTANCE:” COOPERATIVES AND THE GLOBAL 
JUSTICE MOVEMENT  
 
 
Cooperatives in their various forms are an […] existing example of the possibility of extending democracy to 





The purposes of this chapter are twofold.  The first is to contrast the way mainstream 
economists frame cooperatives with the way they are described by social movements—
namely the global justice movement and the older, global cooperative movement itself.  
Rather than the rational-choice/economic-efficiency paradigm, this perspective defines 
the goals of cooperatives in terms of a broader notion of well-being for families and 
communities and, still more broadly, as an effort to combat corporate-centric 
globalization.  This dissertation will draw from this alternative conception of 
cooperatives and incorporate it into its analysis.  The second purpose is descriptive: to 
provide some clarifying definitions of the various types of cooperatives.   
 The first section of this chapter describes the global justice movement and situates 
cooperatives within it.  The second section reviews the early history of the various kinds 
of cooperatives as well as of the International Cooperative Alliance, the main organizing 
body of the global cooperative movement that has advanced the widely used cooperative 
definitions, goals, and principles from which this dissertation draws. 
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The Global Justice Movement 
Its recipients called it the “summit special,” water laced with pepper spray shot into the 
masked faces of protesters at the 2001 Summit of the Americas in Quebec City.  This was 
accompanied by what were quickly becoming standbys for the “anti-globalization” 
protests—tear gas, rubber bullets, and water cannons.  Even though it did not burn the 
eyes or choke a crowd out of the dead-end, cobblestone streets of the old part of Quebec 
City, the very misnomer “anti-globalization” was (and is) arguably just as irritating—to 
the protesters and the movement—as the weapons wielded by riot police. 
[In] Quebec we get painted as anti-globalization protesters, but really 
[who] I think we are is Canadian citizens fighting for a more just and 
democratic world.  A world where trade lawyers don’t negotiate 
agreements over the course of years without consulting with 
Canadians….We’re not struggling against globalization per se.  We’re 
struggling against capitalism.  We’re struggling for a more democratic 
world (Member of Toronto Video Activist Collective. April 13th, 2001. 
Summit of the Americas). 
 
Quebec City protesters interviewed by the New York Times mirrored this sentiment, 
citing their objections not to globalization, but to the ways in which multinational 
corporations have brandished it: impacting human rights, livelihoods, and environments.  
In light of the Mexican maquiladoras (otherwise known as “democracy-free zones”), one 
labor advocate objected to the certain demise of workers’ rights across the globe.  A 
Vermont farmer worried about the impact of corporate-held international patents that 
gave companies like Monsanto and Cargill legal entitlement to seeds that small farmers 
have been developing for centuries or more, degrading genetic diversity and leaving them 
economically shackled to these companies.  All were focused on globalization’s tendency 
to concentrate corporate power, while diluting rights of people (DePalma 2001). 
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The activists themselves have come up with much better epithets for their collective 
intentions—the global justice movement, counter-hegemonic globalization, alter-
globalization, the movement of movements, and the anti-corporate globalization 
movement.  Regardless of its name (I will call it the global justice movement), all can 
agree that its focus is building a new kind of globalization, one that offsets neoliberal 
globalization with more equal distributions of economic resources and power.   
Globalization is a sweeping term for an extremely complex reality that is difficult to 
define.  Scholars get quickly tangled up in debates simply defining globalization, i.e. its 
meaning, whether it exemplifies a process or event or whether its origins are economic, 
cultural, or social (Steger 2003).   
Boyce (2004), however, articulates a clear conception that is well-suited to the 
motivations and beliefs of the global justice movement.  First, he draws from the works 
of Karl Polanyi (an “old” institutionalist), who articulated the economy as a system of 
markets and institutions that shape and constrain market activity.   
Markets are nested within social institutions that both enable them to 
function and temper their effects.  The rise of capitalism was characterized 
by what Karl Polanyi (1957[1944], p. 132) called a ‘double movement’: 
the expansion of the market, coupled with the expansion of ‘social 
protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as 
productive organization’ (Boyce 2004, 2).    
 
Boyce defines globalization as the global integration of that same process, the spread of 
economic activities (both market and institutional) around the world.  But this “has long 
been an uneven process, not only across regions but also across the social spheres that 
structure economic activity” (Boyce 2004, 2).  What the global justice movement objects 
to is that globalization, as it stands, “has proceeded furthest in the sphere of the market” 
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(Boyce 2004, 2), a bias that weakens society’s ability to use institutions to curtail 
corporate concentrations of power.   
This unevenness fosters what sociologists call “social distance.”  Social distance 
refers to the divisions in society among people in different social categories: economic, 
race and ethnicity, gender, etc..  Boyce describes social distance in the context of 
globalization and international trade.   
When trade occurs at prices that do not capture external costs and external 
benefits, market integration is accompanied by the globalization of market 
failure.  It also can widen what can be termed the ‘social distance’ 
between the beneficiaries of cost externalization and those who bear these 
costs, making the latter less able to influence the actions of the former 
(Boyce 2004).   
 
Boyce argues that market globalization expands social distance.  The global justice 
movement’s task at hand, then, is to counterbalance the dominant spread of market 
globalization, thereby narrowing the social distance between those who benefit and those 
who are harmed and fostering “internalization” of costs and benefits.  
Visible configurations of the global justice movement are innumerable and have 
moved well-beyond the protests that launched it.  Via Campesina, Peoples’ Global 
Action, Jubilee 2000, and the Solidarity Economy Network are just a few of its 
organizational pillars.  Among the many examples of direct alternatives to market-centric 
globalization and capitalism are Community Supported Agriculture (CSAs), community 
currencies, fair trade, neighborhood associations, farmers markets, and the one that is 
ever present in discussions and description of the global justice movement, and is the 
central focus of this dissertation: cooperatives.   
The economic equality that worker cooperatives strive for is a constant, 
vibrant catalyst for equality among sexes, nations, and races, through a 
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drive towards democracy, first in our workplaces, and then in our 
communities and societies (Trott 2008). 
 
Cooperatives play a central role in the global justice movement, serving as a symbol 
of democracy as well as a form of governance with which to counterbalance the 
dominance of markets in the globalization process and to internalize the social distance it 
causes.  This is, indeed, the same mantle cooperatives have held since their inception 
over two hundred years ago.   
 
The Early Cooperatives—Consumer, Credit, Worker, and Agricultural
22
 
The Rochdale Pioneers of Britain—formed in 1844—are often incorrectly portrayed as 
the first cooperative society on record.  Actually, many cooperative associations predate 
the Rochdales—in Britain and the rest of Europe, in North America, and in Japan.  It 
would be more accurate to say that the Rochdales became the model that launched the 
global cooperative movement (Birchall 1997). 
There is no exact moment when cooperatives first appeared on the economic stage.  
Humans have always engaged in cooperation for productive purposes, but cooperatives as 
a formal governance structure only appear in societies where markets have already come 
into existence.  Fairbairn (2004) connects cooperatives’ inception to the beginnings of 
“modernism,” a period between the late eighteenth and twentieth centuries characterized 
by “rational pragmatism, secularism, growing urbanism, the power of nation-states, the 
economization of many aspects of society, and other related mentalities and behaviors” 
                                                 
22 The most helpful and comprehensive sources I have found on the four main types, and the development 
of the International Cooperative Alliance is Johnston Birchall’s The International Co-operative Movement.  
I used Birchall as my primary resource, and supplemented with other resources, which are cited in the 
appropriate sections.  
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(Fairbairn 2004, 24).  Again in Karl Polanyi’s terms, it was an era dominated by two 
parallel institutions, the state and the market.  “These processes [that reshaped society to 
fit the state and the market] had immense impacts on the lives of ordinary people, and it 
is in these impacts that we see the origins of co-ops” (Fairbairn 2004, 24).  
According to Digby, a historian of the early cooperative movement, although 
cooperatives were not fully  formed until the early nineteenth century, the “germs of 
many cooperative ideas are to be found in [earlier] schemes: the combination of self-help 
and mutual aid; a voluntary, democratic, and egalitarian association for economic 
purposes; direct relations between producers and consumers and the elimination of the 
middleman” (Digby 1948, 14).   
Digby traces the concept of an economic community, which operates within the state, 
to Protestant England of the seventeenth century, quoting a Dutchman residing in 
England named P.C. Plockboy.  Plockboy published a pamphlet in 1659 that laid out a 
plan for forming “economic associations of agriculturalists, artisans, seamen, and 
professional men, who would all contribute capital and work to the undertaking, while 
retaining the right to withdraw and take their capital with them if they so desired.  The 
products of the farm would be exchanged within the group for the products of industry 
and any profits would be distributed among the members” (Digby 1948, 14).  
In 1695, a Quaker named John Belers published another pamphlet that expanded on 
the ideas of Plockboy.  His Proposals for Raising a Colledge of Industry of all Usefull 
Trades and Husbandry proposed that consumer and producers, farmers and artisans form 
a single organization to sell on the market, with profits from these sales to pay capital 
costs that Belers assumed should come from outside the group.   
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When the first formally recognized cooperative was formed is unclear.  According to 
Williams (2007), the very first formal cooperative on record was a fire insurance 
cooperative, formed in the UK in the early 1700s.  Birchall claims that it was not until 
1760 that groups of shipbuilders in the south of England created flour mills to bust local 
monopolies that sold poor quality bread at extremely high prices.  “By the end of the 
century the idea had spread to several other ports along the east coast, and baking 
societies began to appear in Scotland” (Birchall 1997, 4).  Birchall calls this expansion 
the first cooperative movement.  The second movement, according to Birchall, “began in 
1826 in Brighton and which by 1833 had spread all over Britain and even to Ireland” 
(Birchall 1997, 4).  Williams (2007) states that by 1830, 300 cooperative societies had 
been officially recognized by the UK.   
The cooperatives of this second, early nineteenth century movement were based on 
the ideas of Robert Owen
23
 and William King—both successful men concerned with the 
poverty of the working people.  Owen was a self-made, wealthy industrialist, who was 
well-known for his philanthropy and personal efforts to improve the labor conditions of 
his employees.  King was a physician who had long worked on self-help solutions for the 
working poor.  
Owen’s influential idea was the cooperative village, where the working class could 
reside and work, producing for their own consumption and exchanging with each other 
and with other villages.  He traveled across Europe and to North America to establish 
these communities, but they all ultimately failed.  The key issue was the lack of funds: 
                                                 
23 Owen is often characterized as the father of the modern cooperative movement. 
 38 
the aristocracy was not interested in contributing their money and the working classes 
lacked the capital to establish these villages.   
Many “Owenites” established cooperative shops (consumer cooperatives) as an 
alternative to the villages, despite Owen’s skepticism on the grounds that they did not 
reach far enough.  King, however, preferred the shops because they did not rely on the 
wealthy class for funding, and because the revenues from the cooperative shops could 
potentially be the capital used to establish the Owenite villages.  In any case, King 
believed that establishing cooperative shops was a worthwhile goal in and of itself.   
In 1833, according to Birchall, the second cooperative movement collapsed.
24
  Cole 
(1944) provides several reasons for its disintegration: a collapse of the trade union 
movement, caused by government pressure and employee lock-outs; an economic 
downturn that pushed cooperative members deep into poverty; and the internal problem 
that the cooperatives did not have a way to distribute their profits, so the only mechanism 
members had for accessing their dividends was to dissolve their societies. 
Like the cooperative shops of previous decades, the Rochdale group formed in 
response to the economic conditions of the era: 
The handloom weavers were being squeezed out by power-driven looms.  
The mills were still paying the low wages of the preceding depression.  
There was much unemployment […] Hours of work were long.  Mean and 
crowded houses without adequate water or sanitation had been run up to 
provide for the rapidly increasing population and fill the pockets of 
speculative builders (Digby 1948, 21). 
 
The Rochdales opened their own store (1844) in order to sell foodstuffs they could 
not afford otherwise.  They began with a paltry selection (four items: butter, sugar, flour, 
                                                 
24 Birchall (1996) is somewhat inconsistent in his description.  Recall that he first states that the second 
movement had spread all over Britain (and reached Ireland) by 1833.  Then on the next page claims that the 
movement collapsed by 1833.  It is possible he meant that there was growth across Britain until 1833, at 
which point the movement began to implode.   
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and oatmeal) and were only open two nights a week.  Within a few months, however, 
they expanded their coffers, became notable for providing high quality items, and were 
open for business 5 days a week.  By 1850 the Rochdales established a corn mill and sold 
flour to their members (by then 600 strong) as well as to other cooperatives. 
It is noteworthy that the original Rochdale pioneers (a group of 28 men, mostly 
flannel handloom weavers and a few other trade artisans, who worked in the cotton mills 
of Rochdale, England) were politically active.  “All the pioneers were Owenites or 
Chartists, leaders of strikes or agitators for the ten-hour day or the repeal of the Corn 
Laws.  They were men with a good deal of political experience, used to working with 
their fellows” (Digby 1948, 21).   
The Rochdales were very cognizant of the mistakes made by the failed cooperatives 
that preceded them, and established a broad set of principles with those missteps in mind.  
Over time these “Rochdale Principles” became the founding principles of the global 
cooperative movement (Birchall 1997). 
 
These principles were the following:  
1. Open membership. 
Anyone—man or woman—could be a member (up to a fixed total) and on equal terms 
with the founding members.  There could be no discrimination of any kind.  Only people 
known to have bad characters could be refused admission.   
 
2. Democratic control (one person, one vote). 
Power to determine the affairs of the society are distributed equally, and financial 
contribution should have no bearing on political influence.  
 
3. Payment of fixed and limited interest on capital 
The idea of limited interest was to strike a balance between the group’s need for capital 
investment and its beliefs about unsavory profits. 
 
4. Distribution of surplus in proportion to trade. 
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The Rochdales figured out that instead of having to dissolve the cooperative, trading 
surplus
25
 could paid as a dividend in proportion to member purchases.  This principle is 
often credited with the success of the Rochdale society (Birchall 1997). 
  
This devise solved one of the most difficult of the problems confronting 
the early cooperators.  They had not come together to make profits.  If 
they could, they would have provided their members with the necessities 
of life at cost price.  But, even apart from the violent opposition this would 
have aroused among rival shopkeepers, cost price would have been almost 
impossible to determine in advance in an immature organization, with the 
running expenses and the overhead charges, the risks of spoilage and 
unsold goods, all unknown at the time when prices would have to be 
determined (Digby 1948, 23). 
 
The dividend on member purchases, paid quarterly, made it possible to in effect sell at 
cost price retroactively. 
 
5. Cash trading 
No credit could be established for trading.  This was a safeguard for the Rochdale society 
and a response to what was considered a social evil of the industrial era.   
 
6. Commitment to pure and unadulterated goods 
Providing quality goods, which were generally not available to the masses, was one of the 
main reasons for the formation of consumer cooperatives. 
 
7. Promotion of education 
The use of society funds for educating members signified that the organization, and the 
broader cooperative movement, was something more than just a business enterprise. 
 
8. Political and religious neutrality 
The point of this, beyond reinforcing the open membership principle, was to ensure that 
the society could not become tied to any church or political group. 
 
 
The Rochdales were so influential that by the mid-1850s there were almost 1,000 
consumer cooperatives established in Britain based on their model (Woolf 1928).  
But the Rochdale’s influence moved well-beyond the consumer form of cooperative.  
Once the Rochdales had established a solid set of cooperative practices and principles, 
                                                 
25 The Rochdales preferred the term “trading surplus” to profit. 
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the movement devised new kinds of cooperation—credit, worker, and agricultural.
26
    
According to Birchall (1997), “each form emerged mainly within one country and then, 
whenever the environment was congenial, spread rapidly throughout Europe and then the 





Germany’s economy in the mid-nineteenth century was vastly different from Britain’s, 
closer to that of Tsarist Russia than to the industrial transformation that seeded the 
Rochdales.  In the towns, artisans still dominated production, selling to the surrounding 
rural areas.  The agrarian reforms of 1848 gave peasants land rights that exposed them 
more to the fluctuations of the market (Birchall 1997).  
The first major figurehead of the credit cooperative movement was Hermann 
Schulze—a judge and liberal mayor of Delitzsch, a small village in northeast Germany.  
Concerned about the welfare of workers and artisans, he realized that lack of capital was 
a fundamental economic issue for the townspeople.  He established a “friendly society” in 
1849 similar to those that preceded the consumer cooperatives in Great Britain.  In 1850, 
he established the first credit cooperative, with ten members, all artisans.  Members 
subscribed to one share each, which could be paid in installments.  Liability was 
unlimited, and profits, after twenty percent was first placed in capital reserves, were 
distributed to members as dividends.  The cooperative held accounts and made loans to 
                                                 
26 All other cooperative forms derived from these original four sometime during the twentieth century; 
these are mainly insurance, forestry, fishing, electricity, and health care cooperatives. 
 42 
members, and was run by a salaried professional who was chosen democratically 
(Birchall 1997).   
While Schulze’s credit cooperatives were located in Germany’s towns and cities, 
Friedrich Raiffeisen founded the first rural credit cooperative in 1862, in which only 
farmers comprised the membership.  Raiffeisen built on Schulze’s model, but with some 
fundamental differences: the cooperative did not require any share capital from farmers, 
members used their properties and assets as collateral, no dividends were distributed 
(instead used for reserves), and loans were drawn from savings and deposits.  The 
societies were also very small—kept to the village level (Birchall 1997).   
Both Germany’s urban and rural credit cooperative movements were a success.  By 
1905, there were over 1,000 urban cooperative banks with 600,000 members—a bank in 
almost every town.  In the countryside, over half of the small farmers in Germany were 
members of approximately 13,000 rural credit cooperatives.  According to Birchall, 
“Taken together, both [urban and rural] movements were an astonishing achievement 
which got the urban and rural workers out of debt to money-lenders and enabled them to 
survive in the new market society” (Birchall 1997, 13).   
 
Worker Cooperatives 
Worker cooperatives are non-agricultural production cooperatives: business enterprises 
owned and controlled by workers.  Today the Mondragon cooperative group in Spain is 
the most notable—and influential—collective of worker cooperatives in the world.  It 
began when a prisoner turned priest named Don Josè Maria Arizmendi came to the small 
Basque city of Mondragon to help improve the local school system.  Later, when five of 
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his students set up a stove-making company (in 1956), they were supported by Arizmendi 
(and the local community), who helped by writing the statutes that would fit the 
cooperative into Spanish law.  Soon other groups followed suit and cooperatives were 
being formed throughout the town (Whyte and Whyte 1991).  There are now over 250 
cooperatives in Mondragon, representing almost 100,000 worker-members (Mondragon 
Corporation 2010).  
Worker cooperatives were first conceived in France and Italy in the mid-nineteenth 
century.  Charles Fourier, like Robert Owen, was concerned about the dire poverty 
among France’s working class. (In France, the working class was largely made up of 
independent, skilled workers rather than factory workers.)  Fourier, too, believed in self-
enclosed communities, and like Owen’s they too failed.  Philippe Buchez was France’s 
William King, bringing the more pragmatic sensibility to the cooperative movement. 
Buchez established an association of cabinet makers and codified a set of principles for 
worker cooperation that resembled the Rochdale principles,
27
 which prompted a workers’ 
cooperative movement worldwide.  
 In Italy, the worker cooperative movement developed in Piedmont, the most 
industrialized region at the time.  When the government granted the region freedom of 
association in 1948, groups began to set up mutual aid societies that insured members 
against sickness (informal health cooperatives).  The Owen-like figurehead was a 
political leader named Mazzini, and the first producer cooperative was a glass-making 
                                                 
27 The members elected their representatives democratically.  Each would receive a market-competitive 
wage.  However, they would also receive a return of the surplus in proportion to the work they contributed.  
Capital was “indissoluble”.  Workers had a probation period of one year, and then be eligible for full 
membership.   
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cooperative set up in the village of Altare; by the 1860s there were several others 
(Birchall 1997). 
Worker cooperative movements did not develop significantly outside of France and 
Italy until the 20th century.  In many countries, the movement grew sporadically, in fits 
and starts.  For example, in the United States, there was a small worker cooperative 
movement in the 1930s, which revived in the 1970s.  Those that survived from the 1970s 
became the catalyst for growth in the 1990s (Hoover 2007).  “Many of them were 
thriving; they had demonstrated that the model was viable and they were committed to 
helping grow it, through replication, spinoff, and technical assistance.  These older 1970s 
co-ops provided resources, inspiration and in many cases directed capital to help those 
new co-ops get started in the 1990s” (Hoover 2007, 241).   
    
 
Agricultural Cooperatives 
The terms “agricultural cooperative” and “farmer cooperative” do not denominate one 
form of cooperative, but several.  A simple typology for distinguishing among 
agricultural cooperatives is to classify them as either production cooperatives or service 
cooperatives.  
The function of the agricultural production cooperative is to turn an input or product 
into a higher value product ready for consumption (by humans or animals).  In other 
words, production resources—land and/or machinery—are pooled and members either 
farm or produce jointly.  Agricultural production cooperatives include the Soviet-era 
cooperatives that collectivized either land rights or labor power (and sometimes both).  
Other examples are the dairy cooperatives of Europe and North America.  According to 
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Birchall (1997), the first agricultural cooperative was a cheesemakers cooperative in 
France, formed in 1750. 
 Agricultural service cooperatives can be broken down further, into marketing, supply, 
and credit cooperatives.  Marketing cooperatives are comprised of farmers with 
individual land rights who collectively transform, package, market, and distribute their 
products.
28
  The marketing cooperatives can also be traced to the United States in the 
early nineteenth century; the first marketing cooperative was a pork cooperative in 
Granville, NY (1820).  Supply cooperatives do just that: they supply their members with 
agricultural inputs, e.g. seeds, fertilizer, fuel, and sometimes machinery.  The first supply 
cooperative was established in 1865 in Switzerland for the purchasing of fertilizer 
(Birchall 1997). 
 
The International Cooperative Alliance 
During the second half of the 19th century, several leaders of the cooperative movement 
in Europe galvanized to establish a formal international cooperative body in order to 
further strengthen and expand the global movement.  After fifty years and several 




                                                 
28 Birchall (1997) defines production cooperatives as those that add value to an agricultural product for use 
but that seems to fall in the definition of market cooperative. 
 
29 Furthermore, the ICA is now the largest non-governmental organization in the world and is considered 
by both the UN and the ILO to be extremely important to the cooperative movement.  Its members are 237 




The ICA was formed to accomplish three goals: to provide information on the 
cooperative movement to member cooperatives; to establish commercial relations 
between cooperatives in different countries; and to elucidate the nature of cooperative 
principles. 
The extent to which they succeeded at these goals varied.  In terms of providing 
information, they were quite successful.  In 1897, at the Paris Congress of ICA, the 
organization began to gather statistics, and in 1909 they began publishing their bulletin in 
multiple languages.  They have continued to publish the Review of International 
Cooperation and gather statistics (some are presented in Appendix A), both of which 
have helped connect national cooperative movements.  The results of the efforts to 
stimulate international trade amongst cooperatives were not as promising.  Travel was 
slow and expensive, logistics intimidating, and even the committee designated to 




ICA has been hugely successful in achieving its third goal.  Its cooperative principles 
have been widely influential in the cooperative movement, providing a standard as to 
whether an organization can call itself a cooperative, and have evolved gradually over 
time.   
Three official reviews of principles were undertaken over the course of the ICA’s 
history.  In 1995, the latest set of principles was developed and accepted (see Appendix B 
                                                 
30 The extent to which this is still an ICA goal is unclear.  It seems, however, that the global justice 
movement—and globalization—at least have the potential to help the cooperative movement fulfill its 
original goal of building networks and trade by devising new kinds of trade paradigms that did not exist 
when they the ICA was established.   
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for the 1937 and 1966 versions), as well as this clear statement as to what defines a 
cooperative: 
an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their 
common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a 
jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise. 
  
The principles, underlaid by a clear list of values, are widely used today.  These are the 
following:  
 
1. Voluntary and Open Membership: 
Cooperatives are voluntary organizations, open to all people able to use their 
services and willing to accept the responsibilities of membership, without gender, 
social, racial, political or religious discrimination 
 
2. Democratic Member Control 
Cooperatives are democratic organizations controlled by their members who 
actively participate in setting their policies and making decisions.  Men and 
women serving as elected representatives are accountable to the membership.  In 
primary cooperatives members have equal voting rights (one member, one vote) 
and cooperatives at other levels are also organized in a democratic manner. 
 
3.  Member Economic Participation 
Members contribute equitably to, and democratically control, the capital of their 
cooperative.  At least part of that capital is usually the common property of the 
cooperative.  Members usually receive limited compensation, if any, on capital 
subscribed as a condition of membership.  Members allocate surpluses for any or 
all of the following purposes: developing their cooperative, possibly by setting up 
reserves, part of which at least would be indivisible; benefiting members in 
proportion to their transactions with the cooperative; and supporting other 
activities approved by the membership. 
 
4.  Autonomy and Independence 
  Cooperatives are autonomous, self-help organizations controlled by their  
members.  If they enter to agreements with other organizations, including 
governments, or raise capital from external sources, they do so on terms that 
ensure democratic control by their members and maintain their cooperative 
autonomy.   
 
5.  Education, Training and Information 
Cooperatives provide education and training for their members, elected 
representatives, managers and employees so they can contribute effectively to the 
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development of their cooperatives.  They inform the general public – particularly 
young people and opinion leaders – about the nature and benefits of cooperation. 
 
6. Cooperation among Cooperatives 
Cooperatives serve their members most effectively and strengthen the cooperative 
movement by working together through local national, regional and international 
structures. 
 
7.  Concern for Community 
Cooperatives work for the sustainable development of their communities through 
policies approved by their members. 
 
This most recent iteration of the ICA cooperative principles was formulated in direct 
response to the efficiency approach to cooperative theory.  According to Birchall, there 
was a “crisis of consciousness” about their ideological nature and meaning.  “[This crisis 
of consciousness] arises from gnawing doubts about the true purpose of cooperatives and 
whether they are fulfilling a distinct role as a different kind of enterprise.  If cooperatives 
do nothing more than succeed in being as efficient as other businesses in a commercial 
sense, is that good enough?”   
The ICA’s answer was no; the cooperative definition and set of principles that the 
organization devised in response to this question are now used by all members of the 
Committee for the Promotion and Advancement of Cooperatives (COPAC), which 
includes major development players like the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), the International Labour Office (ILO) and the United Nations 
general secreteriat (UN).
31
   
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
31 The International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP), the Canadian Cooperative Association 
(CCA) and the Swedish Cooperative Centre (SCC) are also members. 
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This chapter has begun the process of developing an alternative framework for 
cooperatives.  Instead of an economic institution comprised of rational-choice actors who 
form an organization for the purpose of reducing transaction costs and maximizing 
efficiency, this chapter places cooperatives in the center of global justice movement’s 
effort to narrow the social distance created by market-centric globalization (to borrow 
Boyce’s conception) and the much older global movement to confront the debilitating 
effects of industrial capitalism.  This chapter also draws from the definition, goals, and 
principles of cooperatives developed by the International Cooperative Alliance, which is 
the organizing body central to the global cooperative movement.   
Of course, not all cooperatives are exemplars of all that is fair and democratic, as this 
dissertation will well-establish in its discussion of inequality and collective action.   
When trying to think theoretically about cooperatives, however, it would be irresponsible 
and narrow-minded not to acknowledge the ICA’s framings and the broader role that 































The objective of this chapter is to explain the nuts and bolts of Ostrom’s theory of 
collective action and then provide a critique and a preliminary analysis by applying her 
theory to what we know of cooperatives thus far (from chapter 3).  
This chapter proceeds as follows.  The first section discusses Ostrom unique 
methodology, which I argue is what makes her work especially relevant and useful, 
especially to heterodox economists.  The second section describes one example of the 
many case studies that Ostrom uses to develop her theory.  The third section presents 
Ostrom’s theory of collective action, and the final section provides a critique of her 
theory.  
 
Ostrom’s Methodology: Fusing Theory and Experience 
In the issue of Yes! Magazine honoring Ostrom’s work,
32
 the magazine’s editor, Fran 
Korten, conducted an interview with Ostrom in which the main emotion she expressed 
from her Nobel win is relief.  Relief?  
Well, relieved in that I was doing a bunch of research through the years 
that many people thought was very radical and people didn’t like.  As a 
person who does interdisciplinary work, I didn’t fit anywhere.  I was 
                                                 
32 Briefly mentioned in chapter 1. 
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relieved that, after all these years of struggle, someone really thought it did 
add up.  That’s very nice.   
 
Indeed, Ostrom’s work is radical, not just for nullifying the “tragedy of the commons,” 
but for how she did so—her distinct methodological style that shatters stiff disciplinary 
boundaries and ignores dogmatic epistemological attachments.   
Ostrom explains that her research approach began developing in the mid-1980s, when 
she became aware of “the possibility of using detailed case studies written by other 
authors to obtain a sufficiently rich empirical base for understanding CPRs” (Ostrom 
1990, xiv).  Ostrom and her colleagues at Indiana University began collecting citations to 
case studies of CPR institutions, and Fenton Martin, in particular, compiled a 
bibliography of the list, which reached 5,000 entries by 1990 (when Governing the 
Commons was published).  Several academic disciplines, across the social and physical 
sciences, were represented in these case studies, but the researchers found that the 
majority stayed within disciplinary boundaries by referencing sources strictly from within 
their subject area.  “Consequently, a vast amount of highly specialized knowledge had 
been accumulated” without much synthesis or application of the knowledge to the policy 
problems involved” (Ostrom 1990, xv).  Ostrom thought it was important to use this 
compilation of literature to understand empirically how institutions help users manage 
CPRs.  With an NSF grant, Ostrom and several of her colleagues screened these case 
studies and selected a smaller subset for further scrutiny, coding, and analysis.  “We have 
now developed a structured coding form that enables us to transform the indepth 
qualitative data into a structured database amenable to quantitative analysis” (Ostrom 
1990, xv).  Throughout this process, the scholars wrote several papers trying to “elucidate 
a theory that would help us understand the patterns we were beginning to see in reading 
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these diverse materials” (Ostrom 1990, xvi).  The result of that work is the theory Ostrom 
presents in Governing the Commons.   
Ostrom’s use of such a wide range of multidisciplinary studies has nurtured a fluid 
epistemological approach.  She uses both inductive and deductive reasoning, both 
empiricism and reason, in a continual back and forth interchange between observations 
“on the ground” and “arms-length conceptualizing” that she says gives her a deeper 
understanding of what she is observing.  
Ostrom calls her method a blend of biology and “new institutionalism.”  She 
characterizes the biology piece as follows: 
Biologists also face the problem of studying complex processes that are 
poorly understood.  Their scientific strategy frequently has involved 
identifying for empirical observation the simplest possible organism in 
which a process occurs in a clarified, or even exaggerated, form.  The 
organism is not chosen because it is representative of all organisms.  
Rather, the organism is chosen because particular processes can be studied 
more effectively using this organism than using another (Ostrom 1990, 
26). 
 
Ostrom’s “organism” is the “CPR situation.”  She defines a “common-pool resource” 
(CPR) as a “natural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it 
costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits 
from its use” (Ostrom 1990, 30).
33
  Her list of examples of such resource systems include 
fishing grounds, groundwater basins, grazing areas, irrigation canals, streams, lakes, 
oceans, and other bodies of water.  
New institutionalism is a form of institutionalism that begins with “broad 
rationality”—the idea that human beings have purpose and plans, and are both limited 
                                                 
33 Hanley et al. 1997 distinguish the meaning of the commons and common-pool resource as follows: the 
commons is the actual environmental asset, whereas common-pool resource or common property resource 
is the property right regime that governs it. 
 
 53 
and capable in their abilities to find solutions to their shared dilemmas.  The 
“institutional” piece feeds into the solution in the form of norms, conventions, and rules 
that both enable and constrain people in achieving their collective action goals.  If strict 
rational choice theory argues that individual decisions are essentially a series of static, 
cost-benefit analyses, then new institutionalism is saying that, yes, individuals weigh 
costs and benefits in making those decisions, but how those costs and benefits are shaped 
and perceived (and sometimes not perceived) is shaped by a broad range of institutional 
factors.   
My criticisms of Ostrom’s work are not meant to overshadow the fundamental 
contribution she has made to the social sciences.  Ostrom’s methodological style is truly 
interdisciplinary in spirit and in practice, and refreshing in its pragmatic autonomy from 
both rationalism and empiricism.  In academia, that is a radical way of doing things.  In 
economics, it has had the effect of throwing not only “the Tragedy of the Commons” on 
its head, but also the market-state dichotomy on which mainstream economics rests.  This 
is a profound methodological contribution, and one that heterodox economists should 
notice.  
 
CPR Case Studies 
Ostrom’s case studies are field settings in which “appropriators” have devised their own 
rules for using their CPRs.  The successful CPR systems are those where the CPRs—and 
the rules the groups have designed to manage them—have survived for long periods of 
time.  “The institutions […] have survived droughts, floods, wars, pestilence, and major 
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economic and political changes” (Ostrom 1990, 58) over the course of decades or 
centuries (in one case, 1000 years). 
One case study is located in Törbel, Switzerland (written by Robert McC. Netting 
1981).  In Ostrom’s Yes! interview with Korten, she says that one example:   
that just unglued me—because I wasn’t expecting it—was the work of 
Robert Netting, an anthropologist who had been studying the alpine 
commons for a very long time.  He studied Swiss peasants and then 
studied in Africa too.  He was quite disturbed that people were saying that 
Africans were primitive because they used common property so frequently 
and they didn’t know about the benefits of private property.  The 
implication was we’ve got to impose private property rules on them.  
Netting said, ‘Are the Swiss peasants stupid?  They use common property 
also’ (Korten 2010).   
 
Törbel is an alpine village of about 600 people in southern Switzerland.  The terrain is 
steep, and there are a range of microclimates based on the variance in altitude.  For 
hundreds of years, the peasants have raised grains, vegetables, fruit trees, and hay on their 
personal plots.  The land they share in common includes pasture, forests, land used for 
waste, irrigation systems, and paths and roads that connect all of these with each other 
and the private land. 
 Legal documents dating back to 1224 detail the various land tenure and management 
arrangements for the five commons in Törbel.  In 1483, the residents formally established 
an association to improve regulation over their use and, in 1507, they set specific 
boundaries, limiting access to Törbel residents and restricting use for those who do have 
access (modifying the rules over time as necessary).  For example, “regulations written in 
1517 stated that ‘no citizen could send more cows to the alp than he could feed during the 
winter’” (Ostrom 1990, 62).  That regulation is still enforced with severe fines imposed 
(by an elected local official) on anyone who violates it. 
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All statutes that establish CPR use are voted on by all local citizens and managed by an 
association of Törbel residents (who own cattle).  They meet annually to discuss rules 
and hold elections.  The elected officials have clearly specified duties: they hire staff for 
monitoring, impose fines, organize maintenance work, etc. 
Ostrom states that the Törbel CPR institutions are not simply holdovers from a 
bygone era, but part of a conscious and long-term effort by residents to match land tenure 
to specific types of land use.  Although productivity for many of these commons areas is 
low, they have also been sustainably maintained over the course of their collective use.  
“The CPR not only has been protected but also has been enhanced by investments in 
weeding and manuring the summer grazing areas and by the construction and 
maintenance of roads” (Ostrom 1990, 64).34     
 
Ostrom’s Theory of Collective Action 
Recall from Chapter 1 that Ostrom defines collective action as any effort by a group to 
organize themselves to retain the residuals of their own efforts.  Any theory of collective 
action must address how groups solve the problems inherent in that action: the free-rider 
problems that the group is addressing, and the secondary free-rider problems that arise 
within the institutions themselves (thus, they become the “commons” or public good).  
Ostrom’s point is that people do find ways to overcome free-rider problems, and a 
comprehensive collective action theory should explain how they do it.   
What Ostrom has discovered is that groups devise complex sets of rules to overcome 
free-riding problems. They create rules with which members must make a “credible 
commitment” to comply and they set up comprehensive monitoring to ensure compliance 
                                                 
34 Ostrom has evaluated thousands of case studies like the Törbel system.   
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with those rules.  Ostrom’s theory of collective action identifies how this is accomplished 
by identifying the specific design principles of those rules and identifying the specific 
factors that predict whether the rules of groups will conform to the design principles.  
The following is a discussion of both of these pieces of Ostrom’s theory. 
 
 
Design Elements of Governance Rules of Successful CPRs 
 
According to Ostrom, the rules of every successful CPR system conform to the following 
design principles, which I will briefly describe in order: 
 
1. Clearly defined boundaries 
2. Congruence between rules and local conditions 
3. Collective choice arrangements 
4. Monitoring 
5. Graduated sanctions 
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms  
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize 
8. Nested enterprises 
 
 
1. Clearly defined boundaries: 
Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the 
CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself. 
 
Ostrom calls this the “first step in organizing for collective action” (Ostrom 1990, 91).  If 
the boundaries of the resource and the rules about who can use it are fuzzy, “no one 
knows what is being managed or for whom” (Ostrom 1990, 91).  The benefits are likely 
to be appropriated by free-riders, and the CPR could be destroyed.   
If there are substantial numbers of potential appropriators and the demand 
for the resource units is high, the destructive potential should all be 
allowed to freely withdraw units from the CPR could push the discount 
rate used by appropriators toward 100%.  The higher the discount rate, the 
closer the situation is to that of a one-shot dilemma in which the dominant 
strategy of all participants is to overuse the CPR (Ostrom 1990, 91).     
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This is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the transition of a natural resource 
from “open access” to “common-property.” 
 
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions: 
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of 
resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring 
labor, materials, and/or money. 
 
“Well-tailored” appropriation and provision rules is the second condition that accounts 
for the sustainability of the successful CPRs.  In every case study, the rules reflect the 
specific features of the particular natural resource.  For example, small differences in 
levels of water scarcity are reflected in different rules for allocating water.  
 
3. Collective-choice arrangements: 
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the 
operational rules. 
 
When CPR institutions apply this principle they are better able to fulfill principle #2 and 
design their rules to the specific circumstances of their resource.   
 
4. Monitoring: 
Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behavior, are  
accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators. 
 
Even in situations where social reputation is important and there are norms for upholding 
agreements, these are not necessarily sufficient for ensuring compliance of CPR rules.  
Thus, in all of the successful cases, monitoring systems are in place.  
 
5. Graduated sanctions: 
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated 
sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other 
appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both. 
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“Now we are at the crux of the problem—and with surprising results.  In these robust 
institutions, monitoring and sanctioning are undertaken not by external authorities but by 
the participants themselves” (Ostrom 1990, 94).  Collective action theories often assume 
that participants will not sanction (and monitor) because it takes too much time and 
effort.  But Ostrom’s case study examples of successful CPR systems demonstrate that 
participants do.  “The appropriators in these CPRs somehow have overcome the 
presumed problem of the second-order dilemma” (Ostrom 1990, 94). 
 
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms: 
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to 
resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials. 
 
Unlike collective action models that assume the rules that structure the strategies of all 
participants are unambiguous, in the CPR systems applying rules is complicated.   
Even such a simple rule as ‘each irrigator must send one individual for one 
day to help clean the irrigation canals before the rainy season begins’ can 
be interpreted quite differently by different individuals. Who is or is not an 
‘individual’ according to this rule?  Does sending a child below age 10 or 
an adult above age 70 to do heavy physical work meet this rule?  Is 
working for four hours or six hours a ‘day’ of work?  Does cleaning the 
canal immediately next to one’s own farm qualify for this community 
obligation? (Ostrom 1990, 100). 
 
The fact that these rules can be interpreted in various ways creates opportunities for 
shirking them.  Conflict-resolution mechanisms allow the participants to navigate this 
ambiguity.   
 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize: 
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by 
external governmental authorities. 
 
When external governmental officials do not give some level of recognition to the 
legitimacy of the CPR rules, and they presume they themselves only have the authority to 
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set the rules that govern, for example, inshore fisheries, then anyone who wishes to 
circumvent the CPR rules created by the fishers can do so by getting the external officials 
to overturn them.   
 
8. Nested enterprises: 
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and 
governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. 
 
Ostrom argues that “all the more complex, enduring CPRs” fulfill this last design 
principle (Ostrom 1990, 101).  By nested enterprises, she means that the CPR systems are 
organized in three or four nested layers of rules, which are in turn nested in local, 
regional and national government in some capacity.  As an example,   
There are two distinct levels in the Philippine federation of irrigation 
systems.  The problems facing irrigators at the level of a tertiary canal are 
different from the problems facing a larger group sharing a secondary 
canal.  Those, in turn, are different from the problems involved in the 
management of the main diversion works that affect the entire system.  
Establishing rules at one level, without rules at the other levels, will 
produce an incomplete system that may not endure over the long run 




Predicting Institutional Change 
The second piece in Ostrom’s theory is a list of predictive factors:   
1. Most appropriators share a common judgment that they will be harmed if they do 
not adopt an alternative rule. 
2. Most appropriators will be affected in similar ways by the proposed rule changes. 
3. Most appropriators highly value the continuation activities from this CPR; in 
other words, they have low discount rates. 
4. Appropriators face relatively low information, transformation, and enforcement 
costs. 
5. Most appropriators share generalized norms of reciprocity and trust that can be 
used as initial social capital. 
6. The group appropriating from the CPR is relatively small and stable. 
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As Ostrom’s research has progressed, this list has evolved.  In Gibson et al. 2000, the list 
of predictive factors for sustainable forestry management included: 
1. Salience: 
Users are dependent on the forest for a major portion of their livelihood (or for 
other variables of importance to them). 
2. Common understanding: 
Users have a shared image of the forest and how their actions affect each other 
and the forest 
3. Discount rate: 
Most users have a sufficiently low discount rate in relation to future benefits to be 
achieved from the forest. 
4. Trust and reciprocity: 
Users trust one another to keep promises and relate to one another with 
reciprocity 
5. Autonomy: 
Users are able to determine access and harvesting rules without external 
authorities counterdemanding them. 
 
 
Finally, in a 2004 International Food Policy Research Institute brief, Ostrom includes 
these attributes: 
1. Agreement by the involved individuals that the problem at hand is important.   
2. The degree of autonomy a group has to take collective action on its own or within 
a nested institutional setting. 
3. Secure property rights. 
4. Participants must also have some level of trust in the reliability of others and be 
willing to use broad strategies of reciprocity.   
5. Prior organizational experience & presence of supportive local leaders. 
 
The following is a discussion of the most current list. 
 
1. Agreement by the involved individuals that the problem at hand is important.   
Individuals must share the idea that they will be worse off if they do not adopt a new rule 
or set of rules.  “At first this characteristic sounds trivial, but it is not.  Government 
agencies frequently complain that local populations do not perceive collective action 
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problems as either relevant to their concerns or within their abilities to address” (Ostrom 
2004, 1). 
 
2. The degree of autonomy a group has to take collective action on its own or within 
a nested institutional setting. 
 
Indeed, collective action can prove to be dangerous for the participants.  “In a highly 
authoritarian regime, independent action is perceived as threatening to the center.  
Individuals who have lived in such regimes for long periods of time are always nervous 
about independent action, even when assured that the regime has changed” (Ostrom 
2004, 1).  
 
3. Secure property rights. 
 
Ostrom argues that those who have been successful in overcoming collective action 
problems typically have a lower discount rate in regard to the particular situation at hand.  
In other words, they value the future and, therefore, exiting is not a viable short-term 
option.  Resource users with a higher discount rate lack the motivation to commit time 
and effort to creating a healthy, long-term governance system. 
These individuals [with a low discount rate] live side by side and farm the 
same plots year after year.  They expect their children and their 
grandchildren to inherit their land.  In other words, their discount rates are 
low.  If costly investments in provision are made at one point in time, the 
proprietors—or their families—are likely to reap the benefits (Ostrom 
2004, 1). 
 
Holding secure property rights, Ostrom argues, is the key ingredient in reinforcing low 
discount rates and the long-term perspective.  
 
4. Participants must also have some level of trust in the reliability of others and be 
willing to use broad strategies of reciprocity.   
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Ostrom doesn’t elaborate, but simply says, “If participants fear that others are going to 
take advantage of them, no one will wish to initiate costly actions only to find that others 
are not reciprocating” (Ostrom 2004, 2).  I will further discuss trust in the inequality 
section.   
 
5. Prior organizational experience & presence of supportive local leaders. 
Ostrom tags these two factors as mechanisms for reducing the transaction costs of solving 
collective action problems.  The costs associated with market transactions—information 
gathering, bargaining, coordinating, monitoring, and enforcement—all apply to solving 
problems of the commons (and to cooperatives).  Ostrom has found that the two 
fundamental ways to minimize transaction costs are ensuring organizational experience in 
the leadership as well as the existence of support from community leaders.  
Unfortunately, she does not explain how effective leadership is accomplished.  This is 
probably easier said than done.   
 
Critiquing Ostrom: Inequality, Rational Choice, and Collective Action 
This dissertation is founded on the conviction that the majority of mainstream economists 
have failed to understand and portray the economy and society adequately.
35
  The power 
of the mainstream school to dominate policy and popular rhetoric is not benign, and can 
be damaging to human and environmental well-being. 
                                                 
35 Heterodox economics is an umbrella term for a range of economic theoretical and methodological 
approaches—institutional, Marxian, Post-Keynesian, feminist, Austrian, evolutionary, ecological, and so 
forth.  The essential element that links all of these, often contradictory, approaches—and defines their place 
in the heterodox tradition—is their explicit objection to mainstream economics.  
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Heterodox economist Neva Goodwin (2008) states that “in graduate school I was told 
that ‘economics is about equity and efficiency: we don’t really know how to deal with 
equity, so we will focus on efficiency.’  The outer circle [heterodox economists], as I see 
it, includes those economists who reject that conclusion, who are at least as concerned 
with equity as with efficiency” (Goodwin 2008, 38).  Heterodox economics takes equity 
seriously, and addresses one of the foundational premises of mainstream economics—the 
alleged tradeoff between efficiency and equity.   
Ostrom’s Nobel Prize win is a promising recognition of the need to combat the 
ideological dominance of neoclassical economics.  Ostrom’s framework, however, does 
not push the boundaries of the mainstream far enough; it is severely lacking any analysis 
of power disparities, and other forms of inequality, which is a primary focus of many, if 
not most, heterodox economists.   
In a 2010 symposium
36
 of distinguished political scientists that was formed to 
understand and critique Ostrom’s work in response to her Nobel win, Margaret Levi 
argues,  
Ostrom does […] incorporate issues of power into her analysis, but it is 
the power to enforce […] By largely considering societies in which the 
power differences are relatively small and where the most important 
conflicts are often between higher levels of government and local 
communities, she does not go as far as she might in identifying 
inequalities of power (Levi 2010, 574). 
 
One of the predominant criticisms heterodox economists have of the mainstream’s 
rational-choice theory is its complete lack of awareness of the presence of power 
                                                 
36 The title of the symposium was “Beyond the Tragedy of the Commons. A Discussion of Governing the 
Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.” 
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disparities that distort individual decisions and market outcomes (See Folbre 1983 for this 
critique within the realm of economic fertility models).  
Indeed, neither Ostrom’s “broadened” rationality, which is the behaviorial foundation 
of her theory, nor the theory itself, provides a discussion of the ways in which power 
disparities manifest across wealth and social structures to impact individual-level 
decisions and collective action outcomes.  As Fine (2010) argues, Ostrom’s “theoretical 
points of reference” might not conform to “the cruder forms of rational choice” (Fine 
2010, 538), but she still conforms to its neglect of the role of power in the economy. 
 Since Ostrom wrote Governing the Commons, the research on the merits of 
community-level natural-resource management has been growing (Jodha 1986; Baland 
and Platteau 1996; Leach et al. 1999 to name a few).  Along with these studies, however, 
are the scholars, heterodox economists included, who have been voicing their concerns 
that decentralized approaches to natural resource management tend to neglect issues of 
inequality.  This concern has gradually become a stronger theme in the collective action 
literature,
37
 and has centered on whether inequality is instrumentally good or bad for 
collective action.  
Olson (1965) himself addressed this question, arguing that inequality promotes 
cooperation among groups by increasing the opportunity for the wealthy few to obtain 
enough benefit of the public good to be willing to provide it, regardless of free-riders.   
Wade (1988) made the argument that a wealthy and powerful minority in the group 
can be particularly effective in leadership roles and are likely to have the political 
                                                 
37 Culminating in an impressive edited volume by Baland, Bardhan, and Bowles (2007) 
 65 
connections that others will lack.  This argument is especially relevant, as Ostrom does 
not address how effective leadership is best achieved.  
 On the other side are those who argue inequality within CPR institutions has the 
undesirable effect of only being reproduced and expanded via the motion of collective 
action.  Agarwal (2006) calls this “participatory exclusion:” the idea that “new 
institutions built on a bedrock of pre-existing inequalities can further entrench those 
inequalities” challenging our “notions of communities as benign institutions” (Agarwal 
2006, 6).   
For example, according to Beteille (1983), access to local common-property in Indian 
villages is determined by caste position, which further perpetuates this social division.  
Hildyard et al. (1998) argued that more powerful groups enjoy “structural dominance” in 
collective forest management.  Finally, Agarwal (2006) argued that not only are women 
typically excluded from decision-making in forest communities, but their gendered 
division of labor means they have a profound stake in the sustainability of the resource as 
well as a deep knowledge of it.  Thus, gender inequality undermines the efficiency of the 
community management of the resource because women’s possession of decision-making 
power can make dramatic improvements in environmental outcomes.
38
  Disturbingly, this 
duality is “unfolding across the globe—in the Amazon, in Africa, and most especially in 
the forests of India and Nepal” (Agarwal 2006, 3).   
 
Trust and Inequality 
                                                 
38 Boyce’s (2003) finding that power inequities can exacerbate environmental degradation complements 
Agarwal’s result.  “The extent of pollution and resource depletion is shaped by the distribution of power: 
the greater the power of the winners vis-à-vis the losers, the greater the extent of environmental 
degradation.  Hence a solution requires a more equitable distribution of power” (Boyce 2003, 12). 
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Returning to Ostrom’s theory, all is most certainly not lost.  The entry-point within her 
framework in which we can think about the impact of inequality on collective action is 
via her emphasis on the social underpinnings of trust and reciprocity.   
Ostrom, with Janssen (2007), defines trust as follows:   
While many definitions of trust exist, all involve a trustor extending 
something of value to a trustee based on an assumption that the trustee 
will reciprocate the faith that the trustee has extended.  A core aspect of 
most definitions of trust is the ‘intention to accept vulnerability based 
upon positive expectations of the intentions of the behavior of another 
(Janssen and Ostrom 2007, 67). 
 
Again quoting Levi (2010), however, “[Ostrom] does not go as far as she might in 
identifying inequalities of power that inhibit trust and constraints on that power, which 
might facilitate trust” (Levi 2010, 574).  True, but in the Janssen and Ostrom (2007) 
piece, she does at least hint at a link between inequality and the presence of trust in 
writing that, along with factors like available information and repeated interaction (in a 
game setting), “the identity and homogeneity of the individuals involved all appear to 
affect the level of trust” (Janssen and Ostrom 2007, 69).   
Levi cites Henry Farrell’s recent work (2004), which distinguishes amongst modest 
and extreme power asymmetries.  In the former, trust is often present and possibly even 
fostered by minor differences in power.  In the latter instance, trust is essentially 
impossible to obtain.  Cardenas (2007) writes that “heterogeneous groups may find it 
more difficult to cooperate if, for instance, there are wealth distances in the group that 
limit the possibility of getting group communication to be effective for building trust, 
cooperation, and a commonly shared goal” (Cardenas 2007, 229).   
  
Inequality and Cooperatives 
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The body of research on inequality and collective action typically focuses on the 
instrumental aspects of inequality, i.e. the way it functions to impact collective action 
outcomes.  What is important to note in the case of cooperatives is that inequality is also 
intrinsically problematic. For cooperatives, inequality in any of its potential dimensions 
(economic and social) is contradictory to the underlying philosophy (at least for the 
cooperatives that adhere to the principles the ICA has set forth and those that interact 
with the global justice movement) and undermines the development goals they have set 
out to achieve. 
There are very few studies exploring how inequality impacts cooperatives.  The most 
prominent is a piece by Banerjee et al. (2001) in which they find that increased 
heterogeneity of landholdings (amongst 100 sugar cooperatives in Maharashtra) causes 
productive inefficiency by causing a lower input price and a lower level of production 
capacity.  
Another piece by Mayoux (1993) analyzes the role that Nicaraguan agricultural 
cooperatives play in empowering women.  Despite the fact that women have been 
encouraged to participate in farmers cooperatives by the Nicaraguan government, gender 
issues have been generally ignored in national cooperative policy and, not surprisingly, 
women’s empowerment via-a-vis cooperatives is insufficient, especially considering 
existing roles of production, which include “childcare responsibilities, the heavy burden 
of housework, and husband’s opposition limited women’s involvement” (Mayoux 1993, 
67).  And Lodhia (2009) documents the fact that in many countries in Asia and Pacific 
the participation of women in cooperative leadership positions has not occurred despite 
efforts of policymakers, academics, and NGOs. 
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Bringing the discussion back to trust, Jones (2004) argues that trust is a mechanism 
by which wealth inequality positively affects cooperatives’ efforts.  “Specifically, the 
presence of perceived economic differences between members of small agricultural 
cooperatives in northwest Ecuador’s agricultural frontier encourages trust in the wealthy, 
thus facilitating coop development during the initial stage of cooperative formation” 
(Jones 2004, 691).  But such inequality may later undermine cooperative efforts.  Jones 
does not argue this, but one reason for this later effect may be that the poorer members 
expect their income and asset levels to rise (relative to the wealthier members) through 
cooperative participation.  If and when this does not happen, members have less incentive 
to be active.   
  
Conclusion 
Ostrom’s theory makes a substantial contribution to understanding how groups overcome 
their collective action problems.  Her methodology should be lauded and used as an 
example, especially for heterodox economists.  However, her lack of attention to how 
inequality functions to impact collective action outcomes is problematic, especially for 
the purposes of this dissertation.  Inequality, particular gender inequality, is an important 
issue in Oromia’s coffee cooperatives.  How the theoretical framework should contend 















CASE STUDY PART 1: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COFFEE  
 
 
All of the major issues of the twenty-first century—globalization, immigration, women’s 
rights, pollution, indigenous rights, and self-determination—are being played out through 
[a] cup of coffee, in villages and remote areas around the world (Cycon 2007, viiii) 
 
Introduction 
The movie Black Gold, produced and directed by British filmmakers Nick and Marc 
Francis (2006), tracks the massive coffee industry from gatherings of Master Cuppers to 
the New York Board of Trade to the virescent highlands of western and southern 
Ethiopia, the reputed birthplace of coffee.  The movie features Tadesse Meskela, general 
manager of the Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union (OCFCU) in Ethiopia and 
follows him over the course of three years as he visits Oromia coffee farmers, travels to 
London to meet with buyers, and attends the 17th Annual Specialty Coffee Association of 
America conference in Seattle—all in a single-minded quest to generate business outside 
of the volatile market for coffee as a mass commodity.   
Black Gold brings to staggering visual form the deep fissures that split the coffee 
world: the image of the western consumer drinking her daily grande latte juxtaposed with 
the malnourished and uneducated children of Ethiopia’s coffee farmers; the image of 
New York traders betting on fluctuations in the price of coffee (the very fluctuations that 
pushed these coffee farmers into such dire poverty); and the footage of a WTO meeting 
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where marginalized representatives of developing countries battle to abolish egregiously 
unfair trade policies. 
Since its release in 2006, US showings of Black Gold at independent theatres, 
colleges and community libraries are creating a broad awareness of the economic plight 
of the world’s coffee farmers, as well as of the new trade paradigms that are gradually 
building momentum.  Fair Trade, the “third wave,” direct trade, organic certification, and 
so forth are all part of a broad attempt to harness the power of coffee cooperatives by 
developing alternative pathways to global commodity chains.  However, as these trade 
alternatives—especially Fair Trade—develop, there is much debate about the trajectory 
that will be most beneficial to coffee farmers, their families, and their communities.      
This chapter provides a detailed picture of the global coffee industry, including its 
early history, its policy narrative, and the uneven impacts of the coffee crisis on coffee 
farmers and coffee producing countries.  It then describes in detail Daviron and Ponte’s 
(2005) concept of the “Coffee Paradox” and their framework of material, symbolic, and 
in-person service attributes that we will use to define the collective action of Oromia’s 
coffee cooperatives.  I then describe the prominent alternative trade paradigm being 
developed in response to the coffee crisis, as well as the mainstreaming debate brewing 
within Fair Trade about its trajectory and how it can be most beneficial to coffee farmers.  
Finally, I further specify the nature of collective action for coffee farmer cooperatives, 
which relates to the mainstreaming debate.   
 
 71 
The History and Policies of the Global Coffee Industry 
The Early History of Coffee 
Coffee is an ancient global commodity—one of the world's oldest.  Common lore 
pinpoints its origins to the verdant highlands of Ethiopia over fifteen hundred years ago.  
As the story goes: when a herder named Kaldi came across his goats dancing, he realized 
that the source of their frenzy was the bright red “cherries” hanging from an unfamiliar 
bush.  Kaldi took the cherries to a nearby monastery, where the monks confirmed that, 
whatever this plant was, it had a powerful, magical effect on humans as well as goats 
(Cycon 2007).  
The Abyssinians were creative in using bunn (their word for coffee).  They initially 
chewed the beans and leaves, but eventually moved on to brewing tea, grinding the beans 
with animal fat for energy, and making wine—kisher—from fermented pulp (Pendergrast 
1999).   
The coffee trade began when the beans found their way across the Red Sea to Yemen, 
around the the sixth century.  The Yemenis were the first to roast coffee beans.  It was not 
until the Ottomans occupied Yemen in the mid-sixteenth century, however, that longer 
trade routes developed—beginning at Yemen’s port of Mocha—and coffee and coffee 





                                                 
39 Coffee consumption was introduced in Europe (via the coffeehouse) in the seventeenth century; the first 
coffee trees had been introduced in the New World in the eighteenth century; and coffee arrived in Latin 
America in the nineteenth century (Pendergrast 1999). 
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The Regulatory Era: the International Coffee Agreements 
By the nineteenth century, the world trade in coffee had risen dramatically, and with it 
the inherent price volatility of the global coffee market.  This volatility prompted the 
formation of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in 1965.  The ICA (1965-1989) 
was an intergovernmental agreement among producing and consuming countries, 
designed to stabilize market prices by setting export quotas.  “The aim was to keep the 
price of coffee relatively high and relatively stable, within a price band or ‘corset’ 
ranging from $1.20 to $1.40/pound” (Petchers and Harris 2008, 44).  Producers 
controlled their supplies by stockpiling coffee, destroying it, and selling it at lower prices 
to non-ICO member countries, namely Soviet-block and developing countries.
40
  When 
prices rose above the agreed ceiling level, they were able to export above their quota 
limits to member countries.     
 According to Petchers and Harris (2008), producer countries found the ICA agreeable 
because prices remained generally high and stable throughout the quarter century the ICA 
was in place.  Daviron and Ponte (2005) characterize the ICA regime as relatively 
successful for several reasons.  First, both producer and consumer countries negotiated 
the quota system (not very common in commodity regulation).  Second, governments of 
producing countries had a certain level of control in export decisions.   Last, Brazil, the 
largest exporter, accepted its shrinking market share, which was a direct result of the ICA 
agreements.   
 The International Coffee Agreement, however, was also beset with problems that 
                                                 
40 Not always made explicit, an underlying motivation of the ICA was the Cold War.  During a Senate 
Committee on Finance discussing the U.S. ratification of the 1962 ICA, Wendell Rollason of a Miami anti-
Castro Organization said of Latin American farmers, “They seek a piece of land, a steady job, a full belly, a 
child’s education...It is going to be us or the Russians.  It’s that simple” (Pendergrast 1999, 278-79). 
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eventually overwhelmed it.  The quotas were extremely costly to negotiate—partly 
because members squabbled over what they should be—and hence they often remained 
unchanged even when consumption varied.  This undermined the participation by 
roasters, who could get coffee from non-members at lower prices (Daviron and Ponte 
2005).  This, along with the waning of United States Cold War concerns in Latin 
America, the ICA was eventually abandoned by its major supporters—the roasters, the 
small producer countries, and the U.S. government—and it was dissolved in 1989.
41
   
 
The Global (South) Coffee Crisis 
In 2001, twelve years after the ICA ended, coffee prices in real terms fell to 100-year 
lows, causing devastation for farmers and coffee-exporting countries all over the global 
South.  The standard explanation of the cause of the coffee crisis was oversupply caused 
by several factors: the aforementioned breakdown of the ICA; the increasing presence of 
Vietnam as a coffee producer; and an industry-wide trend of overproduction.    
According to Prince (2002), in the early 1990s Vietnam was producing about 90,000 
tons per year of Robusta
42
—very low quality Robusta.  “There's good robusta, and not so 
good robusta—Vietnam had stuff that was just about the worst robusta you could grow,” 
akin to drinking a cup of “burning rubber” (Prince 2002, 1).  Nevertheless, with the help 
                                                 
41 By 1994, the International Coffee Organization (ICO), the formal organization associated with the ICA, 
had essentially become an industry promotion group. 
 
42 There are two primary commodity futures markets—located in New York, New York Board of Trade, 
and London, London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange—that determine global prices 
for coffee.  The New York market represents Arabica beans; London, robusta beans.  Arabica beans are 
considered to be of higher quality.  Robusta beans are lower quality, have a higher caffeine content, have a 
more bitter flavor and are generally used as filler for blends.  
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of loans from the World Bank, government provision of cleared and irrigated land,
43
 
subsidies to encourage farmers into coffee, loans by “the big 4” (Nestle, Kraft, Sara Lee, 
and Proctor and Gamble), and the implementation of new techniques that lowered 
production costs on plantations, by 2000 Vietnam had become the world’s second-largest 
producer of coffee (after Brazil)—producing close to a million tons, an eleven-fold 
increase in ten years.  Again, “quality of product was not a concern—maximum profits 
and yields were” (Prince 2002).  
Vietnam’s surge in coffee production was matched by a broader industry trend of 
oversupply in the 1990s.  For example, production increased in India, Uganda, 
Guatemala, and Ethiopia by 20 to 30 percent, while Brazil had a bumper crop in the 
1998-99 growing season (Luttinger and Dicum 2006).  Some of this increase was caused 
by structural adjustment policies that demanded developing countries service their debts 
through increased exports.  “With so many of the coffee-producing nations in the same 
straits, these demands only worsened the worldwide glut, driving countries deeper into 
debt they were even less able to pay” (Luttinger and Dicum 2006, 101).   
The result of Vietnam’s ascendancy as a top producer of coffee and the industry-wide 
production increases was that the price of coffee fell to historic lows.  By 1999, the 
“coffee crisis”—a five year period of record-low coffee prices—had begun.
44
  What 
ensued was nothing short of a disaster for coffee producing countries and farmers across 
the global South.   
The impacts of the coffee crisis have been long-lasting.  “National economies are 
                                                 
43 The country cleared 300,000 acres of forestland to plant. 
 
44 The “C” price did not rise above a dollar per pound for six years until poor weather hit Brazil and 
Vietnam. 
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suffering and some banks are collapsing.  Government funds are being squeezed dry, 
putting pressure on health and education and forcing governments further into debt” 
(Mayne et al. 2002, 2).  Coffee farmers, the majority already living at the edges of 
poverty, plunged even deeper: 
Families dependent on the money generated by coffee are pulling their 
children, especially girls, out of school.  They can no longer afford basic 
medicines, and are cutting back on food.  Beyond farming families, coffee 
traders are going out of business (Mayne et al. 2002, 2).   
 
Farmers had little protection or support at the national or local level, as coffee boards, 
extension services, and other mechanisms had been dismantled during the deregulatory 
era under pressure from neoliberal policies.   
 
The Coffee Paradox 
According to Daviron and Ponte (2005), while the global South was experiencing a 
coffee crisis, the global North was having a “coffee boom.”   
The coffee market has gone through a ‘latte revolution,’ where consumers 
can choose from (and pay dearly for) hundreds of combinations of coffee 
variety, origin, brewing, and grinding methods, flavoring, packaging, 
‘social content’, and ambience.  Retail coffee prices continue to rise in the 
specalty market […] At the same time, coffee farmers receive prices 
below the cost of production (Daviron and Ponte 2005, xvi).   
  
Daviron and Ponte call this “the Coffee Paradox.” They argue that a typical way to 
understand the dynamics of market power in the coffee industry (and in primary markets 
in general) is by defining the growing gap between the price of the raw product (“green” 
coffee beans) and the final product as “oligopolistic rents captured by an increasingly 
concentrated roasting industry” (Daviron and Ponte 2005, xvii).  As an alternative, they 
suggest that “the Coffee Paradox” is better understood in terms of who controls “the 
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ability to define the ‘identity’ of a coffee—in other words to set the language and the 
reference values that determine production norms and quality standards” (xvii).  In other 
words, market power is not just a question of market share but of “capturing the most 
valuable attributes while underming the value of the attributes that need to be purchased” 
(Daviron and Ponte 2005, xvii). 
Daviron and Ponte categorize coffee’s attributes into three groups: material, 
symbolic, and in-person service.   
 
Material Quality 
Material quality is based on official grade standards and includes color, size, shape, 
moisture content, number of defects, presence of disease or mold, etc.  These are called 
“objective parameters” by the coffee industry and can be measured by the senses and by 
machines that separate and sort coffee beans.  Mainstream or commodity coffee (coffee 
traded on the New York and London exchanges) is evaluated in producing countries 




Symbolic quality is developed through branding, packaging, retailing, and consumption.  
These are based on reputation, signaled through methods like trademarks and 
geographical indications, often protected by intellectual property rights.
45
  When 
                                                 
45Daviron and Ponte argue that the main difference between brands and indications lies in the collective 
nature of property for the latter.  Labels are awarded to products provided by enterprises or organizations 
that meet specific criteria.  They are also protected, to some degree as intellectual property, but are in 
principle open to all actors who can match their criteria” (Daviron and Ponte 2005, 128). 
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symbolic attributes do not play an important role in a producer country, its coffee is 
nothing more than a primary commodity crop to be processed and consumed elsewhere.  
 
In-Person Service Quality 
 
In-person service quality is a “product of interpersonal relations between 
producers/providers and consumers”.  These attributes are about not only the quality of a 
physical transformation, but a quality of the “affective work” (Daviron and Ponte 2005, 
128).  This can include the interactions between consumers, the expertise of the barista, 
and the ambience of the coffee shop, or even the particular language used by coffee 
chains like Starbucks. 
 
Alternative Trade Paradigms 
In response to the coffee crisis, there has been a broad movement to develop new trade 
paradigms in the coffee world.  The most well-known of these is Fair Trade. 
 
Fair Trade 
The aim of the Fair Trade system is to directly connect producers in the global South with 
consumers in the North, while ensuring that small-scale farmers earn a price that is 
reflective of the cost of production.
46
  In turn, the farmers comply with established 
economic, social, and environmental requirements, one of the main standards being that 
only producer cooperatives, defined as formally organized groups of farmers, are eligible 
                                                 
46 There are a variety of Fair Trade products, including crafts and textiles as well as food commodities like 
banana, sugar, rice, nuts, tea, as well as coffee. 
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for Fair Trade certification and they, in turn, must follow specific guidelines, such as 
following democratic decision-making processes. 
The Fair Trade movement started in Europe in the late 1950s as missionary church 
groups began importing textiles and hand-made crafts from developing countries.  In the 
1960s, “world shops” began to sell these wares with the goal that the artists and 
producers get a better price than what they received from intermediaries in the traditional 
commodity chain (Conroy 2006).   
As these grassroots efforts progressed, the movement became more organized and 
both the Dutch Max Haavelar Foundation and Transfair International in Germany began 
developing specific standards for selling these goods.  In 1998, these organizations 
merged and established the Fairtrade Labeling Organizations international (FLO), an 
international Fair Trade certifying body with over 24 associative national organizations in 
the global North, including Transfair USA—the sole US FLO certifier (FLO International 
2010).  
For Fair Trade coffee, certification occurs for the two main groups: the producers, 
and the importers or buyers.  Fair Trade eliminates the middlemen in the typical coffee 
commodity chain, and requires that coffee importers pay coffee cooperatives $1.31 per 
pound of coffee and $1.51 per pound of organic coffee.
1
  The importers also required, if 
requested by the producer organization, to pre-finance 60% of the contract value, which 
helps prevent farmers from incurring debt.   
In exchange, coffee farmers are required to comply with the following rules: only 
coffee cooperatives of small farmers are eligible for certification; the cooperatives must 
“have a democratic structure and transparent administration, which enables an effective 
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control by the members and its Board over the management”; they “must not discriminate 
regarding membership and participation;” they must meet a set of specific environmental 
standards; and they must direct ten cents from each pound of Fair Trade certified coffee 
to the cooperative as a whole
1
 (Fairtrade Labelling Organization 2007).
47
   
Fair Trade is not without its controversies.  As the system grows and adopts more 
formal rules and practices, there is arising a “mainstreaming” debate that separates those 
whose main aim is to expand the Fair Trade market and those who are concerned that this 
kind of growth is diminishing the relationship qualities that are the philosophical 
underpinnings of the system.  
Proponents of Fair Trade “mainstreaming” (a.k.a. the “market niche camp”) argue 
that this induces the steady growth of Fair Trade demand, which can only be beneficial to 
impoverished coffee farmers.  The simple reality is that coffee farmers need a steady 
demand for their coffee, and an expanding the Fair Trade market is essential for that to 
happen.  
Opponents argue that mainstreaming is eroding the integrity of support that existed 
for indigenous and peasant farmers and their struggle for political and economic rights 
within the context of their nation states.  “Active and explicit engagement with the 
politics of solidarity and social justice for producers in the global South is being 
dissipated” (Goodman 2008).  This kind of advocacy diminishes as a more standardized 
system implements regimented visits of unknown Fair Trade inspectors only once 
annually.   
                                                 
47 After voting to decide how to allocate their funds, many cooperatives use the “social premium”, as it’s 
called, to build community schools, clinics, roads and bridges, and coffee producing infrastructure. 
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Moreover, as the Fair Trade system expands and corporate roasters enter the market, 
the activist side argues that these buyers are out of touch with coffee farmers.  According 
to Dean Cycon, owner of a small 100% Fair Trade and organic coffee roaster, “Green 
Mountain doesn’t even know where 50% of their coffee comes from”
48
 (Cycon 2006, 1).  
He argues that according to Green Mountain Coffee’s own website, in 2003 only 10% of 
their coffee was Fair Trade certified.   
Another worry is the deluge of certification schemes that have hit the specialty coffee 
market and the concern that this saturation weakens the Fair Trade standards of social and 
economic justice and environmental sustainability.  Some of these certification schemes 
have been instituted by large-scale coffee companies accused of “greenwashing.”
49
   
Starbucks’s C.A.F.E. (Coffee and Farmer Equity) practices and Utz Kapeh
50
 are 
examples of these alternative certification programs.  Starbucks maintains its own 
certification practices, which critics find problematic because it erases the objectivity of 
third-party monitoring.  Utz Kapeh was developed in 1997 by Ahold, a Dutch food retail 
giant, with Guatemalan coffee producers, and is generally considered less strict than Fair 
Trade’s criteria (Courville 2008).  Furthermore, both Starbucks and Utz Kapeh use a pure 
premium model, meaning they pay a premium above the “C” price, rather than using a 
                                                 
48 A Vermont-based coffee roaster that supplies Newman’s Own Organics coffee line. 
 
49 Another potential problem is that behemoth companies like Nestle and Starbucks are becoming “Fair 
Trade companies”, but are only selling a miniscule portion of their coffee as Fair Trade.  Thus they engage 
in a form of “greenwashing” in which a company takes credit for environmental or social virtue that is 
essentially unjustified.  The worry is that consumers will buy from these companies, thinking that they are 
supporting Fair Trade, when they are actually only diluting the much needed consumer demand for Fair 
Trade.  
 
50 “Utz Kapeh” means good coffee in the Mayan Quiche [remember to add accent on e] language 
(Courville 2008).   
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price floor (as Fair Trade does).  This allows for the possibility that the price farmers earn 
could be well below their production costs. 
Advocates of mainstreaming often argue that it is too simplistic to view corporate 
involvement in Fair Trade as a greenwashing ploy (Grodnik and Conroy 2007).  Instead it 
reflects the ways that companies are shifting their emphasis to social and environmental 
accountability, in part due to consumer demand and in part to cultural changes within 
companies stemming from employee pressure.  Green Mountain has moved from 
resistance to Fair Trade to embracing dual-certified organic and Fair Trade coffee, which 
is becoming its fastest growing sales sector (Grodnik and Conroy 2007).  
As Fair Trade shifts to the mainstream, activists, scholars, and coffee buyers are 
moving beyond it to preserve that original goal of building relationships between 
producers and consumers.  Some call this the “third-wave,” out of which a new system 
called “direct trade” is brewing.   
 
The Third Wave of Coffee 
After you break the crust, inhale its fragrance.  Write down the sort of 
aromas you smell….Stir the coffee very gently to lull the grounds to the 
bottom.  Now take a spoonful, take another sniff, and slurp quickly to 
aerate ….   
Brooklyn, NY  January 2008 
So went the instructions given at my first coffee cupping, held by Counter Culture Coffee 
at one of several “third wave” coffee shops around New York City in 2008.  "Use your 
memories to draw out the subtle perfumes and flavors."  I thought back to my childhood 
backyard in Minnesota, pretending to taste prairie grass and crabapple; others claimed 
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spelt flour, watermelon Jolly Ranchers, seaweed, and rubber gloves.  Clearly, at least at 
our amateur level, this was not an exact science.   
The recent manifestation of coffee cuppings–long the domain of professional “master 
cuppers”–offers aspiring connoisseurs a chance to explore and compare the 
characteristics of coffees from the different growing regions in Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America.  Coffee aficionados claim that the subtle and complex features of a coffee come 
from the environmental characteristics of its particular region, much the way wine’s 
celebrated terroir or appellation system produces grapes with their own distinguishable 
features.  Coffee cuppings offer an opportunity to explore the delicate regional variations 
that make a Jamaican Blue Mountain or Tanzanian Peaberry so unique. 
The “third wave of coffee” is a burgeoning movement within the specialty coffee 
industry that elevates coffee making to new heights, and is largely responsible for making 
coffee cuppings a public forum.  If the first wave of coffee was Chock Full o’Nuts and 
Folgers freeze-dried instant breakfast blend—coffee in a can—and the second wave was 
half-caf skinny lattes with a double shot of sugar-free hazelnut syrup, the third wave is 
something else entirely.   
Baristas, tired of pumping candied coffee drinks that no longer taste like coffee, are 
refining their work into craftsmanship.  Their efforts, formalized into the Barista Guild of 
America, involve perfecting techniques for steaming milk to a silky microfoam, 
extracting honey-thick espresso shots topped with caramel-shaded crèma and, more 
philosophically, the promotion of coffee preparation as the art and science of brewing a 
perfect cup.  The third wave has resulted in exuberant sales for contraptions like the 
Clover and the Japanese siphon bar, both reputed to brew transcendent single cups to 
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order with machine prices ranging between ten and twenty thousand dollars.  This is no 
freeze-dried breakfast blend.  
Beneath the obsession—or even fetishism—of coffee’s third wave is something more 
than innovative latte art or the strongest pistons and levers for extracting espresso.  By 
emphasizing the importance of coffee’s origins, the third wave is also emphasizing the 
relationship between specialty coffee buyers and the coffee farmers at the origin.   
John Moore of Counter Culture Coffee, the organization responsible for many of the 
public coffee cuppings in New York (as well as in DC and its base in Durham, North 
Carolina) describes his company’s “relationship-based business model” as identifying 
unique, high-quality coffees and working directly with the growers as well as customers 
to help them perceive the special characteristics of their coffee.  “It’s the reason we cup 
the way we do” (Moore 2008).  Meaning, they don’t just organize public cuppings for 
coffee drinkers, but also hold tastings with the coffee farmers.   
This is critical because most growers do not know the attributes of coffee that are 
prized by consumers; indeed, some do not drink coffee at all.  These cuppings, according 
to Moore, help the coffee farmers develop a palate for the beverage, which in turn helps 
them design growing methods that enhance distinct aromas, mouthfeel, and flavor 
profiles that the company and farmers identify together.   
Illy, an Italian espresso company that has expanded from its humble origins in the 
1930s to become a massive international company that sells to over 130 countries, buys 
directly from the source.  According to Ernest Illy, interviewed in Black Gold, “We 
purchase a coffee that is special, a lot that you cannot exchange with any other lot, which 
is unique, so this is something that does not belong to the kind of negotiation that is made 
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in New York.  New York is commodity, we don’t purchase commodity” (Black Gold 
2006).     
Along with ensuring supreme coffees, third-wave’s relationship-based business 
model also focuses on farmer empowerment and building livelihoods.
51
  Many third-
wave coffee roasters operate within the direct trade certification system.  Stumptown, a 
Portland-based coffee roaster that participates in direct trade believes that quality and 
fairness go hand-in-hand.  The company, like Counter Culture, shares its ideas about 
production methods with coffee farmers, which they argue ensures better quality and 
empowers producers to have more of a stake in their own success.  Furthermore, 
Stumptown guarantees premiums paid out at the farm level for coffees 
with the Direct Trade logo on the bag. We’d be happy to show you 
verifiable documentation proving it. It’s about great coffee here at 
Stumptown, but it’s also about forming and nurturing relationships with 
coffee farmers in the producing world that have become our friends. 
 
Is there a greater satisfaction than knowing you’re about to release a 
coffee worthy of philosophical conversation while simultaneously doing 
what’s right, at a uniquely innovative level, with the folks who created the 
experience? Perhaps only by drinking it in… (Stumptown 2010) 
 
  
Framing the Collective Action of Coffee Cooperatives 
Across the global South, basic patterns have emerged in the ways that farmers have 
responded to the coffee crisis.  Some abandoned their farms and migrated to cities or 
                                                 
51 Beyond coffee, Jaffe and Bacon (2008) see, in the plethora of certification programs that are developing, 
a broader interest in developing alternative, locally-based food networks that are in direct opposition to the 
conventional food system.  One example, in the US, is the growing movement for the Japanese community 
supported agriculture (CSA) model.  CSAs are a system in which community members buy produce shares 
from a local farmer, for which they receive food throughout the growing season but gives the farmer early 
season revenues to purchase seeds, fertilizer, etc. (avoiding debt) and spreads the risk inherent in farming 
among all the participants.  It, of course, benefits the consumer by providing them with a consistent supply 
of fresh, often organically grown, food.  
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outside their home countries.
52
  Some farmers ripped out their coffee plants and began 
growing other crops, including illegal drugs.  And others formed coffee farmer 
cooperatives to build power and wealth in the face of a newly restructured coffee industry 
and as a means to access the alternative trade paradigms that developed, and are still 
developing, in the wake of the coffee crisis.   
Daviron and Ponte’s (2005) conceptualization of coffee as a bundle of attributes is an 
extremely useful way of understanding the nature of the collective action problems of 
cooperatives. Put in terms of the globalization discussion of chapter 3, social distance 
underlies the “Coffee Paradox.”  If coffee is the aggregate of material, symbolic, and in-
person service produced by different actors along the value chains, and market power is a 
matter of capturing the most valuable of those attributes, the power disparity between 
who controls the valuable attributes and who does not (or who controls less valuable 
attributes) creates externalities—vis à vis price distortions—that create free-rider 
problems.  As I will discuss in detail in chapter 7, Ethiopia’s poor coffee farmers have 
had little control over the valuable attributes of their highly reputed coffees, while cafè 
chains like Starbucks have had considerable control.  Thus, while Ethiopia’s coffee 
farmers are receiving a price well-below the “true” value of their coffees, Starbucks is 
selling them at a premium. 
The objective of the coffee farmers is to internalize external benefits via cooperative 
governance, in order to capture these valuable attributes for the purpose of ensuring their 
own sustainable livelihoods.  They can do this by not only accessing the existing 
                                                 
52 In fact, some scholars argue that the coffee crisis is one of the main causes of the escalation of illegal 
immigration from Mexico and Central America to the U.S.; “several Mexican coffee farmers were among 
those who have died attempting to cross the U.S. border” (MacDowell 2005). 
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attributes, but also by defining new ones that they can subsequently control.  Coffee 
cooperatives can, for example, help their member farmers enhance their coffees’ quality 
by teaching them improved processing methods or can create symbolic attributes through 
branding, packaging, and retailing.  (In-person service attributes are more difficult to 
appropriate by producers because, by definition, this occurs in the consuming country.)  I 
will discuss further examples from Ethiopia in chapter 7. 
What role do the alternative trade paradigms have in this story?  Daviron and Ponte 
(2005) call Fair Trade a “sustainability label” and categorize it as symbolic.  More 
specifically, they describe Fair Trade, as well as labels like certified organic, as process-
oriented standards that signal to consumers which products conform to specific criteria.  
Organic certification defines the characteristics of inputs whereas Fair Trade articulates 
the rules regarding the way decisions are made and income streams are partitioned.  
Daviron and Ponte, and others (see Weber 2007) argue that the main problem with 
sustainability labels is that the markets for them are small.  Because there is such a small 
market for these labels, accessing these attributes is difficult.  The cooperatives that tend 
to gain access are those who can afford the certification process.  This perpetuates 
inequality among coffee farmers—in this case, between rather than within cooperatives—
translating income inequality into disparity in the access to the value derived by 
sustainability labels.   
The critique that can be drawn directly from their analysis is that certification labels 
do not necessarily change the power relations of the global coffee trade.  While the 
mainstreaming advocates argue for expanding the market, Daviron and Ponte’s 
framework suggests that the same multinational coffee conglomerates that benefit from 
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“the Coffee Paradox” can also benefit from expansion of the market for the labels, 
without giving coffee farmers much added value.  I would add that many farmers feel no 
sense of ownership over the governance process of Fair Trade, in part because so few 
serve within FLO’s decision-making bodies (Cycon 2006). 
The “third wave” and “direct trade” were not very formed when Daviron and Ponte 
(2005) articulated their framework.  But this new paradigm arguably does more to 
strengthen farmers’ power position in the coffee trade than the other labels, because it 
operates at the material as well as symbolic level, thereby addressing a greater sum of 
coffee attributes.   
Stumptown, for example, helps farmers improve the material attributes of their coffee 
by giving feedback and technical advice on several stages of the production process.  
Through the joint cuppings, they also empower farmers and cooperatives to identify the 
material attributes in their coffee, effectively giving them “the right to know” its value.    
 
Conclusion 
The “global” coffee crisis, in truth, is a misnomer.  The dire impacts of the coffee crisis 
stood in stark contrast to the vast growth in consumption of “grande lattes,” a 
juxtaposition known as the “Coffee Paradox.”  The extent to which Oromia coffee 
cooperatives have been able to overcome their own experiences of the coffee crisis is 












CASE STUDY PART 2: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE OROMIA COFFEE 




Western minds generally associate Ethiopia with despairing images of famine and war, of 
children’s swollen bellies and Soviet supplied AK-47s.  To be sure, there are substantive 
reasons for these stereotypes—Ethiopia has been mired in conflict for decades (with 
Eritrea and Somalia and, within its borders, among its many ethnic groups) and Ethiopia 
is one of the world’s poorest countries. 
Despite Ethiopia’s overwhelming challenges, poverty and war are far from its only 
narrative.  Extraordinary demonstrations of collaboration, entrepreneurship, 
determination, and hard work are also emerging.  One such example is the Oromia Coffee 
Farmers Cooperative Union (OCFCU), whose offices bustle with the commotion of 
selling the world’s finest coffees to the world’s most caffeinated consumers.
53
  OCFCU 
provides an inspiring story of farmers, once debilitated by the global coffee crisis’s deep 
plunge in prices, working together to overcome their perennial hardships, access better 
coffee markets, and give back to their communities. 
The purpose of this chapter is to tell the story of OCFCU, which begins with the 
sordid history of the country’s cooperatives, continues to the challenges and opportunities 
                                                 
53 Including the U.S., Japan, Australia and parts of Europe (Daviron and Ponte 2005). 
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of Ethiopia’s coffee sector, and ends with the birth and growth of the most successful 
cooperative union in the country.  
 
The History of Ethiopia’s Cooperatives 













The fact that cooperatives are having a resurgence in Ethiopia is, well, a marvel.  The 
Derg instituted cooperatives across the countryside as part of their land reform and for 
constructing their particular brand of socialism.
54
  By the time the Derg collapsed, in 
1991, cooperative buildings had been looted, arsoned, and abandoned, and many 
                                                 
54 History often credits the Derg with being the first to introduce cooperatives to Ethiopia.  In fact, it was 
Haille Gabre Sellasie’s regime (1930-1974) that was the first.  But these were fairly limited in scope and 
generally considered ineffective at enhancing agricultural productivity and generating income (Mengisteab 
1989). 
 
PROCLAMATION No. 31 of 1975 
“ETHIOPIA TIKDEM” (ETHIOPIA FIRST) 
WHEREAS, in countries like Ethiopia where the economy is agricultural 
a person’s right, honor, status, and standard of living is determined by his 
relation to the land;  
WHEREAS, several thousand gashas of land have been grabbed from 
the masses by an insignificant number of feudal lords and their families as a 
result of which Ethiopian masses have been forced to live under conditions of 
serfdom; 
WHEREAS, it is essential to fundamentally alter the existing agrarian 
relations so that the Ethiopian peasant masses which have paid so much in 
sweat as in blood to maintain an extravagant feudal class may be liberated 
from age-old feudal oppression, injustice, poverty, and disease, and in order to 
lay the basis upon which all Ethiopians may henceforth live in equality, 
freedom, and fraternity;  
WHEREAS, the development of Ethiopia of the future can be assured 
not by permitting the exploitation of the many by the few as is now the case, 
but only by instituting basic change in agrarian relations which would lay the 
basis upon which, through work by cooperation, the development of one 
becomes the development of all; 
WHEREAS, in order to increase agricultural production and to make the 
tiller the owner of the fruits of his labor, it is necessary to release the 
productive forces of the rural economy by liquidating the feudal system under 
which the nobility, aristocracy and a small number of persons with adequate 
means of livelihood have prospered by the toil and sweat of the masses; 
WHEREAS, it is necessary to provide work for all rural people;  
WHEREAS, it is essential to abolish the feudal system in order to release 
for industry the human labor suppressed within such system;  
WHEREAS, it is necessary to narrow the gap in rural wealth and 
income; 
 NOW, THEREFORE, […] it is hereby proclaimed… 
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cooperative organizers were thrown in jail.  But not ten years later—thanks both to 
remarkable efforts from new organizers who learned how cooperatives can successfully 
function using democratic practices within a market system, and to the substantial 
support of organizations, especially the International Labor Organization—cooperatives 
are increasingly on the rise in Ethiopia. 
 
Land Reform 
Prior to the 1974 revolution that overthrew Haile Gabre Selassie (1930-1974), Ethiopia 
has an extremely complex land tenure system. “In Welo Province, for example, there 
were an estimated 111 types of land tenure” (Ofcansky and Berry 1993).  By the mid-
1960s, Ethiopia’s land reform movement, led mainly by university students, argued that 
the complex land tenure system was archaic and an obstacle to agricultural productivity 
and rural development.  The force of these arguments was central to the 1974 revolution, 
and land reform was one of the first policies that the Derg instituted.   
In 1975, the Derg initiated its land reform program, nationalizing all rural land 
through proclamation No. 31.  The “Proclamation to Provide for the Public Ownership of 
Rural Lands” was considered one of the most radical of its kind at the time, on par with 
China’s and South Korea’s.   
According to Dessalegn (1984), by changing the system of landholdings, the Derg’s 
land reform was intended to change the social profile of rural Ethiopia.   
It has abolished landlordism, tenancy, the hiring of labor, and envisages a 
self-laboring peasantry of small-holders, all of whom have only 
possessory or usufructurary right over the land they cultivate.  All land 
resources and rural assets are ‘the collective property of the Ethiopian 
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people’.  In the rist
55
 areas, the abolition of recurrent land claims and 
therefore of the ‘corporate’ family system […] is bound to have profound 
social and familial implications.  In the South, and especially the tenancy 
areas, the elimination of landlordism, and the removal of ‘outsiders’ who 
previously exercised control over the land of the indigenous population, 
will do away with some of the causes of ethnic discontent which was 
common in the past (Dessalegn 1984, 39). 
 
The Derg also instituted land reform to foster agricultural productivity, which had 
been mired in stagnancy.  “The basis of this development is founded upon a new agrarian 
order in which the independent smallholder will become the major force in rural 
production” (Mengisteab 1989, 37).   
Ethiopia’s land reform policies involved two specific processes: declaration of land 
tenancy rights and the establishment of peasant associations.  Specifically, the Derg’s 
land reform proclamation of 1975 bestowed the right to own land to the state.  Peasants 
could not own, sell or transfer land, but they could claim use rights (usufruct rights) of a 
maximum of ten hectares of arable land.
56
   
The government mobilized 60,000 students to organize peasants into peasant 
associations (PAs).  The purpose of the PAs was to set in motion the provisions of the 
land redistribution policies, as well as to coordinate and strengthen the peasantry.  “These 
rural organizations, which are open to all peasants, were to enable peasants to give up or 
modify their isolated and scattered form of existence, and become involved in activities 
of common concern and benefit” (Dessalegn 1984, 74).   
                                                 
55 Dessalegn (1984) explains that, rather than the term “communal land,” the term “rist” is the technically 
appropriate name for land collectively owned by kin.  In this context, “rist rights” in a farming community 
were held “if he was able to establish descent from one who was recognized to be the original holder of the 
land in question or the founder of the community” (Dessalegn 1984, 17).  Thus, what Dessalegn means by 
“rist areas” are areas in Ethiopia predominated by the rist tenure structure.  Ofcansky and Berry (1993) 
further explain that the principle of rist rights exist mainly in the Amhara region, with some variation 
among the Tigray.  
 
56 Peasants could inherit usufruct rights from family members.   
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Each PA was assigned a minimum of 800 hectares of land to allocate (via usufruct 
rights) to farmers.  Land to be allocated came from those having more than the allowable 
amount, commonly shared farmland, land left fallow or abandoned altogether, and 
government-owned land (Engdawork 1995).  Members of PAs included former tenants, 
landless laborers, hired agricultural workers, and landowners holding fewer than 10 acres.  
Former landowners who had held more than 10 hectares could join only after their land 
was redistributed. 
The land reform proclamation gave peasant associations a broad range of functions 
and power: 
[The PAs] general assembly is the highest decision-making authority, and 
elects the leadership of all subsidiary bodies as well as its own executive 
council.  More importantly, PAs have assumed many of the functions of 
the old local administrative apparatus of the previous regime.  It is the PA 
which is responsible for collecting taxes, resolving community conflicts, 
providing services and maintaining law and order.  The agrarian reform 
has thus drastically restructured rural society, and promises the peasant the 
opportunity to administer his own affairs (Dessalegn 1984, 39). 
 




Between 1975 and 1981, the government issued several proclamations outlining specific 
procedures for forming cooperatives.  Proclamation 71/1975 targeted cooperatives as the 
basis for socialist agriculture, introduced both types of cooperatives—service and 
producer—and outlined their objectives, powers, and duties. 
The service and producer cooperatives were designed to complement each other.  
Service cooperatives were intended to teach socialist philosophy and the cooperative  
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system for the purpose of raising the political consciousness of the peasantry.  The 
producer cooperatives collectivized individual land holdings and labor power, and thus 
were seen as the primary mechanism for creating the Derg’s socialist economic system 
(Dessalegn 1984).   
 
Service Cooperatives 
Beyond their function as a political apparatus, service cooperatives (SCs) were marketing 
and purchasing cooperatives organized by PAs.  SCs held tasks like supplying members 
with consumer goods (based on perceived need), selling members other goods at 
reasonable prices, providing loans, providing storage facilities, promoting small 
businesses, and school development, etc. (Engdawork 1995).   
SCs were promoted to Ethiopians as demonstrating the merits of cooperative activity: 
building capital, making consumer items available to peasants, and releasing producer 
cooperatives (PC) members from shop management duties.  
Because service cooperatives were affiliated with PAs, and membership in PAs was 
not voluntary for farmers, membership in service cooperatives was also compulsory.  “It 
was the Peasant Association rather than the individual that was a member of service 
cooperatives, and the individual peasant, who of course was a member of the PA, had no 
choice in the matter” (Dessalegn 2002, 115).   
 
Producer Cooperatives 
The Derg’s conception of PCs was directly taken from the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European models.  “To those who easily fell into the traps of the revolution, the borrowed 
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concept of PCs had seductive appeal at face value, tempting them to embrace it without 
questioning” (Engdawork 1995, 356). 
In 1979, the government issued a policy edict called the National Policy of 
Cooperative Organization that defined the objectives, responsibilities, and powers of its 
producer cooperatives.  It stated the government’s intentions for the development of 
cooperatives, how the means of production were to be used, membership requirements, 
organizational structures, government support, etc.. (Teka 1988).  It defined producer 
cooperatives as “an economic organization whereby individual peasant proprietors 
willingly combine their means of production, in part or in whole, under one economic 
management and into collective ownership” (Teka 1988, 129).   




1. to bring to an end to capitalist exploitation to see that it is not reinstated in the 
rural areas, and to do away with the exploitation of man by man; 
2. the use of modern agricultural technology to transform fragmented and small-
sized farms to large-scale farming and to develop small-scale industry; 
3. by creating socialism in the rural areas, to safeguard the political, economic and 
social rights of the peasantry; and 
4. to prepare the ground for national planning. 
 
In 1983, the Derg government articulated its expectations for the growth of its service 
and producer cooperatives.  According to its “Ten Year Development Plan (1984-1993),” 
by 1994, more than half of the country’s cultivated land would be collectivized into 
producers’ cooperatives (Ofcansky and Berry 1993). 
                                                 
57 A PC could be established by a minimum of three people who were willing to give their livestock and 
other means of production to the collective and who clearly stated their understanding of the 
responsibilities and benefits of producer cooperatives.  Once a cooperative had 30 members it could be 
registered with the local PA and enjoy legal rights. 
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Neither goal was met.  For a variety of reasons, most peasants felt alienated from the 
Derg’s cooperative ideals and policies:   
The kinds of cooperative activities advocated by the Military government 
were […] foreign to the Ethiopian people.  Socialist cooperatives […] 
were not well received at all by the peasantry.  Although the general 
public shared the concern of resource degradation in rural Ethiopia, only a 
handful of people endorsed collectivization as a policy to tackle the 
problem.  As a result of imposing a socialist policy, serious damages 
occurred on various aspects of the life of the people including 
disintegration of established norms of communities (Engdawork 1995, 
354). 
 
Ethiopian social and cultural lives are a mosaic of collective activities and groups.  For 
example, an Equb is an informal money or credit market organization in which money is 
collected from each member on a specified day of each week and the participants take 
turns receiving the full amount of the funds each week.  Edir’s are groups that contribute 
money to an emergency fund, for times of illness and deaths in families.  Mahber have 
more of a social focus: members take turns preparing meals and gather to eat and discuss 
matters of community interest.  Debo, Jige, and Wonfel are rural work groups that gather 
to share work tasks, as well as eat together (Taye 2007). 
Yet despite these norms of collectivity, most rural Ethiopians despised the Derg’s 
cooperatives because they were instituted with “destructive vigor by party ideologues and 
callous functionaries” (Dessalegn 1994, 195).  This “profoundly destabilized the 
peasantry, exacerbated its vulnerability and ruined what little chances the farming 
population had of improving its livelihood, income and nutrition (Dessalegn 1994, 195). 
It did not help matters that the new cooperatives were notoriously mishandled and 
corrupt.  Money laundering was common and overlooked when party members or anyone 
close with officials was involved.  Leadership was typically ineffective; party and 
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government officials approved all decisions, which forced peasants to wait for 
instructions, sometimes about the most menial issues.  The cooperative leaders promised 
too much, out of their own ignorance and desire to hold power, and often failed to deliver 
on their commitments.  The system never lived up to its espoused ideals of “democratic 
centralism.”  Cooperative leaders felt emboldened by their affiliation with party and 
government officials, threatening members not to ask questions regarding the operation 
of their own cooperatives.  A two-year term limit was never enforced, leaving corrupt 
leaders in place indeterminately (Engdawork 1995).   Finally, many farmers were coerced 
into membership.  “They recalled how they were pushed into becoming a member of a 
cooperative simply because the local political leaders wanted to get credit for organizing 
them….Campaigns were launched by cadres to form as many PCs as possible regardless 
of individual or community point of views or prevailing circumstances” (Engdawork 
1995, 356).  
 
The Demise of the Derg Cooperatives 
 
It is very important to note that the peasant’s conception of [the Derg] government 
initiated cooperative endeavor has been seriously distorted (Engdawork 1995, 359). 
 
When Derg regime fell…it was a really bad time for the cooperative movement in 
Ethiopia… There was so many problems in cooperative movement during Derg, the 
members didn’t like to continue. So they withdrew…simply dismantled the cooperatives.  
And some of the cooperatives were looted (Jena 2007). 
 
 
In 1990, the Derg regime began to implode.  As the government became more desperate, 
it introduced a new mixed economic policy that, among other things, made cooperative 
membership voluntary.  Not surprisingly, most farmers promptly reallocated cooperative 
lands back to the original individual holders and dissolved their cooperatives.  “Hence, 
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most members did not lose time to take action in partitioning the land and their common 
property as soon as they got hold of the new policy news” (Engdawork 1995, 359).
58
 
In 1991, the EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Republic Democratic Front) overthrew the 
Derg regime.  The new government upheld the public ownership of rural land, but viewed 
cooperatives as mechanisms of the corrupt and violent regime of the past.  Meanwhile, 
farmers looted and set fire to any cooperatives that were still in place during the regime 
change.  “Thus the cooperative experiment of the Derg period ended in bitterness and 
violence” (Dessalegn 2002, 115).   
 
Ethiopia’s Cooperative Resurgence 
It took several years for the new government to change its course on cooperatives, a shift 
in mindset and policy that was pushed by the steadfast determination of cooperative 
activists and organizers who held a vision of what cooperatives can and should look like.  
Ethiopian cooperatives would be organizations that farmers joined freely and that they 
operated for their own wealth-building and livelihood security.  They would harness the 
bargaining power of the group to obtain better prices for their products and to buy more 
affordable farm inputs.  These cooperatives would be democratically managed by farmer 
members who are elected, and their profits both shared (paid out as dividends) and 
reinvested back in the cooperative (Jena 2007).   
In 1993, the ILO Cooperative Branch came to Ethiopia and organized study tours to 
neighboring countries “to expose Ethiopian cooperative leaders to the cooperative 
experience in a free-market system” (ILO 2005).  The tours were then proceeded by 
                                                 
58 The exception were the few model cooperatives that were heavily subsidized by the government and 
remained functioning for some time.   
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programs that trained cooperative managers to be leaders in the cooperative movement. 
(ILO 2005).  
Among those trainees were Tadesse Meskela and Dessalegn Jena, the manager and 
deputy manager, respectively, of what is now the Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative 
Union.  
Meskela, a young agricultural extension worker from the Oromo region, came back 
from his cooperative training in Japan in 1994 with a fierce cooperative fever.  Jena, 
having worked in both the Ministry of Coffee and Tea Development and in the Ministry 
of Agriculture, trained (at the same time as Meskela) in Israel and Tanzania.  Together, 
along with other cooperative activists, they began the slow process of organizing farmers, 
and the government, towards building a cooperative resurgence in Ethiopia. 
The first step for the organizers was to lobby the government to legally support 
cooperatives.  They were successful—the EPRDF issued its first cooperative 
proclamation in 1994.
59
  The proclamation declared the importance of making 
“conditions convenient so that an Ethiopian peasant living in rural areas in scattered 
manner by being organized on free will may be able to solve jointly the economic and 
social problems facing him” (EPRDF 1994, 1).  To this end, the proclamation established 
a policy framework for cooperatives to be established on a voluntary basis.  It also 
articulated clear objectives, rights, and guiding principles for cooperatives.   
The cooperative organizers considered this proclamation to be weak as it focused 
solely on agricultural cooperatives and lacked sufficient detail.  However, for the first 
time in Ethiopian history, the legal space opened to organize cooperatives democratically 
                                                 
59 Proclamation No. 85.  
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and within a market setting.   
Once the proclamation was issued, the next order of business for the promoters was 
organizers farmers.  “After [the law was written] we started restrengthening or 
reregistration according to new proclamation” (Jena 2007).  But their early reception was 
dismal.  According to Jena, “It was very very big problem.  Because still [the farmers] 
had bad image of Derg regime.  And members didn’t like to be organized.”   
They decided to do a demonstration project in East Shoha and “after one year they 
started paying dividend to their members” (Jena 2007).  They broadly publicized this 
initial success, which prompted many farmers to form new cooperatives or rejoin their 
old ones.  
Eventually the cooperative promoters pushed the government to issue a new 
proclamation (147/1998), expanding beyond the agriculture sector and creating an 
organizing body—the Federal Cooperative Agency.  It added two features that the Derg 
had forbidden: it set up a clear payment system and a broad organizational structure.  The 
1998 proclamation mandates that cooperative unions deduct 30% of the net profit and 
divide the remaining 70% among member cooperatives.  The member cooperatives, in 
turn, provide 70% of their profit to cooperative members.   
In addition, the proclamation allows cooperative societies to have four organizational 
layers: primary cooperatives, unions, federations, and cooperative leagues.  This 
organizational structure is designed to foster the broader growth of the movement and 
further capture economies of scale.  Thus far, only primary and union levels have been 
formed. 
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By the end of the 1990s, the attitude towards cooperatives thus had changed 
dramatically—with both farmers and the government becoming more aware of the role 
cooperatives could play in improving their lives.  This was timely because in 1999 the 
global price of coffee sunk to historic lows, devastating the already vulnerable birthplace 
of coffee.   
 
The Political Economy of Ethiopian Coffee 
Some Economic Indicators 
Ethiopia is an extremely poor country; its GDP per capita is ranked 171st out of 182 
countries and its HPI-1
60
 is 50.9%, ranking it 130th among 135 countries.  Its annual 
growth rate is rising but its GDP per capita is only $779 (UNDP 2010).
  
Approximately 
forty-four percent of the Ethiopian population
61
 lives under the poverty line.   Most of the 
country’s impoverished live in rural areas—they are mainly small-scale farmers—and 
most rural households subsist on a daily per capita income of less than 50 cents.  A little 
more than half of Ethiopia’s 12 million smallholder farmers have 1 hectare or less of 
land, and about one-third cultivate less than one-half of a hectare—simply not enough to 
sustain the average household (International Fund for Agricultural Development 2010).   
 
Coffee Indicators 
In 2008, the agriculture sector comprised almost 45% of Ethiopia’s GDP, with coffee its 
main primary crop (World Bank 2008).  Ethiopia, arguably the world’s first exporter of 
                                                 
60 The HPI-1 measures deprivation in health by the percentage of people not expected to live to 40 (UNDP 
2010). 
  





 is currently the world’s 8th largest coffee producer and exporter
63  
(International Coffee Organization 2010).  Coffee comprises 60% of Ethiopia’s exports, 
and the country is the largest producer and exporter of coffee in Africa (Petit 2007). 
There are more than 1.2 million coffee growers in Ethiopia and, including coffee 
workers, approximately 15 million households are dependent on coffee for their 
economic livelihoods (Transfair 2007).  The majority of Ethiopia’s coffee farmers are 
impoverished small producers, with the majority holding less than 1 hectare of land.  
 
Coffee Culture 
Coffee is central to Ethiopia’s culture.  In homes in Addis Ababa, in huts in Yirgacheffe, 
even at the airport, elaborate coffee ceremonies are performed—to welcome guests, to 
gather women, to conduct business, to celebrate life, and to mourn death.  During these 
ceremonies, coffee is roasted over a flame, then ground, poured into a pitcher with water, 
boiled until thickly brewed, and served to guests in tiny cups in three rounds.  
 
Coffee Quality 
Ethiopian coffee holds a reputation as being among the best in the world.  “Top Ethiopian 
coffees are sold at high premiums over the New York market price and are essential to 
give ‘character’ to blends.  They are also sold as single origins in the specialty market” 
(Daviron and Ponte 2005, 99).  According to a Master Cupper interviewed in the 
documentary film Black Gold, “There is one coffee here that is probably the best coffee 
                                                 
62 The other possibility is that it was smuggled, not traded, to Yemen. 
 
63 This is down from 6th, probably due to the trade disputes Ethiopia has had recently with Japan, one of its 
major buyers. 
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that I have ever tried.  It’s a coffee that you can put in an espresso or you can sell straight 
or…it’s beautiful…just unbelievable when you find something like this.  It’s Ethiopian 
Harar.  It’s absolutely fantastic” (Black Gold 2006).   
Ethiopia is the only major coffee exporting country that consumes so much 
domestically: approximately 35-40% of coffee grown in Ethiopia is consumed there 
(Petit 2007).  
 
National Coffee Policies 
When the EPRDF came to power in 1991, the new government instituted several reforms 
that reflected broader structural adjustment prescriptions at the time and impacted most 
sectors of the economy, especially coffee.  Coffee market reforms began in 1992 as a 
method for increasing the export price, which would thereby promote production and 
reduce the amount smuggled out of the country.  According to Petit (2007), Ethiopia’s 
coffee reforms have been a gradual process, occurring in phases, and have focused on 
removal of the old state monopoly, more involvement of the private sector at various 
levels, and abolishing price controls and the quota system.  Nevertheless, only partial 
liberalization has occurred and strict government controls have remained in several areas.  
For example, the government continues to maintain the auction; the extent of vertical 
integration is extremely limited through licensing rules; multinational companies are not 
allowed to register as exporters; and local consumption of coffee is severely restricted 
(only rejected coffee can be consumed domestically).                                                         
 
The Coffee Crisis in Ethiopia 
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Given how fundamental coffee is to Ethiopia’s economy and culture, the impacts of the 
coffee crisis in the country were that much more devastating.  At the household level, 
coffee farmers had no choice but to sell assets (like cattle), take their children out of 
school, and reduce their food purchases (Oxfam 2002).  It was described by one 
Ethiopian coffee farmer: 
I have no other income, just coffee.  I don’t even have animals.  I depend 
on coffee for all clothing, food, to pay taxes, children’s uniforms, and 
medical expenses.  Our lives depend on coffee.  Coffee is everything for 
us…Five to seven years ago I was producing seven sacks of red cherry 
and this was enough to buy clothes, medicines, services, and solve so 
many problems.  But now even if I sell four times as much, it is 
impossible to cover all my expenses….I had to sell my oxen for only 400 
Birr to pay back the loan I took out for fertilizers for corn, or face 
prison…My brother has died and I have to help his four sons.  Three of 
them can’t go to school now because I can’t afford the uniform…We have 
stopped buying teff this year and edible oil.  We are just mainly eating 
corn (Oxfam 2002, 2). 
 
Farmers’ struggles were worsened by the “dry check” problem. “Some coffee 
exporters simply purchased coffee at auction without paying any money by issuing post-
dated checks” (Jena 2007).  Those checks never cleared, pulling farmers deep into debt 
they are still trying to pay back.  
Mirroring the global pattern of farmers shifting from coffee to illicit crops, in 
response to the coffee crisis Ethiopian farmers began ripping out their coffee bushes to 
grow an amphetamine called “chat” (or “khat”).  Indeed, chat is much easier to grow than 
coffee, not as susceptible to pests, can be harvested several times a year, and typically 
brings a better price.  Beyond the cultural (and genetic)
64
 loss of switching from coffee to 
chat, there are health impacts, especially from the fact that it is extremely addictive.  “The 
more we chew khat, the more we become addicted” (Thompson 2003). 
                                                 
64 As the birthplace of coffee, Ethiopia is the in situ storehouse of coffee’s genetic diversity.   
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Furthermore, coffee has long been a key source of tax revenues for the Ethiopian 
government.  Thus, the coffee crisis hit the country very hard, rapidly depleting the 
country’s foreign exchange reserves.  The country lost $814 million in tax revenue from 
coffee exports between 1998 and 2003; it lost more still when, in 2002, it reduced the 
export tax in response to the coffee crisis (Petit 2007). 
 
The Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union 
In response to the problems that coffee farmers were facing during the coffee crisis, 
Meskela and Jena directed their organizing efforts to their home region, Oromia,
65
 the 
largest coffee-growing region in the country and the place where coffee was first 
discovered.  “We wanted to establish cooperatives in order to minimize those [coffee 
crisis] problems, to minimize problem of post-dated checks” (Jena 2007).  They also 
wanted to cut down on the role of intermediaries in the Ethiopian coffee industry.  “We 
wanted to avoid middlemen.  If we could export the coffee directly the farmers can be 
beneficiary.  This is how [coffee cooperative] idea emerged” (Jena 2007).   
The Ethiopian coffee industry is indeed a complex network involving many players: 
smallholder coffee farmers, state farms, primary collectors (sebsabies), suppliers 
(akrabies), processors, the cooperatives and unions, exporters, government institutions, 
and international NGOs.   
Farmers sell their coffee to sebsabies, who sell it to akrabies (both must be licensed) 
who deliver to the coffee auction in Addis Ababa (the country’s capital) or Dire Dawa 
(the main exporting outlet).  At the auction centers, the beans are tested by the Coffee and 
                                                 
65 Ethiopia is a federalist state, with administrative levels: federal, regional, zonal, district (woreda), and 
village (kabele).  Regions are divided ethnically, Oromia being the largest coffee producing region in the 
country.   
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Tea Quality Control and Liquoring Unit (CLU) and graded according to quality 
(measured by the number of defects) and processing-type.   
There are two basic processing types: wet and dry.  The wet method (washed coffee) 
involves removing the hull before the beans are dried, and requires specific equipment 
and a large amount of water.  The dry method is less capital-intensive and involves 
cleaning the cherries and drying them in the sun on tables or other surfaces (Jena 2007). 
As opposed to most other coffee-producing countries, which grade and classify by 
bean size, at the two Ethiopian auction centers the coffees from different regions are kept 
separate in order to maintain the distinctions of their respective flavor profiles.   
The coffees that do not fulfill the auction’s export standards are rejected and sent to 
the domestic market.  It is impossible to know how much coffee is consumed in Ethiopia, 
as much of it occurs farm households, but the estimate for local consumption is 
approximately 40% of production (Petit 2007). 
OCFCU has grown dramatically since it was established in 1999.  As of 2008, the 
union has 146 cooperatives and almost 140,000 members (their initial membership had 
22,000 and 34 cooperatives).  In 2001, their total sales volume was 126 tons of coffee; in 
2007, it was over 3200 tons (OCFCU 2007).  Ambitious expansion plans include building 
a coffee business center in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital.  OCFCU has been lauded for 
its role in Black Gold (2006), which has shed light on the severe economic and power 





Table 1  Membership of Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union  







              Source: OCFCU Powerpoint (2007) 
 
Table 2  Volume (in Tons) and Value of Output Sold by the Union in Years 
Year Sales Volume Sales Value (Birr) 
2001 126 2,271,157 
2002 375 7,679,344 
2003 967 18,796,130 
2004 2432 45,309,011 
2005 2691 67,207,845 
2006 3182 86,644,278 
2007 3248 102,725,628 
Source: OCFCU Powerpoint (2007) 
 
Meskela specifically credits both the International Labor Organization and the Fair 
Trade system for OCFCU’s growth and success (Meskela 2007).  The ILO targeted most 
of its cooperative support in the Oromia region, which is now, according to the 
organization, “leading the way in cooperative development in Ethiopia” (Meskela 2005, 
2).  In 2005, Oromia’s cooperative unions comprised almost one-third of all unions in the 
country. 
  
Conclusion: Ethiopia’s Cooperative Resurgence 
1999/00 34 22,503 
2000/01 34 22,821 
2001/02 34 23,043 
2002/03 34 23,593 
2003/04 34 23,593 
2004/05 74 47,912 
2005/06 101 74,795 
2006/07 115 102,950 
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The cooperative movement in Ethiopia is expanding.  The number of cooperatives has 
grown from what remained after the Derg was overthrown
66
 to almost 15,000 in 2005.  
Cooperatives now exist in every region of Ethiopia and in most sectors of its economy 
(Lemma 2008).   
But this burgeoning movement is very young, and the extent to which Ethiopia’s 
cooperatives in general, and Oromia’s coffee cooperatives in particular, will be 
successful at fostering development in this very poor country remains unclear.  The final 
chapter of this dissertation uses Elinor Ostrom’s theory of collective action in an effort to 










                                                 
66 According to Lemma (2008), there were about 7,336 cooperative organizations in 1991, but it is unclear 













This dissertation has explored several layers of the Ethiopian cooperative narrative: the 
mainstream economic perspective of cooperatives; the early history of cooperatives and 
cooperatives’ relationship to the global justice movement; the main tenets of Ostrom’s 
theory, as well as some general critiques; the political economy of the coffee industry, 
including the “Coffee Paradox” and examples of alternative trade paradigms; and, finally, 
the Ethiopian cooperative history, its coffee sector, and the story of the Oromia Coffee 
Farmers Cooperative Union.  We can now draw from this material, especially the 
OCFCU and coffee stories, and return to Ostrom’s theory and the main question of this 
dissertation.   
Can Ostrom’s theory of CPR institutions help to explain whether OCFCU’s coffee 
cooperatives will or will not endure as viable, long-lasting forms of collective action?  
More specifically, does Ostrom’s theory of collective action make sense for 
understanding when coffee farmer cooperatives will be successful at obtaining the most 
valuable of their coffees’ bundle of attributes?   
I begin this analysis by comparing CPR institutions and Oromia coffee cooperatives, 
highlighting their main similarities and their differences.  In this section, I also define the 
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collective action of Oromia’s coffee cooperatives in terms of Daviron and Ponte’s (2005) 
the “Coffee Paradox.”   
The second section provides actual and potential examples of Oromia’s collective 
action, all defined in terms of obtaining the material, symbolic, and in-person service 
quality framework that Daviron and Ponte (2005) present for overcoming the “Coffee 
Paradox.”   
The third section describes the secondary free-rider problems that could potentially 
arise from these examples of collective action. 
The fourth section applies Ostrom’s theory to the way I have defined Oromia’s 
collective action and secondary free-rider problems; these are attempts to connect 
Ostrom’s theory to Oromia and then draw from the Ethiopian evidence.  For example, 
what do Oromia cooperative by-laws look like in terms of Ostrom’s design principles (of 
CPR governance rules)?  To what extent do the Oromia cooperatives exhibit the traits 
that Ostrom argues predict successful efforts at collective action?  Does the evidence 
support the view that these indeed are the factors that foster strong Oromia cooperatives?   
The fact that Ethiopia’s cooperative resurgence is still in its infancy means there is no 
better time to ask these questions, but it also makes trying to answer them problematic.  
Cooperative research conducted in Ethiopia is, thus far, sparse.  Nevertheless, drawing 
from available sources I am able to offer some tentative conclusions.  These sources 
include my personal interviews with Oromia cooperative leadership; the 2005/06 OCFCU 
annual report (the only one translated into English); and, in the spirit of Ostrom’s own 
research methodology, secondary sources that have been essential in gaining an 
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institutional understanding of how cooperatives function in Ethiopia.  From this evidence 
I offer some preliminary conclusions. 
 The fifth section of this chapter returns to a discussion of Ostrom’s theory and 
economic methodology more generally.  I address my criticisms of Ostrom’s theory, 
particularly focusing on her too narrowly-defined frame of governance and her 
inattention to social inequality, which I argue are related.  I then discuss these in the 
context of Oromia. 
 The final section provides some recommendations based on the results derived from 
this analysis. 
 
Solving the Tragedy of the Commons or the Coffee Paradox: Similarities and Differences 
between CPR institutions and Coffee Cooperatives 
 
CPR institutions are collective governance institutions that manage commonly-used 
natural resources.  In general, cooperatives are collective governance institutions that 
democratically operate business enterprises.  In particular, OCFCU’s coffee cooperatives 
are collective governance institutions of coffee farmers who collaborate to process 
(sometimes), market, and sell their coffees.    
Both CPRs and cooperatives are forms of collective action, which, as Ostrom defines 
it, occurs when two or more people act collectively to achieve a common goal: to 
overcome some kind of public good/free-rider problem (whether that be the “Tragedy of 
the Commons” or the “Coffee Paradox”).  The very act of solving collective problems 
produces what Ostrom calls “secondary” free-rider problems.  In other words, the 
institutions themselves are a commons or public good, thereby creating opportunities to 
enjoy the benefits of membership, but shirk responsibilities of producing those benefits.   
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Ostrom says that what defines a successful governance institution in achieving its 
collective action goals is whether or not it is able to overcome these secondary free-rider 
problems.  How groups accomplish this is what Ostrom is trying to explain with her 
theory.    
The key differences between CPR institutions and cooperatives involve the nature of 
their “original” free-rider problems and the mechanisms each form of governance 
institution uses in solving them.   
The original free-rider problem that CPR institutions are solving is “the Tragedy of 
Open Access.”  Individuals using natural resources in a “free for all” scenario (to borrow 
from Boyce 2002) will ultimately degrade the resource.  However, by collaborating in a 
CPR, they transform the open-access resources into common property through the design 
and enforcement of informal rules.   
The collective action of CPR institutions can be described as the creation, 
appropriation, management and protection of a certain bundle of property rights for the 
joint, sustainable management of a common property.  
The primary free-rider problem that Oromia cooperatives are trying to solve is the 
“Coffee Paradox.”  The global trade of coffee has created a vast “social distance” 
(borrowing from Boyce 2002) between who controls the value of coffee attributes and 
who does not.  It follows, then, that the objective of Oromia cooperatives is the creation, 
appropriation, management and protection of the most valuable bundle of their coffee’s 
quality attributes.  
Another key difference between CPR institutions and Oromia’s coffee cooperatives 
involves who makes up the members of the “group” in the respective group action.  In 
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her 8th “design principle” of CPR governance rules, Ostrom claims that the enduring, 
complex CPRs were nested in broader forms of governance: mainly local, but also state 
and national governments.  Coffee cooperatives are nested not only in local and national 
layers of governance, but also their collective action expands to global governance 
structures involving the global justice movement activists (described in Chapter 3), coffee 
buyers who are developing alternative trade channels to help coffee farmers overcome the 
“Coffee Paradox”, and other supportive organizations like the ILO and Oxfam.  These 
forms of global governance play key roles in the efforts of coffee farmers and 
cooperatives to empower themselves.
67
  Their collaboration fosters an enabling 
environment, without which the Oromia farmers could not achieve their collective action 
goals.  This environment includes carefully-designed laws established by the government 
to help lessen conflict and confusion amongst individual cooperatives; the information 
provided by coffee buyers on market conditions and coffee quality that the cooperatives 
could not otherwise access; and the efforts by movement activists in changing Northern 
mindsets from seeing coffee only as their morning beverage to seeing it as a means of 
economic empowerment and self-determination for coffee farmers around the world.  
With this broader picture of collective action—and its range of participants—in mind, 
the following describes some examples of specific collective action efforts (in terms of 
material, symbolic, and in-person service attributes) by OCFCU and member 
cooperatives, which includes the role their broader partners play.   
 
                                                 
67 Their collective action, in fact, involves a variety of players: the government and its various federal and 
regional agencies, Ethiopian civic organizations, global governance institutions like the ILO, USAID, and 
Oxfam, global justice activists, and a host of coffee industry actors, and, most importantly, coffee buyers. 
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The Collective Action of Solving the “Coffee Paradox” in Ethiopia 
Material Quality in Ethiopia 
Recall that Daviron and Ponte (2005) define material quality attributes as what can be 
perceived by the senses (and machines that separate and sort coffee beans).  Mainstream 
or commodity coffees (coffee traded on the New York and London exchanges) are 
evaluated in producing countries solely in terms of material quality attributes that are 
defined by the industry as “objective parameters:” official grade standards that are 
defined by features like color, size, shape, moisture content, number of defects, presence 
of disease or mold, etc.  
One of OCFCU’s most profound achievements was persuading the Ethiopian 
government to allow its cooperatives to bypass the country’s coffee auctions, which 
thereby authorized coffee roasters to purchase directly from the cooperatives.  This has 
allowed coffee roasters to work directly with the farmers and cooperatives, giving them 
technical assistance to improve the quality of their coffee and empowering them with 
knowledge of their coffee’s material quality.  Bypassing traditional trade channels has 
also enabled farmers to get better price information with which to bargain with the 
industry’s sebsabies (see Chapter 6).  Finally, many of the cooperatives run their own 
processing stations, which internalizes another layer of quality control.  
By avoiding Ethiopia’s main trade channels, Oromia cooperatives are able to sell 
their coffees for a price that reflects their very distinct material attributes, which also 
gives farmers further incentives to improve their coffees material quality and potentially 
provides an even higher price.    
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Symbolic Quality in Ethiopia 
Symbolic quality is developed through branding, packaging, retailing, and consumption.  
These attributes are based on reputation and signaled mainly through trademarks and 
geographical indications, which are protected by intellectual property rights.   
One of the most obvious ways OCFCU has worked to symbolic quality attributes is 
by trying to access the value derived from sustainability labels, particularly organic
68
 and 
Fair Trade certification.   
In 2003, OCFCU was the first Ethiopian coffee union in which one of its cooperative 
members obtained Fair Trade certification.  The Fair Trade system has had important 
impacts on Ethiopia’s coffee cooperatives.  These include helping coffee farmers pay off 
debt incurred during the coffee crisis; the creation of savings and credit services; and 
investments in community development projects (Grundy 2005).  However, the problem 
with certification labels, as mentioned in Chapter 5, is that not all coffee cooperatives 
have access to them, and this is true of Oromia’s cooperatives as well.  When I was 
visiting in 2007, Meskela was battling (to no avail) with FLO to get all Oromia 
cooperatives dual-certification (organic and Fair Trade).  As of 2008, however, only 20% 
of OCFCU’s cooperatives were Fair Trade certified (Jena 2008). 
Another way OCFCU and its cooperatives have worked to control the symbolic 
attributes of their coffees is via the “The Ethiopian Fine Coffee Trademarking and 
Licensing Initiative.”  Started in 2004, this is a collaborative project between Light Years 
IP,
69
 the Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office, and the Ethiopian Fine Coffee 
                                                 
68 All OCFCU coffees are organically grown.   
 
69 Lightyears Trade is a non-profit organization committed to helping developing country producers access 
their intellectual property, use it to increase their export income, and improve their livelihood security.  
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Stakeholder Committee, which is comprised of coffee unions (including OCFCU), coffee 
exporters, and other groups.    
The purpose of the collaboration is to help Ethiopians free themselves of the generic 
Arabica commodity market by branding Ethiopia as the birthplace of coffee—the home 
of Arabica—and obtaining a better price for their coffee.   
Prior to the trademarking and licensing initiative, Ethiopia was receiving 
as low as 6% of the final retail price for its fine coffees. Farmers were 
receiving about $1 per kilo, with the exporting sector receiving about $2 
per kilo. Wholesalers receive about $6-11 per kilo, with the final retail 
price about $20-28 per kilo. In one promotion in the United States in 2005, 
the retail price for Sidamo reached an astounding $57.20 per kilogram 
(Light Years IP 2009).  
 
The group specifically targeted Ethiopia’s three most prominent coffees: Yirgacheffe, 
Harar, and Sidamo.  The three main brands were secured with trademark registrations in 
around 30 countries and distributors were required to obtain licenses to sell them.   
The first year of licensing saw improved bargaining positions and, thereby, higher 
export prices.  For example, OCFCU reported that in 2007 that farmers in the Yirgacheffe 
region saw their incomes double from 2006 (Jena 2008).  
   
In-Person Service Quality 
In-person service quality attributes are a “product of interpersonal relations between 
producers/providers and consumers” (Daviron and Ponte 2005, 128).  They are not only 
about the quality of a physical transformation, but a quality of the “affective work” 
(Daviron and Ponte 2005, 128).  This can include the interactions between consumers, the 
expertise of the barista, and the particular ambience of the coffee shop, even the 
particular language used by coffee chains, an example being Starbucks’s naming 
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practices for its coffee sizes: “tall,” “grande,” “venti,” and “trente,” which is the newly-
tested 32 ounce size. 
Accessing in-person service quality is, of course, more difficult for cooperatives 
because, by definition, they must have direct contact with the coffee consumer.  
However, there are some examples of cooperatives in Latin America that have 
established coffee shops that sell their own farmers’ coffee.  It might be possible for 
Oromia to follow suit.  Another potential course of action would be performing their 
coffee ceremony in coffee shops in consuming countries.  As a kind of cultural program, 
coffee shops could host (women-led) coffee ceremonies featuring their coffees, a 
“service” that only Ethiopians could provide.  Finally, coffee shops could invite coffee 
farmers to visit and speak about their coffees, their experiences during the coffee crisis, 
the impacts that the sustainability labels and the trademark initiative have offered their 
communities, etc..   
 
Potential Second-Order Free-Rider Problems 
According to Ostrom’s theory, solving collective action problems (free-rider problems) 
brings with it new, “secondary” free-rider problems.  The following provides some 
potential free-rider scenarios that arise via Oromia’s collective action to obtain the value 
of their coffees’ material and symbolic quality.  (I have excluded a discussion of in-





There is a vast range of opportunities for shirking in this setting.  For example, farmers 
could try to get a higher price for their coffee than its value by adding rocks to their 
coffee bags.  They might be unwilling to invest in the cooperative’s capital 
improvements, e.g. washing equipment and storage facilities.  They could simply not sell 
their coffee to their cooperative, opting to sell to the sebsabies (for a higher price) 
instead.  They might skimp in their growing methods, knowing they will get the 
cooperative price regardless.  At the same time, cooperative managers could cheat the 
farmers by, for example, not paying them in full or in a timely manner.    
Similar free-rider problems could occur amongst cooperatives within OCFCU.  For 
example, cooperatives, or their representatives, could try to shirk their organizational 
responsibilities to the union.  Any carelessness in a cooperatives’ processing methods 
would also impact the marketing efforts of the union as a whole.   
 
Symbolic Quality 
Daviron and Ponte (2005) defined Fair Trade etc. as “sustainability labels” under the 
umbrella of symbolic quality.  Free-riding problems associated with fair trade, for 
example, would involve cooperatives somehow “shading” (Princen 1997) their labor or 
organizational practices.  Direct trade buyers could try to capture part of the farmer’s and 
cooperative’s coffee price for themselves.  Finally, roasters could ‘greenwash” altogether, 
using a sustainability label without paying the premium for it or falsifying a coffee’s 
symbolic quality altogether.   
These are just a few examples that free-riding problems can arise from collective 
action (framed in terms of obtaining valuable coffee attributes).  The next step in this 
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analysis is to consider how the two main aspects of Ostrom’s theory—the design 
principles of CPR rules and predictors of CPR institutional success—apply to the 
collective action of Oromia’s coffee cooperatives.  Can the features of her theory explain 
whether Oromia can and will overcome its secondary free-rider problems? 
 
Ostrom and Oromia 
The Design Principles of OCFCU Cooperative By-Laws 
As review, Ostrom argued that in order to overcome secondary collective action 
problems (and be successful), any CPR institution must have rules in place that conform 
to the following design principles. 
1. Clearly defined boundaries 
2. Congruence between rules and local conditions 
3. Collective choice arrangements 
4. Monitoring 
5. Graduated sanctions 
  6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms  
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize 
8. Nested enterprises 
 
We can proceed by looking at the analogous “design principles” for cooperative 
governance rules.  Most of Oromia cooperatives have instituted by-laws that are 
prescribed by Ethiopian law, which itself was shaped by the ICA principles and 
recommendations (via ILO consulting).  These specifications for cooperatives are 
analogous to Ostrom’s design principles for CPRs.   
The 1998 Ethiopian cooperative proclamation (#147) mandated that every society 
have by-laws.  The specifications for Ethiopia’s cooperative by-laws are as follows:  
(1) name and address of the society;  
(2) objectives and activities of the society; 
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(3) working place (area) of the society;  
(4) requirements necessary for membership of the society;  
(5) the rights and duties of members of the society;  
(6) the powers, responsibilities, and duties of management bodies;  
(7) conditions for withdrawal and dismissal from membership;  
(8) conditions for reelection, appointment, term of office and suspension or dismissal  
      of the members of the management committee or other management bodies;  
(9) conditions for calling of meeting and voting of the society;  
(10) allocation and distribution of profit;  
(11) auditing;  
(12) employment of workers;  
(13) other particulars not contrary to this Proclamation. 
 
Furthermore, the Federal Cooperative Agency (FCA)
70
 has now prepared ten by-laws for 
cooperatives to use, which most Ethiopian cooperatives simply appropriate (Emana 
2009). 
 How do these specifications compare to Ostrom’s design principles?  Specifically, do 
they conform to what she observed makes good CPR governance rules?  Do her design 
principles make sense in the Oromia context? 
Ostrom’s principle of “clearly defined boundaries” would not fit for cooperatives in 
general because, by ICA definition, cooperatives are meant to be “open to all people able 
to use their services and willing to accept the responsibilities of membership, without 
gender, social, racial, political or religious discrimination” (Birchall 1997).  Because 
most cooperatives explicitly embody principles of democracy and economic and social 
equality, they do not have a size restriction.  Ethiopia’s cooperative laws also adhere to 
the ICA principle of open membership.  
The particular design element that I want to focus on is the need for monitoring and 
enforcement.  According to Ostrom, the design of monitoring rules and punishment by 
                                                 
70 Founded in 2004 by the Federal government  
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the group gives the group a sense of ownership and accountability that could not develop 
if an external agent was trying to detect cheating and deciding the punishments.   
The Ethiopian recommendations include a specification for auditing.  According to a 
manual on the design of cooperative by-laws (for U.S. agricultural cooperatives), auditing 
is “a condition sine qua non for the existence of any cooperative system.  As it becomes 
difficult to involve the members directly in the running of the cooperative enterprise, it 
becomes ever more important to provide for transparency of the management in order to 
preserve the democratic nature of the cooperatives” (Henry 2005, 49).  The hitch is that 
most cooperatives, and this applies to Ethiopia’s cooperatives, employ independent 
auditors.
71
  In fact, Henry (2005), in writing recommendations for the design of 
cooperative legislation (for the ILO), argues auditors should be “qualified and 
independent.”  In other words, auditors should be external agents.   
What would Ostrom say to this recommendation and the general practice of external 
auditing?  I think her broader point is that groups working together should feel a sense of 
ownership over their efforts and one way that happens is through the design and 
enforcement of their own rules.  To feel a sense of ownership over their own 
cooperatives, they need to feel a sense of proprietorship over the by-laws that they use to 
govern themselves.   
In Ethiopia, unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case.  On the surface, the 
Ethiopian legal specifications for by-laws leave room for context-based adaptation, but 
according to Lemma (2008), cooperatives are on a fairly short-leash (in general, and in 
terms of by-law design).  For example, cooperatives are required to submit to the Federal 
                                                 
71 Interestingly, monitoring and sanctioning of other forms of community-based collective action in 
Ethiopia (Edir, Equb and so one) are governed by the group, not externally. 
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Cooperative Agency (also formed in the 1998 Proclamation) the minutes of the founding 
meeting, the by-laws of the cooperative, names, addresses and signatures of all members, 
and the names of the management committee.  Furthermore, the enforcement of the by-
law specifications is often very strict.  For example, it is difficult for cooperatives to 
change the number of terms for serving on a board (e.g. from 2 to 3 years) and to engage 
in any economic activities not clearly specified in earlier by-laws.  In other to change the 
by-laws in any substantive way, it has to re-register the cooperative (and pay the 
registration fee again).
72
  “According to the information of local NGOs working with 
cooperatives, the by-laws as allowed by the proclamation are not flexible enough to 
accommodate the interests of cooperatives” (Lemma 2008, 136).  Kodama’s (2007) 
fieldwork with the Yirgecheffe Cooperative Union (YCFCU) supports this claim, finding 
that while its cooperatives seem to function democratically—e.g. the selection of 
management was conducted according to the by-laws—there was a lot of apathy 
exhibited and his interviews revealed that most members did not feel any sense of 
ownership of their cooperatives, that they were not “their” organizations.  
Ostrom’s theory would argue that without a sense of agency, independence, and 
ownership over their own organizations, which at least partially stems from designing 
their own rules, Oromia and Ethiopia’s cooperatives are less able to overcome their free-
rider problems, which ultimately threatens their long-term viability.  
 
Predictive Factors of Success 
                                                 




Ostrom argued that there are elements she observed across all successful CPR institutions 
that predict whether or not CPR institutions will institute governance rules that conform 
to the above design principles.  As review, these factors are the following: 
1. Agreement by the involved individuals that the problem at hand is important.   
2. The degree of autonomy a group has to take collective action on its own or within 
a nested institutional setting. 
3. Secure property rights. 
4. Participants must also have some level of trust in the reliability of others and be 
willing to use broad strategies of reciprocity.   
5. Prior organizational experience & presence of supportive local leaders. 
 
Because some of these issues in Ethiopia are more complicated than others, I discuss the 
simpler elements first.  
 
1. Agreement by the involved individuals that the problem at hand is important. 
Ostrom’s point was that local populations need to “perceive collective action problems as 
either relevant to their concerns or within their abilities to address.”  Residents will not 
engage collective action to support a wildlife refuge, for example, if they do not benefit 
in tangible ways.  
I would rephrase this to “Participants agree that the solution at hand is viable and 
have reasonable expectations for it.”  Considering Ethiopia’s cooperative history, the 
status of farmers’ perception of cooperatives is a fundamental issue.  Meskela and Jena 
both described the great difficulty they had in convincing farmers that cooperatives were 
a viable route out of poverty.  On the other hand, they now face the dilemma that some 
farmers have outsized expectations of their cooperatives and union, well beyond the aims 
and the capacity of these organizations (Jena 2007).  A successful cooperative has a 
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membership base that believes in cooperatives (both philosophically and practically), but 
also has reasonable expectations about the capacity of cooperatives to serve its members.  
 
 
2.  Prior organizational experience & presence of supportive local leaders. 
 
Ostrom very briefly explains (2004) that these are the key elements to overcoming the 
transaction costs associated with organizing collective action.  I would emphasize the 
importance of supportive, experienced leadership within the organization (not just 
locally).   
I would also add that these leaders must uphold the cooperative idea strongly.  When 
we look back at the early history of cooperatives in Europe (Chapter 3), the birth of each 
type of cooperative was directly linked to the role of strong leaders (usually more than 
one) who carried with them the vision and belief in the cooperative idea and worked 
steadfastly to bring that vision to reality. 
 The relationship between the EPRDF and Ethiopia’s citizens has had a problematic 
effect on the presence of leadership in Ethiopia’s cooperatives.  According to an article in 
the Economist (2010), “Ethiopia has a cheap and disciplined workforce,” but few with the 
skills and capacity to think creatively and take on leadership roles.  Many among those 
who do have these are either in jail, in the diaspora, or generally disinterested in 
supporting what they perceive to be a government program or worse, a reprise of the 
Derg’s cooperative program.   
Successful Oromia cooperatives specifically require skilled and committed leadership 
to promote cooperatives (especially considering Ethiopia’s history), run the 
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organizational meetings, host coffee buyers, and other players in the coffee world, and 
serve as the main conduit between OCFCU and the coffee farmers.   
Meskela argues that the ILO leadership training and support has been crucial to the 
growth of OCFCU (Jena 2007).  But, competent, educated leadership in Oromia 
cooperatives is not abundant, which OCFCU argues is a substantial impediment to 
cooperative success (The Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union 2005/06).       
 
3.  Participants must have some level of trust in the reliability of others and  
be willing to use broad strategies of reciprocity.   
 
Ostrom argues that it is necessary for CPR appropriators to trust each other to keep 
promises, which impacts their sense of reciprocity. “If participants fear that others are 
going to take advantage of them, no one will wish to initiate costly actions only to find 
that others are not reciprocating” (Ostrom 1990, 2). 
 As described in Chapter 4, trust is a primary entry point for thinking about the 
instrumental ways inequality functions in collective action.  But the extent to which 
wealth and power inequality fosters or hinders collective action outcomes is not clear, 
especially in Ethiopia where so little research has been done.   
Recall that Farrell found that moderate disparities can foster trust, whereas larger 
inequalities undermine it.  Cardenas (2007) argued that when heterogeneous groups also 
have large wealth distances, it undermines the ability to build trust.  Finally, in terms of 
cooperatives, Jones (2004) found that inequality fostered trust in the initial stages of 
cooperative development, but undermined it in later stages.   
The few studies on Ethiopia’s current cooperatives include no discussion of the role 
that trust plays in overcoming collective-action problems, nor of the ways inequality 
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encourages or undermines the development of trust.  Nevertheless, we can proceed with 
the assumption that Ostrom is correct; trust is extremely important, not only within 
cooperatives, but across the other forms of collective action between cooperatives and 
their union and between cooperatives, the union, and coffee buyers.   
 
4.  Secure property rights. 
 
Ostrom argues that those who have been successful in overcoming collective action 
problems typically have a lower discount rate in regard to the particular situation at hand.  
Resource users with a higher discount rate lack the motivation to commit time and effort 
to creating a healthy, long-term governance system. 
These individuals [with a low discount rate] live side by side and farm the 
same plots year after year.  They expect their children and their grandchildren 
to inherit their land.  In other words, their discount rates are low.  If costly 
investments in provision are made at one point in time, the proprietors—or 
their families—are likely to reap the benefits (Ostrom 2004, 1). 
 
Holding secure property rights, Ostrom argues, is the key ingredient in reinforcing low 
discount rates and the long-term perspective.  
There is a well-developed body of research on security of tenure and its impact on 
agricultural productivity.  The need for tenure security is also brandished in land reform 
debates, typically by proponents of private property (see Abegaz 2004 for this argument 
applied to Ethiopia).  Thus, tenure security could potentially be important for 
cooperatives.  It shapes the incentives for contributing to institutional development, but it 
also shapes the incentives for enhancing coffee production, which itself is crucial to 
successful coffee cooperatives and their efforts to obtain the attributes of their coffees. 
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What is the evidence regarding tenure security for OCFCU cooperatives?  The 
EPRDF has made minimal changes to Ethiopia’s land policy since the Derg’s 1975 
proclamation.  According to wa Githinji (2005), the EPRDF “realizing the political 
sensitivity of the land question and also as a matter of practical political purposes, 
decided to retain the public ownership of rural land” (wa Githinji 2005, 7).  (In fact, 
according to Nega et al. 2003, it upheld state ownership in the new federal constitution of 
1995.) 
Despite these measures, the land reform debate is alive and well in Ethiopia, with 
arguments falling along the standard fault lines of state versus private ownership.  The 
state and ruling party advocate for public ownership while most external economic 
advisors and opposition political parties tend to favor private ownership. 
Deininger et al. 2003 asked the Ethiopian farmers themselves how they perceived 
their tenure stability.  They found that farmers indicated attaining tenure security was 
more of a priority than the ownership form.  Their data suggest that the farmers preferred 
a flexible landholding system centered on providing security of tenure.  From Ostrom’s 
theory, we can conclude that the farmers’ lack of a sense of security in their user rights to 
land could pose a problem for the viability of cooperatives in Oromia and Ethiopia.   
 
 
5.   The degree of autonomy a group has to take collective action on its own or  
within a nested institutional setting.  
 
Ostrom’s point is a group’s collective action can prove to be dangerous for the 
participants, since “in a highly authoritarian regime, independent action is perceived as 
threatening to the center.  Individuals who have lived in such regimes for long periods of 
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time are always nervous about independent action, even when assured that the regime has 
changed” (Ostrom 2004, 1).   
For the CPR institutions, the threat of a political regime is delivered via hostility the 
rights of its citizens, lessening their incentives to organize.  The other threat, as Ostrom 
described in Governing the Commons, is the threat of underestimating the capacity of 
citizens to effect the outcomes that are best for them.   
 For OCFCU cooperatives the threats from the government to collective action efforts 
are reversed to some extent.  There is indeed the general threat of tyranny, but, in terms 
of cooperatives, there is also the threat of forced participation (even if not with the threat 
of force, then via political pressure), not the prevention of participation.  For OCFCU 
cooperatives, for all Ethiopian cooperatives, both of these threats remain a serious 
concern to their viability, and the viability of the country’s cooperative movement.   
The Ethiopian government, ruled by Meles Zenawi since 2000, has severely restricted 
individual political freedom.  Several international institutions, including the Human 
Rights Watch, claimed that the 2005 election violated basic fair voting practices (Human 
Rights Watch 2010).  That election, and its violent aftermath, exposed the current lack of 
civil liberties. 
 “When the EPRDF came to power in 1991, it adopted a national charter and to their 
great joy, journalists were informed that except in matters concerning state security, they 
were free to enjoy full rights to disseminate information in any shape or form without 
state interference” (Milkias 2006, 21).  In reality, this has not come to pass.  The Ministry 
of Information frequently cancels the licenses of publications it deems “irresponsible.” 
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Much worse, between 1992 and 2005, 16 Ethiopian journalists were killed by the state’s 
armed “death squads.”  Many more are still in prison. 
 According to the Economist magazine, as part of his “revolutionary democracy,” 
Prime Minister Meles “contends that a strong hand and development in the villages—
rather than liberalizing markets—is the way forward” (The Economist 2010).  Part of that 
“way forward” is a national cooperative policy that plans to restructure and strengthen 
cooperatives, increasing membership as a proportion of the Ethiopian population from 
30% in 2005 to 70% by 2010 (Teshome 2006).   
 Critics of the current cooperative movement argue that it has devolved into a 
government program and that the individuals running these organizations “are not 
peasants themselves but government functionaries who favored those who voted for the 
EPRDF and punished those who supported the opposition parties” (Milkias 2006, 25).   
 We thus have a situation in which a government does not the respect the democratic 
rights of the Ethiopian people, while at the same time it has turned the cooperative 
movement into a government policy.  In light of Ostrom’s argument that group’s cannot 
overcome their collective-action problems in such a context, it is logical to conclude that 
cooperatives in Ethiopia will, at the very least, not meet their full potential.  At worst the 
political setting will hamper the cooperative movement altogether.   
 
Preliminary Conclusions 
The conclusion that can be drawn by applying Ostrom’s theory to the collective action 
efforts of Oromia’s (and Ethiopia’s) cooperatives is not encouraging.  Many cooperatives 
lack experienced, effective leadership; many farmers bring with them, from the Derg era, 
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their tarnished perceptions of cooperatives (and yet some now have outsized expectations 
of their potential); farmers on the whole report feeling that their property rights are 
insecure; and the autonomy of cooperatives is threatened by the state’s general treatment 
of its citizens and its cooperative policies.   
 The only potentially auspicious element for Ethiopian coffee cooperatives, in 
overcoming their collective-action problems is the role of trust, which is a heavy burden 
on one particular factor, for which we have no evidence.  Before I offer some potential 
opportunities for building trust amongst Oromia cooperative members, the union, and 
their coffee buyers, as well as recommendations in general, I want to return to my 
broader discussion of Ostrom’s theory. 
 
Returning to Ostrom’s Theory 
This dissertation has called into question mainstream economic methodology, which, 
according to Grapard (1999), can have two meanings.  First, it is an epistemological 
process involving the ways that economists decide what is economic knowledge.   
As such it deals with issues of disciplinary authority and legitimation: it 
addresses questions about who gets to define the domain of economic 
inquiry, how it is decided which activities will be the subject of economic 
inquiry, which variables will be considered important economic variables, 
and which assumptions the world and the nature of scientific analysis 
economists will adhere to (Grapard 1999, 545).   
 
  The second meaning refers to the tools and techniques economists use—the 
theoretical models and empirical methods—to articulate economic relations.  To my 
mind, what defines neoclassical economics is the convergence of these two meanings of 
methodology.  In other words, from the perspective of the mainstream, what conforms to 
the standard economic models is, indeed, what is “economics.”   
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Given that standard economic models are described through the language of calculus 
(the same language of mechanical physics), what is defined as “economic” is essentially 
the market and its various components.  The economy is comprised of “rational” actors 
spontaneously converging via perfectly competitive markets on the holy grail, Pareto 
efficiency.  
Anything that diverges from that narrative gets a rewrite to fit into the main storyline.  
Individual rational actors, not collaborative groups comprised of members with a range of 
motivations and abilities, simultaneously use (and degrade) natural resources.  
Cooperatives, comprised of rational actors, form organizations not to redress social 
injustice, but to maximize profit.   
Given that these narratives were born in the academy, it is easy to assume they are 
harmless.  But, as the “queen” of social sciences, economics plays a predominant role in 
shaping popular rhetoric about the economy (McCloskely 2000, 236),.  
 As Ostrom has articulated so well, economics also profoundly shapes the way policy 
is designed and implemented.  When models that are meant to be illustrative metaphors 
are used to set policy, they threaten the communities that are trying to develop solutions 
to the problems before them, efforts that are essentially ignored or at best “exogeneous” 
in the models.  
What happens when we change our definition of the economy?  Instead of viewing 
the economy simply as a vast set of markets, we follow Boyce’s (2002) lead and take 
Karl Polanyi’s (and “old” institutionalists in general) conception of the economy as 
comprised of markets and the social institutions that shape and constrain market activity.  
Add to that picture a much broader conception of human behavior than what underpins 
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the market-efficiency paradigm, and our picture of the economy is more comprehensive 
and more complex.  It also allows us to ask more questions. 
Trying to identify and understand patterns in this more comprehensive economic 
sketch becomes more difficult than when the economy is so narrowly defined.  This is 
especially true for framing collective action.  According to Bowles and Gintis (2002), 
“communities solve problems in a bewildering variety of ways with hundreds of differing 
membership rules, de facto property rights, and decision-making procedures” and thus 
“there can be no blueprint for ideal community governance” (Bowles and Gintis 2002, 
F31).   
Instead of the mainstream economic theories to which we are accustomed—which 
Ostrom argues are really models, not theories—the best we can do is to identify the 
common elements that make “good governance” at the group level.  Rather than a 
mathematical model, this style of theory reads more like a recipe, one that can be passed 
from hand to hand and adapted as needed, the way a cake recipe is often slightly altered 
to account for changes in kitchen humidity, altitude, the hot spots of an old oven, and the 
temperament and preferences of the baker.    
 With that in mind, this “baker” wants to make a few changes to Ostrom’s “recipe.”  In 
particular, I want to add to her “list of ingredients” to better address and incorporate the 
issues of inequality and more comprehensive portrayals of various governance 
institutions.   
 These two modifications go hand-in-hand.  Proposing solutions for the ways in which 
one form of governance reproduces inequality involves including other forms of 
governance into the mix.  In other words, it involves a broader picture of who and what 
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comprises an economy, expanding beyond the market and the state to forms of collective 
action that exist locally and at the global level.   
 It also requires recognizing that no single form of governance is wholly ideal or 
objectionable.  Markets can, in fact, offset “participatory exclusions” reproduced by 
cooperatives and CPR institutions.  No one form of governance is a panacea; all are part 
of a broader economic system that we can harness to articulate the world we want to 
have.  But any theory of a “new economy” must first recognize that a comprehensive 
economic framework, while including the market, should not be imprisoned by its 
contours.   
  
Cooperative Inequality in Oromia 
How is inequality reproduced in Oromia cooperatives?  There is very little literature on 
how cooperatives perpetuate various inequalities or how inequality might impede or 
foster (via trust or otherwise) cooperative outcomes in Ethiopia.  One piece, written by 
Bernard et al. (2007), identified some key factors determining who joined cooperatives.   
For example, Bernard et al. (2007) found that land ownership is a major predictor of 
cooperative membership; participation increases by five percent with each additional 
hectare.  They also found a ten percent increase in probability that a household will 
participate in a cooperative if the head of household is literate.  Finally, the more remote 
kebeles (peasant associations) are less likely to have a cooperative than those closer to 
markets.   
This article does not address the extent to which these inequalities between who does 
and does not participate in cooperatives translate into disparities of well-being.  Many of 
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the Fair Trade projects developed by Oromia cooperatives benefit those outside of it.  
The roads, the wells, the schools, and the health clinics are not for the exclusive use of 
cooperative members, but are explicitly intended for the use of the broader community.  
According to Lemma (2008),  
Cooperatives generally do not explicitly target the poorest.  However, they 
mix the poorest with the less-poor members.  They care about the 
wellbeing and economic problems of all their members.  Due to their 
cohesive nature, they address the issues of poverty at an individual level 
through various means such as providing opportunities for casual labor, 
waiving contributions and mobilizing resources from members to support 
the very poor (Lemma 2008, 146). 
 





According to the Chairman of the Board of Oxfam USA, Oromia cooperatives have a 
long way to go in empowering the women in their communities (McKinley 2008).  
Indeed, only a small proportion of OCFCU’s members are women (see Table 3), most 






                                                 
73 The gender inequality amidst OCFCU cooperatives are not surprising given Ethiopia’s GEM rating.  The 
UNDP’s GEM combines measures for economic participation and decision-making, political participation, 
and decision-making and power over resources.  According to the UNDP (2006), the country’s GEM 
ranking is extremely low, placing the position of Ethiopia’s women at 170th out of 177 countries.  
 
74 This gender disparity is not restricted to OCFCU, female members of the Yirgacheffe Coffee Farmers 
Cooperative Union (YCFCU) account for only 6.5% of the total membership despite the fact that 20% of 
landholders (and thus, by definition, household heads) in that region are women.  Actually, Kodama (2007) 
interviewed a female coffee producer who “lost her household’s membership because of the death of her 
husband.  She had not asked for entry to the cooperative, and had not been asked to join the cooperative” 
(Kodama 2007, 100). 
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Table 3 The Percentage of Women in OCFCU’s Cooperatives 
Source: OCFCUa (2007) 
 
Why is female membership in cooperatives important?  Along with ethical concerns, 
which are reflected in the principles laid out by the ICA and the Ethiopian government, 
another important reason is the existence of gendered intrahousehold spending patterns.  
The feminist development literature has demonstrated that in many areas of the global 
South, women and men spend money differently, with women spending a larger 
proportion on children’s welfare, including food, health care and education.  “Research 
shows that when women have direct control over income they are more likely than men 
to spend it on the well-being of the family, particularly on improving the nutritional 
status of the more vulnerable members” (SEAGA 2003, 12).  Sam Daley-Harris, director 
of the Microcredit Summit Campaign, described this pattern in an interview on the radio 
show Against the Grain (2007).   
What [the Grameen Bank] realized was that a loan that went [into] the 
family through the woman, the proceeds from the little accrued more to 
the family and the children when it went through the woman than when it 
went through the man.  The man might take the proceeds or benefits and 
spend it on drinking or taking friends to a movie or something and the 
woman would more volitionally focus on improving the health of the 
children or get the kids in school or whatever it was…If your goal was the 
             Farmer members        Year        Member 
Cooperatives Male                  Female                  Total                           % 
   1999-2003 34 21,342 1,161 22,503 .2% 
2004 74 45,237 2,675 47,912 .6% 
2005 101 70,816 3,909 74,795 .2% 
2006 115 98,247 5,315 103,562 .1% 
2007 129 122,461 5,720 128,361 .5% 
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transformation out of poverty than it was more powerful that the loans go 
through the woman (Daley-Harris 2003, 1). 
 
Using Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) data, Quisumbing and Maluccio 
(2003) show that spending on food increases when Ethiopian women control income, 
whereas alcohol and tobacco expenditure shares rose with assets controlled by men.
75
  
Jena (2007) confirmed to me that these gendered spending patterns were generally true 
for Oromia coffee households, too (Jena 2007).    
There are also participatory exclusions within cooperatives to consider.  Very few 
women participate on decision-making boards.  Meskela, the general manager of 
OCFCU, is well aware of these disparities and has appealed to cooperatives to elect 
women to decision-making boards.  But Meskela seems defeated, saying that when 
women are elected, they still do not participate (Meskela 2007).   
Given some interesting threshold effects that Agarwal’s (2006) research shows, this 
lack of women’s active participation is not at all surprising.  She found that the higher 
percentage of women serving on the executive committee of a particular CPR institution, 
the more likely the women members will actively participate (attend and speak up in 
them).  “This supports the idea mooted by some political scientists (although rather little 




                                                 
75 See also Karl 1996, Katz 1995 and Phipps and Burton 1998. 
 
76 Furthermore, Agarwal (2006) demonstrates that ensuring a certain threshold of women’s “effective 
participation” impacts collective action outcomes.  “The larger the percentage of women in the EC the less 
the likelihood of firewood shortages, although again this makes a difference only after reaching a threshold 
of 25% or more women in the EC. A critical mass of women in the EC are able to induce the CFG to open 
up the regenerated forests a few times in the year, so that more firewood can be extracted sustainably” 
(Agarwal 2006, 10). 
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With that in mind, one possibility for ensuring effective participation would be not 
only electing more women to cooperative boards, but to form women’s committees at the 
union and cooperative level.  This would give women in coffee-farming households an 
opportunity to voice their concerns in a comfortable environment.  At the union level, 
these meetings could be attended by activists, for example lawyers from the Ethiopian 
Women’s Lawyers Association, arguably the strongest feminist civic organization in 
Ethiopia, which had a major hand in writing most of the family legislation since the 
EPRDF took power (Paulos 2007).   
Another possibility would be for the women of OCFCU cooperatives to build micro-
enterprise projects.  However, when I spoke with Jena, the deputy manager of OCFCU, 
about potential micro-enterprise projects for women in coffee households—in particular, 
the possibility of women raising bees to sell honey—he gave me a confused look and said 
“Beekeeping is not women’s work.”  
To solve the problem of gender inequality, other forms of governance must be 
involved, including the state, various examples of global governance via NGOs, and 
social movements. 
 
Broadening State Governance 
Bowles and Gintis (2002) argue that all forms of governance—states, markets and those 
at the community level—have their capabilities as well as their failures.  The challenge is 
finding the right institutional arrangement such that they complement rather than 
undermine each other.  Boyce (2002) emphasizes the importance of various forms of 
global governance.  I have already articulated how various forms of global governance 
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play a role in Oromia’s effort to overcome the “Coffee Paradox,” thereby broadening 
Ostrom’s conception of other forms of governance.  But Ostrom’s portrayal of the state’s 
role in collective action, which is to say, hands off, is also too narrow.  State governance 
is crucial to the success of cooperative governance, especially in places where 
cooperatives fail.  The state should provide a policy environment that “complements the 
distinctive governance abilities of communities” (Bowles and Gintis 2002, 15).  For 
example, “a comparison of Taiwanese and South Indian farmer-managed irrigation 
organizations shows that the greater success of the former is due to the effective 
intervention of national governments in providing a favorable legal environment and 
handling cases in which the informal sanctions of the community would not be adequate” 
(Bowles and Gintis 2002, 15).  Thus, the state can help cooperatives to overcome market 
failures. 
My conjecture is that the government’s role (beyond not threatening the basic civil 
freedoms of its citizens and not imposing cooperatives upon farmers) should be both to 
establish a cooperative law that complies with international standards and to create 
institutional support to help cooperatives alleviate market failures (by, for example, 
building roads to more easily access markets, providing extension services, and helping 
transmit market information). 
   
Recommendations 
Based on Ostrom’s framework, and the above comments, the following are 
recommendations that might improve the viability of Oromia cooperatives.  These target   
a range of players involved in the collective action of Oromia cooperatives to overcome 
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the “Coffee Paradox” by gaining power over the supreme quality of their own coffee 
building improved livelihoods for themselves, their families, and their communities.    
 
Oromia Cooperatives 
OCFCU and its cooperatives should seek alternative trade relationships outside of the 
Fair Trade system, particularly amongst “direct trade” buyers.  This is true not only 
because, as I argue from Daviron and Ponte’s (2005) attribute framework, direct trade has 
the potential to offer more of their coffees’ bundle of coffee attributes, but because the 
market expansion that is occurring within the Fair Trade system (mainstreaming) is 
losing the quality of trust-based relationships that Ostrom argues is so important to any 
collective action effort.  Given the nature of the cooperatives’ relationship with the 
Ethiopian state, these relationships are even more important for empowering farmers, 
whose human rights are generally not recognized at home.  As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
more Fair Trade expands, the more these concerns are undermined in favor of market 
expansion, which as Daviron and Ponte (2005) have demonstrated, does not necessarily 
translate to coffee farmers gaining power over their coffees attributes.   
OCFCU should also explore another potential source of symbolic value: a labeling 
system that would indicate to consumers the rich genetic diversity of Ethiopian coffee.  
The celebrated Russian botanist Nikolai Vavilov “hypothesized that the ancient centers of 
crop origin tend to be the modern centers of crop diversity, a suggestion that, by and 
large, has stood the test of time” (Boyce 2004, 5).  This correlation holds true for coffee 
as Ethiopia is coffee’s center of origin and today has the greatest genetic diversity of 
coffee in the world (Wale and Mburu 2006).   
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Unfortunately, the southwestern and southeastern rainforests where Ethiopia’s wild 
coffee grows are threatened by deforestation—for agricultural land, new settlements, and 
timber extraction.  Conserving these forests, and thereby protecting the main in situ 
source of coffee’s genetic diversity, has national and international importance.  It also 
holds significance as part of the broader Eastern Afromontane Biodiversity Hotspot, a 
region globally recognized for its rich plant diversity as well as its vulnerability to habitat 
destruction (Schmitt and Grote 2006).   
One possible solution for stemming the deforestation process—and creating further 
economic value for Ethiopia’s coffee farmers—is by identifying Ethiopia’s genetic coffee 
resources as symbolic attributes of Ethiopia’s coffees through environmental 
certification, akin to the forest certification provided by the Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC).  The FSC is an international umbrella organization established in 1993 by a range 
of actors: timber users, traders, and environmentalists and human-rights groups.  The 
FSC International Center, located in Germany, defines and maintains the agreed upon 
standards and policies of sustainable forestry, and certifies forestry professionals who 
comply with these standards.   
In Africa almost two million hectares of forest in seven countries (Cameroon, 
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Kenya) have been certified 
by FSC.  The majority of these certifications are for private forests, because the FSC 
system is “expensive to implement and difficult to apply to informal community-based 
projects” (Schmitt and Grote 2006, 6).  Nevertheless, FSC is beginning to attempt 
certification for community groups.  Collaborating with FSC on the potential for 
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certifying wild coffee cultivation could be seems a potential way for Oromia to further 
create and define the unique attributes of their coffees.  
OCFCU and its cooperatives should also work to find ways to create in-person 
service attributes, particularly by member farmers, and Oromian women in coffee 
households, visiting consuming countries to talk about their experiences, as well as 
“perform” their elaborate coffee ceremony.   
OCFCU cooperatives should also continue to try to empower women in their 
communities, through microenterprise projects, cooperative committees that focus on 
their economic and political empowerment, and via leadership training. 
 
The Ethiopian Government 
Meles and the Ethiopian government should be lauded for enacting proclamations that 
support cooperatives and setting up institution support for building and sustaining coffee 
farmers.  Clear cooperative laws and institutional support are key elements to creating an 
enabling environment for successful cooperative efforts.  Laws enrich the soil required 
for restructuring and strengthening a wide range of cooperatives, as well as germinating 
new ones, while institutional support is necessary for helping coffee farmers overcome 
market failures that are beyond their collective ability to solve. 
However, they should also be less concerned with setting target goals for 
cooperatives and be more concerned with honoring the basic human rights of its citizens.  
Many of the educated class, who are arguably well-suited to serve in leadership and 
organizing positions, are in prison or amongst the diaspora.  This political “brain drain” is 
severely hindering the cooperative movement in Ethiopia. 
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Fair Trade Players 
Fair Trade players should not lose sight of the crucial role that trust plays in the collective 
action of building alternative trade relationships and the work coffee cooperatives are 
doing to empower themselves.  There is a genuine risk that in expanding the specialty 
markets to build the wealth of coffee farmers, the trust-based relationships on which the 
Fair Trade system was founded, are degraded.  As Ostrom has demonstrated, trust is a 
main ingredient to the success of collective action efforts.  For Oromian and Ethiopian 
coffee farmers, it is the most viable ingredient.  
 
Global Governance Organizations 
The ILO has been fundamental to building Ethiopia’s cooperative movement.  They, and 
other supportive international organizations should continue to identify particularly 
vulnerable cooperatives and target those for leadership training.  (This would relieve 
OCFCU’s leadership somewhat as they now do much of the training and organizing.)   
They should also focus on creating by-law recommendations for cooperatives.  (Their 
current recommendations only target policymakers.)  
These organizations should also focus on leadership trainings for women and gender 
mainstreaming for OCFCU’s leadership.  
 
Economists 
One of the underlying concerns of this dissertation has been the importance of properly 
defining human behavior and the way those assumptions impact the construction of 
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theories and the explanations those theories derive.  In the cooperative literature, Sen 
(1966) demonstrates this by assuming some level of sympathy among cooperative 
members, an assumption that can generate the opposite result than Ward’s “perverse 
supply.”   
  This is true of collective action theories in general.  A well-worn concept across the 
social sciences, collective action is generally understood to be the pursuit of a goal or set 
of goals by two or more people.  In economics, the definition of collective action is very 
narrow.  Bardhan et al. (2007) defines collective action as the “voluntary provision or use 
of collective goods” (Bardhan et al. 2007, 36).  Another way of saying the economic 
version is the following: collective action is the provision and use of public goods by two 
or more people.   
Sociologists define collective action as the following: 
at its most elementary level, [it] consists of any goal-directed activity 
engaged in jointly by two or more individuals.  It entails the pursuit of a 
common objective through joint action—that is, people working together 
in some fashion for a variety of reasons, often including the belief that 
doing so enhances the prospect of achieving the objective (Snow et al. 
2004, 6). 
 
Sociology tends to conflate collective action with social movements, the goal is some 
kind of social change (whether that be the 1960s-era Civil Rights movement working for 
racial justice in America or its backlash by racial hate groups).  According to Goldberg 
(1991), “a social movement is an organized group that acts consciously to promote or 
resist change through collective action” (Kendall 2010, 562).  
Social movements are one of the principal social forms through which 
collectivities give voice to their grievances and concerns about the rights, 
welfare, and well-being of themselves and others by engaging in various 
types of collective action, such as protesting in the streets, that dramatize 
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those grievances and concerns and demand that something be done about 
them (Snow et al. 2004, 3). 
 
The action in movement-level collective action can involve a range of activities, e.g. 
violet or non-violent protests. 
Finally, Ostrom’s definition of collective action lies somewhere in the middle.  She 
defines collective action as any effort by a group to organize themselves to retain the 
residuals of their own efforts.   
What is striking about all three of these definitions of collective action is that all three 
conceptions of collective action come from three different understandings of human 
motivation and behavior, which range from economics’ strict rational choice, Ostrom’s 
somewhat broader rationality, and sociology’s, which seem to be broad enough to allow 
for at least some degree of altruism.
77
  There is obviously a direct linkage between 
theories about human behavior and theories about human institutions.  If we are strictly 
rational, then any attempt at collective action will ultimately fail.  If our motivations and 
abilities are opened up, however, then we have the capacity to do more than weigh costs 
and benefits.  We have the capacity to build institutions that reflect our values and our 
goals.    
If, in the words of Folbre (2010), another economics is really underway, than it is 
imperative that economists, especially heterodox economists, recognize the relationship 
between how we define humans and how we define the economy.  The more credibility 
                                                 
77 At least more than in the first two treatments.  During the civil rights movement in the United States, 
many white activists from above and below the Mason-Dixon line risked their physical well-being, 
sometimes their lives, definitely their freedom, in participation of various marches in the cause for racial 
justice.  Some maybe did it because they were in a bi-racial relationship.  Some possibility went to upset 
their parents.  But it is reasonable to assume that at least one of the reasons white individuals participated 
was altruistic or “sympathy” or “commitment” (Sen 1966)—to further the cause of civil rights for minority 
groups in America. 
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we give people, the more we can understand their behavior as the collective action of 
“building an economy,” which thereby defines the economy as a public good and, in the 
spirit of Elinor Ostrom, allows people to feel ownership over what we share in common.   
 
Question for Future Research 
One key question that arises from this project is the extent to which the coffee industry is 
unique in its vastly uneven power structure.  Is the “Coffee Paradox” generalizable to 
other commodities?  This is an important question because if the power disparities are 
similar, then it is arguable that the solutions for overcoming them are analogous as well.  
Certainly coffee is unique in that it is the second most traded commodity (after 
petroleum) in dollar value and it has the most well-developed certification network of any 
crop.  Nevertheless, the global industries for cocoa, cotton, tea, and sugar have all faced 
global policy shifts similar to those that ultimately destabilized the coffee industry.  The 
extent of the power inequities within each industry might vary, but the push for export-
led growth and simultaneous effacement of regulatory controls and protection have left 
commodity producers unilaterally vulnerable to dramatic market shifts.  The collective 
solutions that Oromia’s farmers and farmers in coffee growing regions all over the world 
have devised to protect themselves may prove to be a viable approach for producers of 
other food commodities.  Mapping Ostrom’s framework onto the collective action efforts 





The Oromia Coffee Farmer Cooperative Union office in Addis Ababa is a site of 
commerce and commotion: an inspiring froth of coffee buyers coming in and out of 
offices, workers rushing down the hallways seeking a signatures on a purchase order, and 
cars pulling out of the driveway carrying journalists and Fair Trade activists visiting 
coffee farmers in Ethiopia’s highlands. 
 How does an economist frame this story in a way that is most consistent with the 
aspirations of the Oromia coffee farmers (along with coffee farmers all over the coffee 
regions of the global South)?  Rather than using the rational-choice/efficiency paradigm 
that would essentially strip them of their cooperative and democratic ideals, their sense of 
community, and their range of development objectives, I have drawn from Elinor 
Ostrom’s theory of the commons—and Daviron and Ponte’s framework of the “Coffee 
Paradox”—to analyze how OCFCU’s coffee farmers can and do seek to build the wealth 
and well-being for themselves, their families, and their communities.  Elinor Ostrom’s 
theoretical framework represents a significant step forward in devising a comprehensive 
theory that captures the essence of collective action while not shrouding its inherent 
complexities.    
  If Nancy Folbre is right and a “new economics” is indeed taking root, then both 
cooperatives like those in the Oromo region of Ethiopia and Elinor Ostrom’s theory of 











• In Belgium, there were 29,933 co-operative societies in 2001 
 
• In Finland, S-Group has a membership of 1,468,572 individuals which represents 
62% of Finnish households. 
 
• In Germany, there are 20 million people who are members of co-operatives, 1 out 
of 4 people. 
 
• In Norway, 1.5 million people of the 4.5 million people are member of co-
operatives. 
 
• In Portugal, approximately 3000 co-operatives are responsible for 5% of the 
Gross National Product of the country. 
 
• Co-operatives and mutuals in Scotland account for 4.25% of the Scottish Gross 
Domestic Product, having an annual turnover of GBP 4 billion and assets of GBP 
25 billion. 
 
• In France, 21,000 co-operatives provide over 4 million jobs. 
 
• In Germany, 8,106 co-operatives provide jobs for 440,000 people. 
 
• In Italy, 70,400 co-operative societies employed nearly 1 million people in 2005. 
 
• In Slovakia, the Co-operative Union represents more 700 co-operatives who 




• In Argentina, co-operatives are responsible for providing direct employment to 
over 233,000 individuals. 
• Argentina, there are 12,670 co-operative societies with over 9.3 million members 
- approximately 23.5% of the population. 2008 
 
• In Bolivia, 2,940,211 people or one -third of the population is a member of the 
1590 co-operatives 2008 
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 International Cooperative Alliance (2010). 
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• In Bolivia, 1590 co-operatives provide 32,323 direct jobs and 128,180 indirect 
jobs. 
 
• In Colombia over 4.4 million people or 10.7% of the population are members of 
the 7,833 co-operatives in the country. The movement reports an annual growth 
rate of 11.27% with 453,180 new members joining co-operatives in 2008. 
 
• Costa Rica counts over 10% of its population as members of co-operatives. 
 
• Colombia, the over 7,300 co-operatives are responsible for 5.61% of the GDP in 
2007 - up from 5.37% in 2006 and 5.25% in 2005. They employ over 110,000 
people and some sectors are providing a significant proportion of the jobs - 24.4% 
of all health sector jobs are provided by co-operatives, 18.3% of the jobs in the 
transport sector,8.3% in agriculture and 7.21% of the jobs in the financial sector. 
Co-ops provide 87.5% of all microcredit in the country; they provide health 
insurance to 30% of all Colombians and are responsible for 35.29% of Colombian 
coffee production. 
 
• In Colombia, the co-operative movement provides 123,643 jobs through direct 




• In the United States, 4 in 10 individuals is a member of a co-operative (25%). 
 
• In Canada, four of every ten Canadians are members of at least one co-operative. 
In Quebec, approximately 70% of the population are co-op members, while in 
Saskatchewan 56% are members. 
 
• In the United States more than 30 co-operatives have annual revenue in excess of 
USD 1 billion. In 2003 the top 100 US co-operatives had combined revenues of 
USD 117 billion. 
 
Asia 
• In Indonesia, 27.5% families representing approximately 80 million individuals 
are members of co-operatives.  Cooperatives provide jobs to 288,589 individuals. 
 
• In India, over 239 million people are members of a co-operative. 
 
• In Japan, 1 out of every 3 families is a member of a co-operatives. 
• In Malaysia, 5.9 million people or 24% of the total population are members of co-
operatives. 
 




• In Vietnam, co-operatives contribute 8.6% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
 




• In Kenya, co-operatives are responsible for 45% of the GDP.  1 in 5 is a member 
of a co-operative, 250,000 people are employed by co-operatives and 20 million 
Kenyans directly or indirectly derive their livelihood from them. 
 
• and 31% of national savings and deposits. They have 70% of the coffee market, 




• In Iran, there are over 130,000 co-operative societies with 23 million members or 
approximately 33% of the population. 
• In Iran, co-operatives have created and maintain 1.5 million jobs. 






























At the 1937 ICA Congress, a special committee presented a revised set of principles.  
 
1. Open membership 
2. Democratic control 
3. Distribution of the surplus to the members in proportion to their transactions
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4. Limited interest on capital 
5. Political and religious neutrality 
6. Cash trading 
7. Promotion of education 
 
They also added two that the Rochdale’s never wrote down, but which the ICA felt were 
inherent to their philosophy and practice.   
 
8. Voluntary membership 
9. Mutuality (trading only with members) 
 
In 1966, the principles were again revised to reflect a shift in the cooperative movement 
to the developing world and defined the principles as “those practices which are essential, 
that is, absolutely indispensable, to the achievement of the Cooperative Movement’s 
purpose” (Birchall 59).  They kept the voluntary principle but abolished the political and 
religious neutrality (as many cooperatives were born out of religious organizations), they 
reintroduced education and added a brand new principle—cooperation among 
cooperatives. 
 
1. Open membership and voluntary membership 
                                                 
79 The dividend on purchases brought up to date. 
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2. Democracy 
3. Limited interest on share capital 
4. Equitable return of surpluses of members 
5. Provision of education 
6. Cooperation  
 151 
 WORKS CITED 
 
Abegaz, Berhanu. "Escaping Ethiopia's Poverty Trap: The Case for a Second Agrarian 
Reform." Journal of Modern African Studies 42.3 (2004): 313-342. Print.  
 
Agarwal, Bina. "Environmental Governance and Gender Justice: From Paradox to 
Potential". Forum on Social Wealth Presentation. 2006. Print.  
 
Aregay, Merid. "The Early History of Ethiopia's Coffee Trade and the Rise of Shawa." 
Journal of African History 29 (1988): 19-25. Print.  
 
Azfar, Omar. "The Logic of Collective Action." The Elgar Companion to Public Choice. 
Eds. William F. Shughart and Laura Razzolini. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2001. 59-82. Print.  
 
Baland, Jean-Marie, Pranab Bardhan, and Samuel Bowles. "Introduction." Inequality, 
Cooperation, and Environmental Sustainability. Eds. Jean-Marie Baland, Pranab 
Bardhan, and Samuel Bowles. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. 1-9. 
Print.  
 
Baland, Jean-Marie, and Jean-Philippe Platteau. "Collective Action on the Commons: 
The Role of Inequality." Inequality, Cooperation, and Environmental Sustainability. 
Eds. Jean-Marie Baland, Pranab Bardhan, and Samuel Bowles. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2007. 10-35. Print.  
 
---. Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is there a Role of Rural Communities?. 
New York: FAO, Oxford University Press, 1996. Print.  
 
Banerjee, Abhijit, et al. "Inequality, Control Rights, and Rent Seeking: Sugar 
Cooperatives in Maharashtra." Journal of Political Economy 109.1 (2001): 138-190. 
Print.  
 
Bardhan, Pranab. "Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic 
Development." The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions. Ed. Pranab Bardhan. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. 3-17. Print.  
 
Bernard, Tanguy, Eleni Gabre-Madhin, and Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse. Smallholders' 
Commercialization through Cooperatives. 00722 Vol. Washington, DC: 
International Food Policy Research Institute, 2007. Print.  
 
Beteille, A., ed. Equality and Inequality: Theory and Practice. Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1983. Print.  
 
Birchall, Johnston. The International Cooperative Movement. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1997. Print.  
 
 152 
Bonin, John P., Derek C. Jones, and Louis Putterman. "Theoretical and Empirical Studies 
of Producer Cooperatives: Will Ever the Twain Meet?" Journal of Economic 
Literature XXXI (1993): 1290-1320. Print.  
 
Bonus, Holger. "The Cooperative Association as a Business Enterprise: A Study in the 
Economics of Transactions." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.142 
(1986): 310-339. Print.  
 
Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis. "Social Capital and Community Governance." The 
Economic Journal 112.483 (2002): F419-F436. Print.  
 
Boyce, James K. "From Natural Resources to Natural Assets." Natural Assets: 
Democratizing Environmental Ownership. Eds. James K. Boyce and Barry G. 
Shelley. Washington, DC: Island Press, 2003. 7-27. Print.  
 
---. A Future for Small Farms? Biodiversity and Sustainable Agriculture. 86 Vol. 
Political Economy Research Institute, 2004. Print.  
 
Boyce, James. "Green and Brown? Globalization and the Environment." Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy 20 (2004): 105-128. Print.  
 
---. The Political Economy of the Environment. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2002. 
Print.  
 
Braverman, Avishay, and J. Luis Gusch. Rural Credit in Developing Countries. 219 Vol. 
The World Bank, 1989. Print.  
 
Bromley, Daniel W. "A most Difficult Passage: The Economic Transition in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union".November 2-4, Humbolt University, 
Berlin. 2000. Print.  
 
Brousseau, Eric, and Jean-Michel Glachant. "A Road Map for the Guidebook." New 
Institutional Economics: A Guidebook. Eds. Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel 
Glachant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Print.  
 
Cardenas, Juan-Camilo. "Wealth Inequality and Overexploitation of the Commons: Field 
Experiments in Colombia." Inequality, Cooperation, and Environmental 
Sustainability. Eds. Jean-Marie Baland, Pranab Bardhan, and Samuel Bowles. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. Print.  
 
Coase, Ronald H. "The Nature of the Firm." Economica 4.16 (1937): 386-405. Print.  
 
---. "The Problem of Social Cost." Journal of Economic Literature and Economics 3 
(1960): 1-44. Print.  
 
 153 
Cole, G. D. H. A Century of Co-Operation. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1944. 
Print.  
 
Conroy, Michael. "Certification Systems as Tools for Natural Asset Building." 
Reclaiming Nature: Environmental Justice and Ecological Restoration. Eds. James 
K. Boyce, Sunita Narain, and Elizabeth A. Stanton. New York: Anthem Press, 2006. 
258-284. Print.  
 
Cook, Michael L. "The Future of U.S. Agricultural Cooperatives: A Neo-Institutional 
Approach." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77.5 (1995): 1153-1159. 
Print.  
 
Courville, Sara. "Organic and Social Certifications: Recent Developments from the 
Global Regulators." Confronting the Coffee Crisis: Fair Trade, Sustainable 
Livelihoods and Ecosystems in Mexico and Central America. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2008. 289-310. Print.  
 
Cycon, Dean. Javatrekker: Dispatches from the World of Fair Trade Coffee. White River 
Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2007. Print.  
 
---. "The Real Impact of Fair Trade." 2006.Web. 
<http://www.deansbeans.com/coffee/deans_zine.html?blogid=191>.  
 
Daley-Harris, Sam. "Is Microcredit the Answer?" 2007.Web. 
<http://www.againstthegrain.org/program-archive>.  
 
Daviron, Benoit, and Stefano Ponte. The Coffee Paradox: Global Markets, Commodity 
Trade, and the Elusive Promise of Development. NY: Zed, 2005. Print.  
 
Deininger, Klaus, et al. Tenure Security and Land-Related Investment: Evidence from 
Ethiopia. 2991 Vol. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003. Print.  
 
DePalma, Anthony. "In the Streets, Fervor, Fears and a Gamut of Issues." The New York 
TimesPrint. 2001.  
 
Dessalegn, Rahmato. Agrarian Reform in Ethiopia. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of 
African Studies, 1984. Print.  
 
---. "Civil Society Organizations in Ethiopia." Ethiopia: The Challenge of Democracy 
from Below. Eds. Bahru Zewde and Siegfried Pausewang. Sweden: Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet and Forum for Social Studies, 2002. Print.  
 
---. "Civil Society Organizations in Ethiopia." Ethiopia in Change: Peasantry, 
Nationalism, and Democracy. Eds. Abebe Zegeye and Siegfriend Pausewang. UK: 
British Academic Press, 1994. Print.  
 
 154 
Digby, Margaret. The World Co-Operative Movement. London: Hutchinson University 
Library, 1948. Print.  
 
Domar, Evsey D. "The Soviet Collective Farm as a Producer Cooperative." The 
American Economic Review 56.4 (1966): 734-757. Print.  
 
Egerstrom, Lee. "Obstacles to Cooperation." Cooperatives and Local Development: 
Theory and Applications for the 21st Century. Eds. Christopher D. Merrett and 
Norman Walzer. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. 70-91. Print.  
 
Emana, Bezabih. Cooperatives: A Path to Economic and Social Empowerment in 
Ethiopia. Ed. ILO. Working Paper ed. Geneva:, 2009. Print.  
 
Engdawork, Desta. "Agricultural Producer Cooperatives: Some Lessons of Experience 
from Ethiopia." GeoJournal 36.4 (1995): 353-360. Print.  
 
Enke, Stephen. "Consumer Cooperatives and Economic Efficiency." The American 
Economic Review 35.1 (1945): 148-155. Print.  
 
Fairbairn, Brett. "History of Cooperatives." Cooperatives and Local Development: 
Theory and Applications for the 21st Century. Eds. Christopher D. Merrett and 
Norman Walzer., 2004. 23-51. Print.  
 
Fairtrade Labelling Organization International. "Producer Standards."Web. 
<http://www.fairtrade.net/standards.html>.  
 
Farrell, Henry. "Trust, Distrust, and Power." Distrust. Ed. Russell Hardin. New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation, 2004. 85-105. Print.  
 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Agricultural Cooperative Societies 
Proclamation., 1994. Print.  
 
---. A Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment of Cooperative Societies., 1998. 
Print.  
 
Fine, Ben. Review Symposium: Beyond the Tragedy of the Commons. 8 Vol. , June 2010. 
Print.  
 
FLO International. "Frequently Asked Questions." 2010.Web. 
<http://www.fairtrade.net/faqs.html?&no_cache=1>.  
 
Folbre, Nancy. "Is Another Economics Possible?" July 19, 2010.Web. 
<http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/is-another-economics-possible/>.  
 
---. "Of Patriarchy Born: The Political Economy of Fertility Decisions." Feminist Studies 
9.2 (1983): 261-284. Print.  
 155 
 
Black Gold: Wake Up and Smell the Coffee. Dir. Francis, Nick, and Marc Francis. Prod. 
Nick Francis, Marc Francis, and Christopher Hird. Perf. Anonymous California 
Newsreel, 2006.  
 
Fulton, Murray. "The Future of Canadian Agricultural Cooperatives: A Property Rights 
Approach." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77.5 (1995): 1144-1152. 
Print.  
 
Gibson, Clark C., Margaret McKean, and Elinor Ostrom. "Explaining Deforestation: The 
Role of Local Institutions." People and Forests: Communities, Institutions, and 
Governance. Eds. Clark C. Gibson, Margaret A. McKean, and Elinor Ostrom. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000. Print.  
 
Goodman, David. "The International Coffee Crisis: A Review of the Issues." Confronting 
the Coffee Crisis: Fair Trade, Sustainable Livelihoods and Ecosystems in Mexico 
and Central America. Eds. Christopher M. Bacon, et al. Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press, 2008. Print.  
 
Goodwin, Neva. "From Outer Circle to Center Stage: The Maturation of Heterdox 
Economics." Future Directions for Heterodox Economics. Eds. John T. Harvey and 
Jr Garnett Robert F. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008. 27-52. Print.  
 
Grapard, Ulla. "Methodology." The Elgar Companion to Feminist Economics. Eds. 
Janice Peterson and Margaret Lewis. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 1999. 545-
555. Print.  
 
Gresser, Chris, and Sophia Tickell. Mugged: Poverty in Your Coffee Cup. Oxfam 
International, 2002. Print.  
 
Grodnik, Ann, and Michael Conroy. "Fair Trade Coffee in the United States: Why 
Companies Join the Movement." Fair Trade: The Challenges of Transforming 
Globalization. Eds. Laura T. Raynolds, Douglas Murray, and John Wilkinson. NY: 
Routledge, 2007. 83-102. Print.  
 
Grundy, Sam. "It's Not just about the Money: An Evaluation of the Impact of Fair Trade 
on Improving the Livelihoods of Smallholder Coffee Farmers in Oromia Region, 
Ethiopia." Master's University of Birmingham, 2005. Print.  
 
Hardin, Garrett. "The Tragedy of the Commons." Science 162.3859 : 1243-1248. Print.  
 
Henry, Hagan. Guidelines for Cooperative Legislation. 2nd ed. Geneva: International 
Labor Organization, 2005. Print.  
 
Hildyard, N., et al. Same Platform, Different Train: The Politics of Participation. 04 Vol. 
Dorset:, 1998. Print.  
 156 
 
Hill, Roderick. "The Case of the Missing Organizations: Co-Operatives and the 
Textbooks." The Journal of Economic Education 31.3 (2000): 281-295. Print.  
 
Hoover, Melissa. "Another Workplace is Possible: Co-Ops and Workplace Democracy." 
Solidarity Economy: Building Alternatives for People and Planet. Eds. Jenna Allard, 
Carl Davidson, and Julie Matthaei. Chicago: ChangeMaker Publications, 2008. Print.  
 




International Coffee Organization. "Trade Statistics." 2010.Web. 
<http://www.ico.org/prices/m1.htm>.  
 
International Cooperative Alliance. "ICA Membership Statistics." 2010.Web. 
<http://www.ica.coop/members/member-stats.html>.  
 
---. "What is a Cooperative?" 2009.Web. <http://www.ica.coop/coop/index.html>.  
 




International Labor Organization. "Taking Root: The Revival of Cooperatives in 
Ethiopia." The World of Work: the Magazine of the ILO December 2005: 8-10. Print.  
 
Ireland, Norman J., and Peter J. Law. "Efficiency, Incentives and Individual Labor 
Supply in the Labor-Managed Firm." Journal of Comparative Economics 5.1 (1981): 
1-24. Print.  
 
Israelsen, Dwight L. "Collectives, Communes, and Incentives." Journal of Comparative 
Economics 4.2 (1980): 99-125. Print.  
 
Jaffe, Roberta, and Christopher M. Bacon. "From Differentiated Coffee Markets Toward 
Alternative Trade and Knowledge Networks." Confronting the Coffee Crisis: Fair 
Trade, Sustainable Livelihoods and Ecosystems in Mexico and Central America. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008. Print.  
 
Janssen, Marco A., and Elinor Ostrom. "Adoption of a New Regulation for the 
Governance of Common-Pool Resources by a Heterogeneous Population." 
Inequality, Cooperation, and Environmental Sustainability. Eds. Jean-Marie Baland, 
Pranab Bardhan, and Samuel Bowles. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2007. Print.  
 
Jena, Dessalegn. Personal Interviews., 2007. Print.  
 157 
 
---. Personal Interviews., 2008. Print.  
 
Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. "Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure." Journal of Financial Economics 
3 (1976): 305-360. Print.  
 
Jodha, N. S. "Common Property Resources and the Rural Poor in Dry Regions of India." 
Economic and Political Weekly 21.27 (1986): 169-181. Print.  
 
Jones, Derek C. "Wealth-Based Trust and the Development of Collective Action." 32.4 
(2004): 691-711. Print.  
 
Jossa, Bruno. "Labor-Managed Enterprises." Encyclopedia of Political Economy. Ed. 
Phillip Anthony O'Hara. 2nd ed. L-Z Vol. NY: Routledge, 2001. 638-640. Print.  
 
Kalmi, Panu. "The Disappearance of Cooperatives from Economics Textbooks." 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 31 (2007): 625-647. Print.  
 
Kamshad, Kimya M. "A Model of the Free-Entry Producer Cooperative." Annals of 
Public and Cooperative Economics 68.2 (1997): 225-245. Print.  
 
Karl, Marilee. Inseparable: The Crucial Role of Women in Food Security. Manila: Isis 
International, 1996. Print.  
 
Katz, Elizabeth K. "Gender and Trade within the Household: Observations from Rural 
Guatemala." World Development 23.2 (1995): 327-342. Print.  
 
Kendall, Diana. "Sociology in our Times." (2010)Print.  
 
Kodama, Yuka. "New Role of Cooperatives in Ethiopia: The Case of Ethiopian Coffee 
Farmers Cooperatives." African Study Monographs 35 (March 2007): 87-108. Print.  
 








Leach, M., R. Mearns, and I. Scoones. "Environmental Entitlements: Dynamics and 
Institutions in Community-Based Natural Resource Management." World 
Development 28.4 (1999): 225-247. Print.  
 
 158 
Lemma, Teigist. "Growth without Structures: The Cooperative Movement in Ethiopia." 
Cooperating Out of Poverty. Geneva: International Labor Organization, World Bank 
Institute, 2008. 128-152. Print.  
 
Levi, Margaret. Review Symposium: Beyond the Tragedy of the Common. 8 Vol. , June 
2010. Print.  
 
Light Years IP. "Ethiopian Fine Coffee: Trademarking and Licensing Initiative." 
2009.Web. <http://www.lightyearsip.net/projects/ethiopiancoffee/>.  
 
Lodhia, Shital Viththaldas. Gender Inequality in Decision Making in Cooperatives: A 
Cross National Study of Asia and Pacific Countries., March 31, 2009. Print.  
 
Luttinger, Nina, and Gregory Dicum. The Coffee Book: Anatomy of an Industry from 
Crop to the Last Drop. 2nd ed. NY: The New Press, 2006. Print.  
 
MacDowell, Megan E. "Waking Up from the Coffee Crisis: Finding the Path Towards 
Conservation, Sustainability, and Justice." Master's University of Maryland, College 
Park, 2005. Print.  
 
Mayne, Ruth, Abera Tola, and Gezahegn Kebede. Crisis in the Birthplace of Coffee. 
Oxfam International, September 2002. Print.  
 
Mayoux, Linda. "Integration is Not enough: Gender Inequality and Empowerment in 
Nicaraguan Agricultural Cooperatives." Development Policy Review 11.1 (1993): 
67-90. Print.  
 
McKinley, Janet. Personal Conversation. Specialty Coffee Association of America:, 
2008. Print.  
 
Mengisteab, Kidane. "The Nature of the State and Agricultural Crisis in Post-1975 
Ethiopia." Studies in Comparative International Development 24.1 (1989): 20-38. 
Print.  
 
Meskela, Tadesse. Personal Interviews., Fall, 2007. Print.  
 
Milkias, Paulos. "The Role of Civil Society in Promoting Democracy and Human Rights 
in Ethiopia". Ethiopian Americans Council Conference. Los Angeles, CA. July 2, 
2006. Print.  
 
Mohamed, Seeraj. "The State of Economics." April 23, 2010 2010.Web. 
<http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/the-state-of-economics-2010-04-23>.  
 




Moore, John. Personal Interview., 2008. Print.  
 
Nega, B., B. Adenew, and S. Gebre Sellasie. Current Land Policy Issues in Ethiopia. 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Food and Agriculture Organization, Ethiopian Economic 
Policy Research Institute, 2003. Print.  
 
North, Douglass C. "Five Propositions about Institutional Change." Explaining Social 
Institutions. Eds. Jack Knight and Itai Sened. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1998. 15-26. Print.  
 
Ofcansky, Thomas P., and Berry LaVerle. Ethiopia: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: 
United States Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1993. Print.  
 
Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 
1st ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965. Print.  
 
Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union. Annual Report., 2005/06. Print.  
---. Powerpoint Presentation., 2007. Print.  
 
Ostrom, Elinor. "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective 
Action." Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in 
Political Theory and Policy Analysis. Ed. Michael D. McGinnis. Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 2000. 472-522. Print.  
 
---. Collective Action and Property Rights for Sustainable Development. 11: 2 Vol. 
International Food Policy Research Institute, February 2004. Print.  
 
---. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990. Print.  
 
Paulos, Mahdere. Personal Interview., 2007. Print.  
 
Pendergrast, Mark. Uncommon Grounds: The History of Coffee and how it Transformed 
our World. NY: Basic Books, 1999. Print.  
 
Percival, Robert V. Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy. 1st ed. Wolters 
Kluwer, 1992. Print.  
 
Petchers, Seth, and Shana Harris. "The Roots of the Coffee Crisis." Confronting the 
Coffee Crisis: Fair Trade, Sustainable Livelihoods, and Ecosystems in Mexico and 
Central America. Eds. Christopher M. Bacon, et al. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2008. Print.  
 
Petit, Nicolas. "Ethiopia's Coffee Sector: A Bitter Or Better Future?" Journal of Agrarian 
Change 7.2 (2007): 225-263. Print.  
 
 160 
Phipps, S. A., and P. S. Burton. "What's Mine is Yours? the Influence of Male and 
Female Incomes on Patterns of Household Expenditures." Economica 65 (1998): 
599-613. Print.  
 
Porter, Philip K., and Gerald W. Scully. "Economic Efficiency in Cooperatives." Journal 
of Law and Economics 30.2 (1987): 489-512. Print.  
 
Poteete, Amy R., and Elinor Ostrom. "Heterogeneity, Group Size and Collective Action: 
The Role of Institutions in Forest Management." Development and Change 35.3 : 
435-461. Print.  
 
Prince, Mark. "So You Say There's a Coffee Crisis." Coffee Geek.Web. 
<http://coffeegeek.com/opinions/markprince/11-27-2002>.  
 
Princen, Thomas. "The Shading and Distancing of Commerce: When Internalization is 
Not enough." Ecological Economics 20 (1997): 235-253. Print.  
 
Pryor, Frederic L. "The Economics of Production Cooperatives: A Readers' Guide." 
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 54 (1983): 133-172. Print.  
 
Quisumbing, Agnes R., and John A. Maluccio. "Resources at Marriage and 
Intrahousehold Allocation: Evidence from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and 
South Africa." Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 65.3 (2003): 283-327. 
Print.  
 
Schmitt, Christine, and Ulrike Grote. Wild Coffee Production in Ethiopia: The Role of 
Coffee Certification for Forest Conservation. Bonn, Germany: Conservation and use 
of wild populations of Coffea arabica in the montane rainforest of Ethiopia, 2006. 
Print.  
 
Sen, Amartya K. "Labor Allocation in a Cooperative Enterprise." The Review of 
Economic Studies 33.4 (1966): 361-371. Print.  
 
---. "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory." 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 6.4 (1977): 317-344. Print.  
 
Sisk, David E. "The Cooperative Model Versus Cooperative Organization." Journal of 
Economic Issues 16.1 (1982): 211-220. Print.  
 
Smith, Robert J. "Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property 
Rights in Wildlife." Cato Journal 1.2 (1981): 439-468. Print.  
 
Snow, David A., Sarah Anne Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. "Mapping the Terrain." The 
Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. Print.  
 
 161 
Socio-Economic and Gender Analysis Programme (SEAGA). Macro Level Handbook: 
Gender Analysis in Macroeconomic and Agricultural Sector Policies and 
Programmes. Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, 2003. Print.  
 
Staatz, John. Farmer Cooperative Theory: Recent Developments. 84 Vol. United States 
Department of Agriculture, 1989. Print.  
 
---. Farmers' Incentives to Take Collective Action Via Cooperatives: A Transaction Cost 
Approach. Ed. Jeffrey Royer. 18 Vol. Washington, DC: USDA, 1987. Print.  
 
Steger, Manfred B. Globalization: A very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003. Print.  
 
Stiglitz, Joseph. Whither Socialism?. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1994. Print.  
 
Stumptown. "Direct Trade." 2010.Web. <http://www.stumptowncoffee.com/>.  
 
Sykuta, Michael E., and Michael L. Cook. "A New Institutional Economics Approach to 
Contracts and Cooperatives." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 83.5 
(2001): 1273-1279. Print.  
 
Taye, Tsion. Personal Interviews., Fall, 2007. Print.  
 
Teka, Tegegne. The State and Rural Cooperatives in Ethiopia. Ed. Hans Hedlund. 21 
Vol. Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1988. Print.  
 
Teshome, Amdissa. Agriculture, Growth and Poverty Reduction in Ethiopia: Policy 
Processes Around the New PRSP (PASDEP). Future Agricultures, March 2006. 
Print.  
 
The Derg. A Proclamation to Provide for the Public Ownership of Rural Lands., 1975. 
Print.  
 
The Economist. "Ethiopia's Elections: Five More Years." May 22, 2010Print.  
 
The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. "Press Release: Economic Governance: the 
Organization of Cooperation." 2009.Web. 
<http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/press.html>.  
 
Thomson, Mike. "Ethiopia Swaps Coffee for Drugs." 2003.Web.  
 








Trott, Adam. "The Story of Collective Copies." Solidarity Economy: Building 
Alternatives for People and Planet. Eds. Jenna Allard and Michael D. McGinnis., 
2008. 224-227. Print.  
 
UNDP. "Human Development Reports." 2010.Web. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>.  
 
Valentinov, Vladislav. "Why are Cooperatives Important in Agriculture? an 
Organizational Economics Perspective." Journal of Institutional Economics 3.1 
(2007): 55-69. Print.  
 
Van Bekkum, Onno-Frank. "Cooperatives: A New Institutional Economic Approach." 
Cooperatives Models and Farm Policy Reform. The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 
2001. 10-38. Print.  
 
Vanek, Jaroslav. "Decentralization Under Workers' Management: A Theoretical 
Appraisal." American Economic Review 5.December (1969): 1006-14. Print.  
 
wa Githinji, Mwangi. Untying the Gordian Knot: The Question of Land Reform in 
Ethiopia. the Netherlands: Institute of Social Studies, UNDP, October 15, 2005. 
Print.  
 
Wade, Robert. Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South 
India. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Print.  
 
Wale, E., and J. Mburu. "An Attribute-Based Index of Coffee Diversity and Implications 
for on-Farm Conservation in Ethiopia." Valuing Crop Biodiversity: On-Farm 
Genetic Resources and Economic Change. Ed. Melinda Smale. Cambridge, MA: 
CABI Publishing, 2006. Print.  
 
Walljasper, Jay. "The Victory of the Commons." 2010.Web. 
<http://www.yesmagazine.org/new-economy/the-victory-of-the-commons>.  
 
Ward, Benjamin. "The Firm in Illyria: Market Syndicalism." The American Economic 
Review 48.4 (1958): 566-589. Print.  
 
Weber, Jeremy. "Fair Trade Coffee Enthusiasts should Confront Reality." Cato Journal 
27.1 (2007)Print.  
Whyte, William Foote, and Kathleen King Whyte. Making Mondragen: The Growth and 
Dynamics of the Worker Cooperative Complex. 2nd ed. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1991. Print.  
 
 163 
Williams, Richard C. The Cooperative Movement: Globalization from Below. VT: 
Ashgate, 2007. Print.  
 
Williamson, Oliver E. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Anti-Trust Implications. 
NY: Free Press, 1975. Print.  
 
Woolf, Leonard S. Co-Operation and the Future of Industry. Ed. 4th. UK: Unwin 
Brotherse, 1928. Print.  
 
World Bank. Ethiopia at a Glance., 2009. Print.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
